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authorMichael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>2006-10-04 02:16:22 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org>2006-10-04 07:55:24 -0700
commit237fead619984cc48818fe12ee0ceada3f55b012 (patch)
tree40c6cacf2331191139e847988882b168d111c12e /fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
parentf7aa2638f288f4c67acdb55947472740bd27d27a (diff)
downloadlinux-237fead619984cc48818fe12ee0ceada3f55b012.tar.gz
[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig
eCryptfs is a stacked cryptographic filesystem for Linux. It is derived from Erez Zadok's Cryptfs, implemented through the FiST framework for generating stacked filesystems. eCryptfs extends Cryptfs to provide advanced key management and policy features. eCryptfs stores cryptographic metadata in the header of each file written, so that encrypted files can be copied between hosts; the file will be decryptable with the proper key, and there is no need to keep track of any additional information aside from what is already in the encrypted file itself. [akpm@osdl.org: updates for ongoing API changes] [bunk@stusta.de: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: alpha build fix] [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [tytso@mit.edu: inode-diet updates] [pbadari@us.ibm.com: generic_file_*_read/write() interface updates] [rdunlap@xenotime.net: printk format fixes] [akpm@osdl.org: make slab creation and teardown table-driven] Signed-off-by: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c1659
1 files changed, 1659 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..ed35a9712fa15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1659 @@
+/**
+ * eCryptfs: Linux filesystem encryption layer
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1997-2004 Erez Zadok
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2004 Stony Brook University
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 International Business Machines Corp.
+ * Author(s): Michael A. Halcrow <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
+ * Michael C. Thompson <mcthomps@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the
+ * License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA
+ * 02111-1307, USA.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include "ecryptfs_kernel.h"
+
+static int
+ecryptfs_decrypt_page_offset(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ struct page *dst_page, int dst_offset,
+ struct page *src_page, int src_offset, int size,
+ unsigned char *iv);
+static int
+ecryptfs_encrypt_page_offset(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ struct page *dst_page, int dst_offset,
+ struct page *src_page, int src_offset, int size,
+ unsigned char *iv);
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_to_hex
+ * @dst: Buffer to take hex character representation of contents of
+ * src; must be at least of size (src_size * 2)
+ * @src: Buffer to be converted to a hex string respresentation
+ * @src_size: number of bytes to convert
+ */
+void ecryptfs_to_hex(char *dst, char *src, size_t src_size)
+{
+ int x;
+
+ for (x = 0; x < src_size; x++)
+ sprintf(&dst[x * 2], "%.2x", (unsigned char)src[x]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_from_hex
+ * @dst: Buffer to take the bytes from src hex; must be at least of
+ * size (src_size / 2)
+ * @src: Buffer to be converted from a hex string respresentation to raw value
+ * @dst_size: size of dst buffer, or number of hex characters pairs to convert
+ */
+void ecryptfs_from_hex(char *dst, char *src, int dst_size)
+{
+ int x;
+ char tmp[3] = { 0, };
+
+ for (x = 0; x < dst_size; x++) {
+ tmp[0] = src[x * 2];
+ tmp[1] = src[x * 2 + 1];
+ dst[x] = (unsigned char)simple_strtol(tmp, NULL, 16);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_calculate_md5 - calculates the md5 of @src
+ * @dst: Pointer to 16 bytes of allocated memory
+ * @crypt_stat: Pointer to crypt_stat struct for the current inode
+ * @src: Data to be md5'd
+ * @len: Length of @src
+ *
+ * Uses the allocated crypto context that crypt_stat references to
+ * generate the MD5 sum of the contents of src.
+ */
+static int ecryptfs_calculate_md5(char *dst,
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ char *src, int len)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+
+ mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_md5_tfm_mutex);
+ sg_init_one(&sg, (u8 *)src, len);
+ if (!crypt_stat->md5_tfm) {
+ crypt_stat->md5_tfm =
+ crypto_alloc_tfm("md5", CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (!crypt_stat->md5_tfm) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error attempting to "
+ "allocate crypto context\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ crypto_digest_init(crypt_stat->md5_tfm);
+ crypto_digest_update(crypt_stat->md5_tfm, &sg, 1);
+ crypto_digest_final(crypt_stat->md5_tfm, dst);
+ mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_md5_tfm_mutex);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_derive_iv
+ * @iv: destination for the derived iv vale
+ * @crypt_stat: Pointer to crypt_stat struct for the current inode
+ * @offset: Offset of the page whose's iv we are to derive
+ *
+ * Generate the initialization vector from the given root IV and page
+ * offset.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error.
+ */
+static int ecryptfs_derive_iv(char *iv, struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ pgoff_t offset)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ char dst[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ char src[ECRYPTFS_MAX_IV_BYTES + 16];
+
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "root iv:\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stat->root_iv, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
+ }
+ /* TODO: It is probably secure to just cast the least
+ * significant bits of the root IV into an unsigned long and
+ * add the offset to that rather than go through all this
+ * hashing business. -Halcrow */
+ memcpy(src, crypt_stat->root_iv, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
+ memset((src + crypt_stat->iv_bytes), 0, 16);
+ snprintf((src + crypt_stat->iv_bytes), 16, "%ld", offset);
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "source:\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(src, (crypt_stat->iv_bytes + 16));
+ }
+ rc = ecryptfs_calculate_md5(dst, crypt_stat, src,
+ (crypt_stat->iv_bytes + 16));
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error attempting to compute "
+ "MD5 while generating IV for a page\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(iv, dst, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "derived iv:\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(iv, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_init_crypt_stat
+ * @crypt_stat: Pointer to the crypt_stat struct to initialize.
+ *
+ * Initialize the crypt_stat structure.
+ */
+void
+ecryptfs_init_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
+{
+ memset((void *)crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat));
+ mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
+ mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
+ mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_md5_tfm_mutex);
+ ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_STRUCT_INITIALIZED);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_destruct_crypt_stat
+ * @crypt_stat: Pointer to the crypt_stat struct to initialize.
+ *
+ * Releases all memory associated with a crypt_stat struct.
+ */
+void ecryptfs_destruct_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
+{
+ if (crypt_stat->tfm)
+ crypto_free_tfm(crypt_stat->tfm);
+ if (crypt_stat->md5_tfm)
+ crypto_free_tfm(crypt_stat->md5_tfm);
+ memset(crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat));
+}
+
+void ecryptfs_destruct_mount_crypt_stat(
+ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat)
+{
+ if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key)
+ key_put(mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key);
+ if (mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm)
+ crypto_free_tfm(mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm);
+ memset(mount_crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat));
+}
+
+/**
+ * virt_to_scatterlist
+ * @addr: Virtual address
+ * @size: Size of data; should be an even multiple of the block size
+ * @sg: Pointer to scatterlist array; set to NULL to obtain only
+ * the number of scatterlist structs required in array
+ * @sg_size: Max array size
+ *
+ * Fills in a scatterlist array with page references for a passed
+ * virtual address.
+ *
+ * Returns the number of scatterlist structs in array used
+ */
+int virt_to_scatterlist(const void *addr, int size, struct scatterlist *sg,
+ int sg_size)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ struct page *pg;
+ int offset;
+ int remainder_of_page;
+
+ while (size > 0 && i < sg_size) {
+ pg = virt_to_page(addr);
+ offset = offset_in_page(addr);
+ if (sg) {
+ sg[i].page = pg;
+ sg[i].offset = offset;
+ }
+ remainder_of_page = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset;
+ if (size >= remainder_of_page) {
+ if (sg)
+ sg[i].length = remainder_of_page;
+ addr += remainder_of_page;
+ size -= remainder_of_page;
+ } else {
+ if (sg)
+ sg[i].length = size;
+ addr += size;
+ size = 0;
+ }
+ i++;
+ }
+ if (size > 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return i;
+}
+
+/**
+ * encrypt_scatterlist
+ * @crypt_stat: Pointer to the crypt_stat struct to initialize.
+ * @dest_sg: Destination of encrypted data
+ * @src_sg: Data to be encrypted
+ * @size: Length of data to be encrypted
+ * @iv: iv to use during encryption
+ *
+ * Returns the number of bytes encrypted; negative value on error
+ */
+static int encrypt_scatterlist(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ struct scatterlist *dest_sg,
+ struct scatterlist *src_sg, int size,
+ unsigned char *iv)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ BUG_ON(!crypt_stat || !crypt_stat->tfm
+ || !ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
+ ECRYPTFS_STRUCT_INITIALIZED));
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Key size [%d]; key:\n",
+ crypt_stat->key_size);
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stat->key,
+ crypt_stat->key_size);
+ }
+ /* Consider doing this once, when the file is opened */
+ mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
+ rc = crypto_cipher_setkey(crypt_stat->tfm, crypt_stat->key,
+ crypt_stat->key_size);
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error setting key; rc = [%d]\n",
+ rc);
+ mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypting [%d] bytes.\n", size);
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_iv(crypt_stat->tfm, dest_sg, src_sg, size, iv);
+ mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void
+ecryptfs_extent_to_lwr_pg_idx_and_offset(unsigned long *lower_page_idx,
+ int *byte_offset,
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ unsigned long extent_num)
+{
+ unsigned long lower_extent_num;
+ int extents_occupied_by_headers_at_front;
+ int bytes_occupied_by_headers_at_front;
+ int extent_offset;
+ int extents_per_page;
+
+ bytes_occupied_by_headers_at_front =
+ ( crypt_stat->header_extent_size
+ * crypt_stat->num_header_extents_at_front );
+ extents_occupied_by_headers_at_front =
+ ( bytes_occupied_by_headers_at_front
+ / crypt_stat->extent_size );
+ lower_extent_num = extents_occupied_by_headers_at_front + extent_num;
+ extents_per_page = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE / crypt_stat->extent_size;
+ (*lower_page_idx) = lower_extent_num / extents_per_page;
+ extent_offset = lower_extent_num % extents_per_page;
+ (*byte_offset) = extent_offset * crypt_stat->extent_size;
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * crypt_stat->header_extent_size = "
+ "[%d]\n", crypt_stat->header_extent_size);
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * crypt_stat->"
+ "num_header_extents_at_front = [%d]\n",
+ crypt_stat->num_header_extents_at_front);
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * extents_occupied_by_headers_at_"
+ "front = [%d]\n", extents_occupied_by_headers_at_front);
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * lower_extent_num = [0x%.16x]\n",
+ lower_extent_num);
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * extents_per_page = [%d]\n",
+ extents_per_page);
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * (*lower_page_idx) = [0x%.16x]\n",
+ (*lower_page_idx));
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * extent_offset = [%d]\n",
+ extent_offset);
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * (*byte_offset) = [%d]\n",
+ (*byte_offset));
+}
+
+static int ecryptfs_write_out_page(struct ecryptfs_page_crypt_context *ctx,
+ struct page *lower_page,
+ struct inode *lower_inode,
+ int byte_offset_in_page, int bytes_to_write)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->mode == ECRYPTFS_PREPARE_COMMIT_MODE) {
+ rc = ecryptfs_commit_lower_page(lower_page, lower_inode,
+ ctx->param.lower_file,
+ byte_offset_in_page,
+ bytes_to_write);
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error calling lower "
+ "commit; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc = ecryptfs_writepage_and_release_lower_page(lower_page,
+ lower_inode,
+ ctx->param.wbc);
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error calling lower "
+ "writepage(); rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int ecryptfs_read_in_page(struct ecryptfs_page_crypt_context *ctx,
+ struct page **lower_page,
+ struct inode *lower_inode,
+ unsigned long lower_page_idx,
+ int byte_offset_in_page)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->mode == ECRYPTFS_PREPARE_COMMIT_MODE) {
+ /* TODO: Limit this to only the data extents that are
+ * needed */
+ rc = ecryptfs_get_lower_page(lower_page, lower_inode,
+ ctx->param.lower_file,
+ lower_page_idx,
+ byte_offset_in_page,
+ (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE
+ - byte_offset_in_page));
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(
+ KERN_ERR, "Error attempting to grab, map, "
+ "and prepare_write lower page with index "
+ "[0x%.16x]; rc = [%d]\n", lower_page_idx, rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc = ecryptfs_grab_and_map_lower_page(lower_page, NULL,
+ lower_inode,
+ lower_page_idx);
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(
+ KERN_ERR, "Error attempting to grab and map "
+ "lower page with index [0x%.16x]; rc = [%d]\n",
+ lower_page_idx, rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_encrypt_page
+ * @ctx: The context of the page
+ *
+ * Encrypt an eCryptfs page. This is done on a per-extent basis. Note
+ * that eCryptfs pages may straddle the lower pages -- for instance,
+ * if the file was created on a machine with an 8K page size
+ * (resulting in an 8K header), and then the file is copied onto a
+ * host with a 32K page size, then when reading page 0 of the eCryptfs
+ * file, 24K of page 0 of the lower file will be read and decrypted,
+ * and then 8K of page 1 of the lower file will be read and decrypted.
+ *
+ * The actual operations performed on each page depends on the
+ * contents of the ecryptfs_page_crypt_context struct.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success; negative on error
+ */
+int ecryptfs_encrypt_page(struct ecryptfs_page_crypt_context *ctx)
+{
+ char extent_iv[ECRYPTFS_MAX_IV_BYTES];
+ unsigned long base_extent;
+ unsigned long extent_offset = 0;
+ unsigned long lower_page_idx = 0;
+ unsigned long prior_lower_page_idx = 0;
+ struct page *lower_page;
+ struct inode *lower_inode;
+ struct ecryptfs_inode_info *inode_info;
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int lower_byte_offset = 0;
+ int orig_byte_offset = 0;
+ int num_extents_per_page;
+#define ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_UNREAD 0
+#define ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_READ 1
+#define ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_MODIFIED 2
+#define ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_WRITTEN 3
+ int page_state;
+
+ lower_inode = ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(ctx->page->mapping->host);
+ inode_info = ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ctx->page->mapping->host);
+ crypt_stat = &inode_info->crypt_stat;
+ if (!ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED)) {
+ rc = ecryptfs_copy_page_to_lower(ctx->page, lower_inode,
+ ctx->param.lower_file);
+ if (rc)
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error attempting to copy "
+ "page at index [0x%.16x]\n",
+ ctx->page->index);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ num_extents_per_page = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE / crypt_stat->extent_size;
+ base_extent = (ctx->page->index * num_extents_per_page);
+ page_state = ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_UNREAD;
+ while (extent_offset < num_extents_per_page) {
+ ecryptfs_extent_to_lwr_pg_idx_and_offset(
+ &lower_page_idx, &lower_byte_offset, crypt_stat,
+ (base_extent + extent_offset));
+ if (prior_lower_page_idx != lower_page_idx
+ && page_state == ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_MODIFIED) {
+ rc = ecryptfs_write_out_page(ctx, lower_page,
+ lower_inode,
+ orig_byte_offset,
+ (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE
+ - orig_byte_offset));
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error attempting "
+ "to write out page; rc = [%d]"
+ "\n", rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ page_state = ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_WRITTEN;
+ }
+ if (page_state == ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_UNREAD
+ || page_state == ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_WRITTEN) {
+ rc = ecryptfs_read_in_page(ctx, &lower_page,
+ lower_inode, lower_page_idx,
+ lower_byte_offset);
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error attempting "
+ "to read in lower page with "
+ "index [0x%.16x]; rc = [%d]\n",
+ lower_page_idx, rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ orig_byte_offset = lower_byte_offset;
+ prior_lower_page_idx = lower_page_idx;
+ page_state = ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_READ;
+ }
+ BUG_ON(!(page_state == ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_MODIFIED
+ || page_state == ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_READ));
+ rc = ecryptfs_derive_iv(extent_iv, crypt_stat,
+ (base_extent + extent_offset));
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error attempting to "
+ "derive IV for extent [0x%.16x]; "
+ "rc = [%d]\n",
+ (base_extent + extent_offset), rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypting extent "
+ "with iv:\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(extent_iv, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "First 8 bytes before "
+ "encryption:\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex((char *)
+ (page_address(ctx->page)
+ + (extent_offset
+ * crypt_stat->extent_size)), 8);
+ }
+ rc = ecryptfs_encrypt_page_offset(
+ crypt_stat, lower_page, lower_byte_offset, ctx->page,
+ (extent_offset * crypt_stat->extent_size),
+ crypt_stat->extent_size, extent_iv);
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypt extent [0x%.16x]; "
+ "rc = [%d]\n",
+ (base_extent + extent_offset), rc);
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "First 8 bytes after "
+ "encryption:\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex((char *)(page_address(lower_page)
+ + lower_byte_offset), 8);
+ }
+ page_state = ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_MODIFIED;
+ extent_offset++;
+ }
+ BUG_ON(orig_byte_offset != 0);
+ rc = ecryptfs_write_out_page(ctx, lower_page, lower_inode, 0,
+ (lower_byte_offset
+ + crypt_stat->extent_size));
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error attempting to write out "
+ "page; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_decrypt_page
+ * @file: The ecryptfs file
+ * @page: The page in ecryptfs to decrypt
+ *
+ * Decrypt an eCryptfs page. This is done on a per-extent basis. Note
+ * that eCryptfs pages may straddle the lower pages -- for instance,
+ * if the file was created on a machine with an 8K page size
+ * (resulting in an 8K header), and then the file is copied onto a
+ * host with a 32K page size, then when reading page 0 of the eCryptfs
+ * file, 24K of page 0 of the lower file will be read and decrypted,
+ * and then 8K of page 1 of the lower file will be read and decrypted.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success; negative on error
+ */
+int ecryptfs_decrypt_page(struct file *file, struct page *page)
+{
+ char extent_iv[ECRYPTFS_MAX_IV_BYTES];
+ unsigned long base_extent;
+ unsigned long extent_offset = 0;
+ unsigned long lower_page_idx = 0;
+ unsigned long prior_lower_page_idx = 0;
+ struct page *lower_page;
+ char *lower_page_virt = NULL;
+ struct inode *lower_inode;
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int byte_offset;
+ int num_extents_per_page;
+ int page_state;
+
+ crypt_stat = &(ecryptfs_inode_to_private(
+ page->mapping->host)->crypt_stat);
+ lower_inode = ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(page->mapping->host);
+ if (!ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED)) {
+ rc = ecryptfs_do_readpage(file, page, page->index);
+ if (rc)
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error attempting to copy "
+ "page at index [0x%.16x]\n",
+ page->index);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ num_extents_per_page = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE / crypt_stat->extent_size;
+ base_extent = (page->index * num_extents_per_page);
+ lower_page_virt = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_lower_page_cache,
+ SLAB_KERNEL);
+ if (!lower_page_virt) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error getting page for encrypted "
+ "lower page(s)\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ lower_page = virt_to_page(lower_page_virt);
+ page_state = ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_UNREAD;
+ while (extent_offset < num_extents_per_page) {
+ ecryptfs_extent_to_lwr_pg_idx_and_offset(
+ &lower_page_idx, &byte_offset, crypt_stat,
+ (base_extent + extent_offset));
+ if (prior_lower_page_idx != lower_page_idx
+ || page_state == ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_UNREAD) {
+ rc = ecryptfs_do_readpage(file, lower_page,
+ lower_page_idx);
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error reading "
+ "lower encrypted page; rc = "
+ "[%d]\n", rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ prior_lower_page_idx = lower_page_idx;
+ page_state = ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_READ;
+ }
+ rc = ecryptfs_derive_iv(extent_iv, crypt_stat,
+ (base_extent + extent_offset));
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error attempting to "
+ "derive IV for extent [0x%.16x]; rc = "
+ "[%d]\n",
+ (base_extent + extent_offset), rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Decrypting extent "
+ "with iv:\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(extent_iv, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "First 8 bytes before "
+ "decryption:\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex((lower_page_virt + byte_offset), 8);
+ }
+ rc = ecryptfs_decrypt_page_offset(crypt_stat, page,
+ (extent_offset
+ * crypt_stat->extent_size),
+ lower_page, byte_offset,
+ crypt_stat->extent_size,
+ extent_iv);
+ if (rc != crypt_stat->extent_size) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error attempting to "
+ "decrypt extent [0x%.16x]\n",
+ (base_extent + extent_offset));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "First 8 bytes after "
+ "decryption:\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex((char *)(page_address(page)
+ + byte_offset), 8);
+ }
+ extent_offset++;
+ }
+out:
+ if (lower_page_virt)
+ kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_lower_page_cache, lower_page_virt);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * decrypt_scatterlist
+ *
+ * Returns the number of bytes decrypted; negative value on error
+ */
+static int decrypt_scatterlist(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ struct scatterlist *dest_sg,
+ struct scatterlist *src_sg, int size,
+ unsigned char *iv)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* Consider doing this once, when the file is opened */
+ mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
+ rc = crypto_cipher_setkey(crypt_stat->tfm, crypt_stat->key,
+ crypt_stat->key_size);
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error setting key; rc = [%d]\n",
+ rc);
+ mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Decrypting [%d] bytes.\n", size);
+ rc = crypto_cipher_decrypt_iv(crypt_stat->tfm, dest_sg, src_sg, size,
+ iv);
+ mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error decrypting; rc = [%d]\n",
+ rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = size;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_encrypt_page_offset
+ *
+ * Returns the number of bytes encrypted
+ */
+static int
+ecryptfs_encrypt_page_offset(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ struct page *dst_page, int dst_offset,
+ struct page *src_page, int src_offset, int size,
+ unsigned char *iv)
+{
+ struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
+
+ src_sg.page = src_page;
+ src_sg.offset = src_offset;
+ src_sg.length = size;
+ dst_sg.page = dst_page;
+ dst_sg.offset = dst_offset;
+ dst_sg.length = size;
+ return encrypt_scatterlist(crypt_stat, &dst_sg, &src_sg, size, iv);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_decrypt_page_offset
+ *
+ * Returns the number of bytes decrypted
+ */
+static int
+ecryptfs_decrypt_page_offset(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ struct page *dst_page, int dst_offset,
+ struct page *src_page, int src_offset, int size,
+ unsigned char *iv)
+{
+ struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
+
+ src_sg.page = src_page;
+ src_sg.offset = src_offset;
+ src_sg.length = size;
+ dst_sg.page = dst_page;
+ dst_sg.offset = dst_offset;
+ dst_sg.length = size;
+ return decrypt_scatterlist(crypt_stat, &dst_sg, &src_sg, size, iv);
+}
+
+#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_SCATTERLIST_LEN 4
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_init_crypt_ctx
+ * @crypt_stat: Uninitilized crypt stats structure
+ *
+ * Initialize the crypto context.
+ *
+ * TODO: Performance: Keep a cache of initialized cipher contexts;
+ * only init if needed
+ */
+int ecryptfs_init_crypt_ctx(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
+{
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!crypt_stat->cipher) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "No cipher specified\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG,
+ "Initializing cipher [%s]; strlen = [%d]; "
+ "key_size_bits = [%d]\n",
+ crypt_stat->cipher, (int)strlen(crypt_stat->cipher),
+ crypt_stat->key_size << 3);
+ if (crypt_stat->tfm) {
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
+ crypt_stat->tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(crypt_stat->cipher,
+ ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CHAINING_MODE
+ | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
+ mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
+ if (!crypt_stat->tfm) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "cryptfs: init_crypt_ctx(): "
+ "Error initializing cipher [%s]\n",
+ crypt_stat->cipher);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void set_extent_mask_and_shift(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
+{
+ int extent_size_tmp;
+
+ crypt_stat->extent_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF;
+ crypt_stat->extent_shift = 0;
+ if (crypt_stat->extent_size == 0)
+ return;
+ extent_size_tmp = crypt_stat->extent_size;
+ while ((extent_size_tmp & 0x01) == 0) {
+ extent_size_tmp >>= 1;
+ crypt_stat->extent_mask <<= 1;
+ crypt_stat->extent_shift++;
+ }
+}
+
+void ecryptfs_set_default_sizes(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
+{
+ /* Default values; may be overwritten as we are parsing the
+ * packets. */
+ crypt_stat->extent_size = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_EXTENT_SIZE;
+ set_extent_mask_and_shift(crypt_stat);
+ crypt_stat->iv_bytes = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_IV_BYTES;
+ if (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE <= ECRYPTFS_MINIMUM_HEADER_EXTENT_SIZE) {
+ crypt_stat->header_extent_size =
+ ECRYPTFS_MINIMUM_HEADER_EXTENT_SIZE;
+ } else
+ crypt_stat->header_extent_size = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
+ crypt_stat->num_header_extents_at_front = 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_compute_root_iv
+ * @crypt_stats
+ *
+ * On error, sets the root IV to all 0's.
+ */
+int ecryptfs_compute_root_iv(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ char dst[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+ BUG_ON(crypt_stat->iv_bytes > MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ BUG_ON(crypt_stat->iv_bytes <= 0);
+ if (!ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Session key not valid; "
+ "cannot generate root IV\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = ecryptfs_calculate_md5(dst, crypt_stat, crypt_stat->key,
+ crypt_stat->key_size);
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error attempting to compute "
+ "MD5 while generating root IV\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(crypt_stat->root_iv, dst, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
+out:
+ if (rc) {
+ memset(crypt_stat->root_iv, 0, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
+ ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
+ ECRYPTFS_SECURITY_WARNING);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void ecryptfs_generate_new_key(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
+{
+ get_random_bytes(crypt_stat->key, crypt_stat->key_size);
+ ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID);
+ ecryptfs_compute_root_iv(crypt_stat);
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Generated new session key:\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stat->key,
+ crypt_stat->key_size);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals
+ * @crypt_stat
+ *
+ * Default values in the event that policy does not override them.
+ */
+static void ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals(
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat)
+{
+ ecryptfs_set_default_sizes(crypt_stat);
+ strcpy(crypt_stat->cipher, ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CIPHER);
+ crypt_stat->key_size = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_KEY_BYTES;
+ ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID);
+ crypt_stat->file_version = ECRYPTFS_FILE_VERSION;
+ crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat = mount_crypt_stat;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_new_file_context
+ * @ecryptfs_dentry
+ *
+ * If the crypto context for the file has not yet been established,
+ * this is where we do that. Establishing a new crypto context
+ * involves the following decisions:
+ * - What cipher to use?
+ * - What set of authentication tokens to use?
+ * Here we just worry about getting enough information into the
+ * authentication tokens so that we know that they are available.
+ * We associate the available authentication tokens with the new file
+ * via the set of signatures in the crypt_stat struct. Later, when
+ * the headers are actually written out, we may again defer to
+ * userspace to perform the encryption of the session key; for the
+ * foreseeable future, this will be the case with public key packets.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise
+ */
+/* Associate an authentication token(s) with the file */
+int ecryptfs_new_file_context(struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat =
+ &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_dentry->d_inode)->crypt_stat;
+ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
+ &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
+ ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
+ int cipher_name_len;
+
+ ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals(crypt_stat, mount_crypt_stat);
+ /* See if there are mount crypt options */
+ if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Initializing context for new "
+ "file using mount_crypt_stat\n");
+ ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
+ ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID);
+ memcpy(crypt_stat->keysigs[crypt_stat->num_keysigs++],
+ mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig,
+ ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
+ cipher_name_len =
+ strlen(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name);
+ memcpy(crypt_stat->cipher,
+ mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
+ cipher_name_len);
+ crypt_stat->cipher[cipher_name_len] = '\0';
+ crypt_stat->key_size =
+ mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size;
+ ecryptfs_generate_new_key(crypt_stat);
+ } else
+ /* We should not encounter this scenario since we
+ * should detect lack of global_auth_tok at mount time
+ * TODO: Applies to 0.1 release only; remove in future
+ * release */
+ BUG();
+ rc = ecryptfs_init_crypt_ctx(crypt_stat);
+ if (rc)
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error initializing cryptographic "
+ "context for cipher [%s]: rc = [%d]\n",
+ crypt_stat->cipher, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * contains_ecryptfs_marker - check for the ecryptfs marker
+ * @data: The data block in which to check
+ *
+ * Returns one if marker found; zero if not found
+ */
+int contains_ecryptfs_marker(char *data)
+{
+ u32 m_1, m_2;
+
+ memcpy(&m_1, data, 4);
+ m_1 = be32_to_cpu(m_1);
+ memcpy(&m_2, (data + 4), 4);
+ m_2 = be32_to_cpu(m_2);
+ if ((m_1 ^ MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER) == m_2)
+ return 1;
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "m_1 = [0x%.8x]; m_2 = [0x%.8x]; "
+ "MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER = [0x%.8x]\n", m_1, m_2,
+ MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER);
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "(m_1 ^ MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER) = "
+ "[0x%.8x]\n", (m_1 ^ MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct ecryptfs_flag_map_elem {
+ u32 file_flag;
+ u32 local_flag;
+};
+
+/* Add support for additional flags by adding elements here. */
+static struct ecryptfs_flag_map_elem ecryptfs_flag_map[] = {
+ {0x00000001, ECRYPTFS_ENABLE_HMAC},
+ {0x00000002, ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED}
+};
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_process_flags
+ * @crypt_stat
+ * @page_virt: Source data to be parsed
+ * @bytes_read: Updated with the number of bytes read
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success; non-zero if the flag set is invalid
+ */
+static int ecryptfs_process_flags(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ char *page_virt, int *bytes_read)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ int i;
+ u32 flags;
+
+ memcpy(&flags, page_virt, 4);
+ flags = be32_to_cpu(flags);
+ for (i = 0; i < ((sizeof(ecryptfs_flag_map)
+ / sizeof(struct ecryptfs_flag_map_elem))); i++)
+ if (flags & ecryptfs_flag_map[i].file_flag) {
+ ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
+ ecryptfs_flag_map[i].local_flag);
+ } else
+ ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
+ ecryptfs_flag_map[i].local_flag);
+ /* Version is in top 8 bits of the 32-bit flag vector */
+ crypt_stat->file_version = ((flags >> 24) & 0xFF);
+ (*bytes_read) = 4;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_ecryptfs_marker
+ * @page_virt: The pointer to in a page to begin writing the marker
+ * @written: Number of bytes written
+ *
+ * Marker = 0x3c81b7f5
+ */
+static void write_ecryptfs_marker(char *page_virt, size_t *written)
+{
+ u32 m_1, m_2;
+
+ get_random_bytes(&m_1, (MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER_SIZE_BYTES / 2));
+ m_2 = (m_1 ^ MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER);
+ m_1 = cpu_to_be32(m_1);
+ memcpy(page_virt, &m_1, (MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER_SIZE_BYTES / 2));
+ m_2 = cpu_to_be32(m_2);
+ memcpy(page_virt + (MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER_SIZE_BYTES / 2), &m_2,
+ (MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER_SIZE_BYTES / 2));
+ (*written) = MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER_SIZE_BYTES;
+}
+
+static void
+write_ecryptfs_flags(char *page_virt, struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ size_t *written)
+{
+ u32 flags = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ((sizeof(ecryptfs_flag_map)
+ / sizeof(struct ecryptfs_flag_map_elem))); i++)
+ if (ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
+ ecryptfs_flag_map[i].local_flag))
+ flags |= ecryptfs_flag_map[i].file_flag;
+ /* Version is in top 8 bits of the 32-bit flag vector */
+ flags |= ((((u8)crypt_stat->file_version) << 24) & 0xFF000000);
+ flags = cpu_to_be32(flags);
+ memcpy(page_virt, &flags, 4);
+ (*written) = 4;
+}
+
+struct ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map_elem {
+ char cipher_str[16];
+ u16 cipher_code;
+};
+
+/* Add support for additional ciphers by adding elements here. The
+ * cipher_code is whatever OpenPGP applicatoins use to identify the
+ * ciphers. List in order of probability. */
+static struct ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map_elem
+ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map[] = {
+ {"aes",RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_128 },
+ {"blowfish", RFC2440_CIPHER_BLOWFISH},
+ {"des3_ede", RFC2440_CIPHER_DES3_EDE},
+ {"cast5", RFC2440_CIPHER_CAST_5},
+ {"twofish", RFC2440_CIPHER_TWOFISH},
+ {"cast6", RFC2440_CIPHER_CAST_6},
+ {"aes", RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_192},
+ {"aes", RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_256}
+};
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string
+ * @str: The string representing the cipher name
+ *
+ * Returns zero on no match, or the cipher code on match
+ */
+u16 ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
+{
+ int i;
+ u16 code = 0;
+ struct ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map_elem *map =
+ ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map;
+
+ if (strcmp(crypt_stat->cipher, "aes") == 0) {
+ switch (crypt_stat->key_size) {
+ case 16:
+ code = RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_128;
+ break;
+ case 24:
+ code = RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_192;
+ break;
+ case 32:
+ code = RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_256;
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map); i++)
+ if (strcmp(crypt_stat->cipher, map[i].cipher_str) == 0){
+ code = map[i].cipher_code;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return code;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_cipher_code_to_string
+ * @str: Destination to write out the cipher name
+ * @cipher_code: The code to convert to cipher name string
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success
+ */
+int ecryptfs_cipher_code_to_string(char *str, u16 cipher_code)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ str[0] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map); i++)
+ if (cipher_code == ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map[i].cipher_code)
+ strcpy(str, ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map[i].cipher_str);
+ if (str[0] == '\0') {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Cipher code not recognized: "
+ "[%d]\n", cipher_code);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_read_header_region
+ * @data
+ * @dentry
+ * @nd
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise
+ */
+int ecryptfs_read_header_region(char *data, struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ mm_segment_t oldfs;
+ int rc;
+
+ mnt = mntget(mnt);
+ file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY);
+ if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Error opening file to "
+ "read header region\n");
+ mntput(mnt);
+ rc = PTR_ERR(file);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ file->f_pos = 0;
+ oldfs = get_fs();
+ set_fs(get_ds());
+ /* For releases 0.1 and 0.2, all of the header information
+ * fits in the first data extent-sized region. */
+ rc = file->f_op->read(file, (char __user *)data,
+ ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_EXTENT_SIZE, &file->f_pos);
+ set_fs(oldfs);
+ fput(file);
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void
+write_header_metadata(char *virt, struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ size_t *written)
+{
+ u32 header_extent_size;
+ u16 num_header_extents_at_front;
+
+ header_extent_size = (u32)crypt_stat->header_extent_size;
+ num_header_extents_at_front =
+ (u16)crypt_stat->num_header_extents_at_front;
+ header_extent_size = cpu_to_be32(header_extent_size);
+ memcpy(virt, &header_extent_size, 4);
+ virt += 4;
+ num_header_extents_at_front = cpu_to_be16(num_header_extents_at_front);
+ memcpy(virt, &num_header_extents_at_front, 2);
+ (*written) = 6;
+}
+
+struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_header_cache_0;
+struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_header_cache_1;
+struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_header_cache_2;
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_write_headers_virt
+ * @page_virt
+ * @crypt_stat
+ * @ecryptfs_dentry
+ *
+ * Format version: 1
+ *
+ * Header Extent:
+ * Octets 0-7: Unencrypted file size (big-endian)
+ * Octets 8-15: eCryptfs special marker
+ * Octets 16-19: Flags
+ * Octet 16: File format version number (between 0 and 255)
+ * Octets 17-18: Reserved
+ * Octet 19: Bit 1 (lsb): Reserved
+ * Bit 2: Encrypted?
+ * Bits 3-8: Reserved
+ * Octets 20-23: Header extent size (big-endian)
+ * Octets 24-25: Number of header extents at front of file
+ * (big-endian)
+ * Octet 26: Begin RFC 2440 authentication token packet set
+ * Data Extent 0:
+ * Lower data (CBC encrypted)
+ * Data Extent 1:
+ * Lower data (CBC encrypted)
+ * ...
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success
+ */
+int ecryptfs_write_headers_virt(char *page_virt,
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry)
+{
+ int rc;
+ size_t written;
+ size_t offset;
+
+ offset = ECRYPTFS_FILE_SIZE_BYTES;
+ write_ecryptfs_marker((page_virt + offset), &written);
+ offset += written;
+ write_ecryptfs_flags((page_virt + offset), crypt_stat, &written);
+ offset += written;
+ write_header_metadata((page_virt + offset), crypt_stat, &written);
+ offset += written;
+ rc = ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set((page_virt + offset), crypt_stat,
+ ecryptfs_dentry, &written,
+ PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset);
+ if (rc)
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error generating key packet "
+ "set; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_write_headers
+ * @lower_file: The lower file struct, which was returned from dentry_open
+ *
+ * Write the file headers out. This will likely involve a userspace
+ * callout, in which the session key is encrypted with one or more
+ * public keys and/or the passphrase necessary to do the encryption is
+ * retrieved via a prompt. Exactly what happens at this point should
+ * be policy-dependent.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error
+ */
+int ecryptfs_write_headers(struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry,
+ struct file *lower_file)
+{
+ mm_segment_t oldfs;
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat;
+ char *page_virt;
+ int current_header_page;
+ int header_pages;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(
+ ecryptfs_dentry->d_inode)->crypt_stat;
+ if (likely(ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
+ ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED))) {
+ if (!ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
+ ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Key is "
+ "invalid; bailing out\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING,
+ "Called with crypt_stat->encrypted == 0\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Released in this function */
+ page_virt = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_header_cache_0, SLAB_USER);
+ if (!page_virt) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(page_virt, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
+ rc = ecryptfs_write_headers_virt(page_virt, crypt_stat,
+ ecryptfs_dentry);
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error whilst writing headers\n");
+ memset(page_virt, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG,
+ "Writing key packet set to underlying file\n");
+ lower_file->f_pos = 0;
+ oldfs = get_fs();
+ set_fs(get_ds());
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Calling lower_file->f_op->"
+ "write() w/ header page; lower_file->f_pos = "
+ "[0x%.16x]\n", lower_file->f_pos);
+ lower_file->f_op->write(lower_file, (char __user *)page_virt,
+ PAGE_CACHE_SIZE, &lower_file->f_pos);
+ header_pages = ((crypt_stat->header_extent_size
+ * crypt_stat->num_header_extents_at_front)
+ / PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
+ memset(page_virt, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
+ current_header_page = 1;
+ while (current_header_page < header_pages) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Calling lower_file->f_op->"
+ "write() w/ zero'd page; lower_file->f_pos = "
+ "[0x%.16x]\n", lower_file->f_pos);
+ lower_file->f_op->write(lower_file, (char __user *)page_virt,
+ PAGE_CACHE_SIZE, &lower_file->f_pos);
+ current_header_page++;
+ }
+ set_fs(oldfs);
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG,
+ "Done writing key packet set to underlying file.\n");
+out_free:
+ kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_header_cache_0, page_virt);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int parse_header_metadata(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ char *virt, int *bytes_read)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ u32 header_extent_size;
+ u16 num_header_extents_at_front;
+
+ memcpy(&header_extent_size, virt, 4);
+ header_extent_size = be32_to_cpu(header_extent_size);
+ virt += 4;
+ memcpy(&num_header_extents_at_front, virt, 2);
+ num_header_extents_at_front = be16_to_cpu(num_header_extents_at_front);
+ crypt_stat->header_extent_size = (int)header_extent_size;
+ crypt_stat->num_header_extents_at_front =
+ (int)num_header_extents_at_front;
+ (*bytes_read) = 6;
+ if ((crypt_stat->header_extent_size
+ * crypt_stat->num_header_extents_at_front)
+ < ECRYPTFS_MINIMUM_HEADER_EXTENT_SIZE) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Invalid header extent size: "
+ "[%d]\n", crypt_stat->header_extent_size);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * set_default_header_data
+ *
+ * For version 0 file format; this function is only for backwards
+ * compatibility for files created with the prior versions of
+ * eCryptfs.
+ */
+static void set_default_header_data(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
+{
+ crypt_stat->header_extent_size = 4096;
+ crypt_stat->num_header_extents_at_front = 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_read_headers_virt
+ *
+ * Read/parse the header data. The header format is detailed in the
+ * comment block for the ecryptfs_write_headers_virt() function.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success
+ */
+static int ecryptfs_read_headers_virt(char *page_virt,
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ int offset;
+ int bytes_read;
+
+ ecryptfs_set_default_sizes(crypt_stat);
+ crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
+ ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
+ offset = ECRYPTFS_FILE_SIZE_BYTES;
+ rc = contains_ecryptfs_marker(page_virt + offset);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ offset += MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER_SIZE_BYTES;
+ rc = ecryptfs_process_flags(crypt_stat, (page_virt + offset),
+ &bytes_read);
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error processing flags\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (crypt_stat->file_version > ECRYPTFS_SUPPORTED_FILE_VERSION) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "File version is [%d]; only "
+ "file version [%d] is supported by this "
+ "version of eCryptfs\n",
+ crypt_stat->file_version,
+ ECRYPTFS_SUPPORTED_FILE_VERSION);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ offset += bytes_read;
+ if (crypt_stat->file_version >= 1) {
+ rc = parse_header_metadata(crypt_stat, (page_virt + offset),
+ &bytes_read);
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error reading header "
+ "metadata; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ }
+ offset += bytes_read;
+ } else
+ set_default_header_data(crypt_stat);
+ rc = ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(crypt_stat, (page_virt + offset),
+ ecryptfs_dentry);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_read_headers
+ *
+ * Returns zero if valid headers found and parsed; non-zero otherwise
+ */
+int ecryptfs_read_headers(struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry,
+ struct file *lower_file)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ char *page_virt = NULL;
+ mm_segment_t oldfs;
+ ssize_t bytes_read;
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat =
+ &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_dentry->d_inode)->crypt_stat;
+
+ /* Read the first page from the underlying file */
+ page_virt = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_header_cache_1, SLAB_USER);
+ if (!page_virt) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Unable to allocate page_virt\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ lower_file->f_pos = 0;
+ oldfs = get_fs();
+ set_fs(get_ds());
+ bytes_read = lower_file->f_op->read(lower_file,
+ (char __user *)page_virt,
+ ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_EXTENT_SIZE,
+ &lower_file->f_pos);
+ set_fs(oldfs);
+ if (bytes_read != ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_EXTENT_SIZE) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = ecryptfs_read_headers_virt(page_virt, crypt_stat,
+ ecryptfs_dentry);
+ if (rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Valid eCryptfs headers not "
+ "found\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+out:
+ if (page_virt) {
+ memset(page_virt, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
+ kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_header_cache_1, page_virt);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_encode_filename - converts a plaintext file name to cipher text
+ * @crypt_stat: The crypt_stat struct associated with the file anem to encode
+ * @name: The plaintext name
+ * @length: The length of the plaintext
+ * @encoded_name: The encypted name
+ *
+ * Encrypts and encodes a filename into something that constitutes a
+ * valid filename for a filesystem, with printable characters.
+ *
+ * We assume that we have a properly initialized crypto context,
+ * pointed to by crypt_stat->tfm.
+ *
+ * TODO: Implement filename decoding and decryption here, in place of
+ * memcpy. We are keeping the framework around for now to (1)
+ * facilitate testing of the components needed to implement filename
+ * encryption and (2) to provide a code base from which other
+ * developers in the community can easily implement this feature.
+ *
+ * Returns the length of encoded filename; negative if error
+ */
+int
+ecryptfs_encode_filename(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ const char *name, int length, char **encoded_name)
+{
+ int error = 0;
+
+ (*encoded_name) = kmalloc(length + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!(*encoded_name)) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* TODO: Filename encryption is a scheduled feature for a
+ * future version of eCryptfs. This function is here only for
+ * the purpose of providing a framework for other developers
+ * to easily implement filename encryption. Hint: Replace this
+ * memcpy() with a call to encrypt and encode the
+ * filename, the set the length accordingly. */
+ memcpy((void *)(*encoded_name), (void *)name, length);
+ (*encoded_name)[length] = '\0';
+ error = length + 1;
+out:
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_decode_filename - converts the cipher text name to plaintext
+ * @crypt_stat: The crypt_stat struct associated with the file
+ * @name: The filename in cipher text
+ * @length: The length of the cipher text name
+ * @decrypted_name: The plaintext name
+ *
+ * Decodes and decrypts the filename.
+ *
+ * We assume that we have a properly initialized crypto context,
+ * pointed to by crypt_stat->tfm.
+ *
+ * TODO: Implement filename decoding and decryption here, in place of
+ * memcpy. We are keeping the framework around for now to (1)
+ * facilitate testing of the components needed to implement filename
+ * encryption and (2) to provide a code base from which other
+ * developers in the community can easily implement this feature.
+ *
+ * Returns the length of decoded filename; negative if error
+ */
+int
+ecryptfs_decode_filename(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
+ const char *name, int length, char **decrypted_name)
+{
+ int error = 0;
+
+ (*decrypted_name) = kmalloc(length + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!(*decrypted_name)) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* TODO: Filename encryption is a scheduled feature for a
+ * future version of eCryptfs. This function is here only for
+ * the purpose of providing a framework for other developers
+ * to easily implement filename encryption. Hint: Replace this
+ * memcpy() with a call to decode and decrypt the
+ * filename, the set the length accordingly. */
+ memcpy((void *)(*decrypted_name), (void *)name, length);
+ (*decrypted_name)[length + 1] = '\0'; /* Only for convenience
+ * in printing out the
+ * string in debug
+ * messages */
+ error = length;
+out:
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_process_cipher - Perform cipher initialization.
+ * @tfm: Crypto context set by this function
+ * @key_tfm: Crypto context for key material, set by this function
+ * @cipher_name: Name of the cipher.
+ * @key_size: Size of the key in bytes.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success. Any crypto_tfm structs allocated here
+ * should be released by other functions, such as on a superblock put
+ * event, regardless of whether this function succeeds for fails.
+ */
+int
+ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_tfm **tfm, struct crypto_tfm **key_tfm,
+ char *cipher_name, size_t key_size)
+{
+ char dummy_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES];
+ int rc;
+
+ *tfm = *key_tfm = NULL;
+ if (key_size > ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Requested key size is [%Zd] bytes; maximum "
+ "allowable is [%d]\n", key_size, ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher_name, (ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CHAINING_MODE
+ | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY));
+ if (!(*tfm)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate crypto cipher with name "
+ "[%s]\n", cipher_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *key_tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher_name, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
+ if (!(*key_tfm)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate crypto cipher with name "
+ "[%s]\n", cipher_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (key_size < crypto_tfm_alg_min_keysize(*tfm)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Request key size is [%Zd]; minimum key size "
+ "supported by cipher [%s] is [%d]\n", key_size,
+ cipher_name, crypto_tfm_alg_min_keysize(*tfm));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (key_size < crypto_tfm_alg_min_keysize(*key_tfm)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Request key size is [%Zd]; minimum key size "
+ "supported by cipher [%s] is [%d]\n", key_size,
+ cipher_name, crypto_tfm_alg_min_keysize(*key_tfm));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (key_size > crypto_tfm_alg_max_keysize(*tfm)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Request key size is [%Zd]; maximum key size "
+ "supported by cipher [%s] is [%d]\n", key_size,
+ cipher_name, crypto_tfm_alg_min_keysize(*tfm));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (key_size > crypto_tfm_alg_max_keysize(*key_tfm)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Request key size is [%Zd]; maximum key size "
+ "supported by cipher [%s] is [%d]\n", key_size,
+ cipher_name, crypto_tfm_alg_min_keysize(*key_tfm));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ get_random_bytes(dummy_key, key_size);
+ rc = crypto_cipher_setkey(*tfm, dummy_key, key_size);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to set key of size [%Zd] for "
+ "cipher [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", key_size, cipher_name, rc);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = crypto_cipher_setkey(*key_tfm, dummy_key, key_size);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to set key of size [%Zd] for "
+ "cipher [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", key_size, cipher_name, rc);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}