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| author | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2021-03-23 08:32:59 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2021-04-16 23:51:21 +0200 |
| commit | 9601148392520e2e134936e76788fc2a6371e7be (patch) | |
| tree | 4b12106c68f6229ce8292b94ad12e790e4ec756d | |
| parent | afd0be7299533bb2e2b09104399d8a467ecbd2c5 (diff) | |
| download | tpmdd-9601148392520e2e134936e76788fc2a6371e7be.tar.gz | |
bpf: Use correct permission flag for mixed signed bounds arithmetic
We forbid adding unknown scalars with mixed signed bounds due to the
spectre v1 masking mitigation. Hence this also needs bypass_spec_v1
flag instead of allow_ptr_leaks.
Fixes: 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 3a738724a380c..2ede4b8502302 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -6085,7 +6085,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]); return -EACCES; case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: - if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) { + if (!env->env->bypass_spec_v1 && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) { verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n", off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src); return -EACCES; |