diff options
| author | Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> | 2018-01-26 17:07:05 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> | 2018-01-29 16:56:20 -0800 |
| commit | 79812a9620fa200cdb2791d03086f34da980eb32 (patch) | |
| tree | 24ba5f2588e4493b08927a371556cc8f83b4a555 | |
| parent | f87b1c4f59bd1a4848af774fa5d1a5a021cafeff (diff) | |
| download | linux-nospec-v6.tar.gz | |
x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1nospec-v6
Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall'
protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling
will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for
now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 390b3dc3d43827..06f1d4c5ec6bec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, |