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authorWei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>2023-03-13 09:27:51 +0000
committerMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>2023-05-14 06:30:01 +0100
commitdff919090155fb22679869e8469168f270dcd97f (patch)
tree3370be7a5c0ce700ecab8bffc445cd86cf5f8503
parenta6dcefcc08eca1bf4e3d213c97c3cfb75f377935 (diff)
downloadlinux-dff919090155fb22679869e8469168f270dcd97f.tar.gz
media: dvb-usb-v2: ce6230: fix null-ptr-deref in ce6230_i2c_master_xfer()
In ce6230_i2c_master_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be passed. Malicious data finally reach ce6230_i2c_master_xfer. If accessing msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash. Similar commit: commit 0ed554fd769a ("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20230313092751.209496-1-harperchen1110@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c8
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c
index 44540de1a2066..d3b5cb4a24daf 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c
@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ static int ce6230_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
if (num > i + 1 && (msg[i+1].flags & I2C_M_RD)) {
if (msg[i].addr ==
ce6230_zl10353_config.demod_address) {
+ if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+ i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
req.cmd = DEMOD_READ;
req.value = msg[i].addr >> 1;
req.index = msg[i].buf[0];
@@ -117,6 +121,10 @@ static int ce6230_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
} else {
if (msg[i].addr ==
ce6230_zl10353_config.demod_address) {
+ if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+ i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
req.cmd = DEMOD_WRITE;
req.value = msg[i].addr >> 1;
req.index = msg[i].buf[0];