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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-11-01 17:11:41 -1000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-11-01 17:11:41 -1000 |
| commit | babe393974de0351c0e6cca50f5f84edaf8d7fa1 (patch) | |
| tree | 0893d62d555675d8bcfacc5d8e3965ef377791cd /Documentation/arch | |
| parent | 7dc0e9c7dda66bd91eeada00d90033e3eb647fc3 (diff) | |
| parent | cf63348b4c45384d02126f86676d5afc75d661a7 (diff) | |
| download | linux-babe393974de0351c0e6cca50f5f84edaf8d7fa1.tar.gz | |
Merge tag 'docs-6.7' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"The number of commits for documentation is not huge this time around,
but there are some significant changes nonetheless:
- Some more Spanish-language and Chinese translations
- The much-discussed documentation of the confidential-computing
threat model
- Powerpc and RISCV documentation move under Documentation/arch -
these complete this particular bit of documentation churn
- A large traditional-Chinese documentation update
- A new document on backporting and conflict resolution
- Some kernel-doc and Sphinx fixes
Plus the usual smattering of smaller updates and typo fixes"
* tag 'docs-6.7' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (40 commits)
scripts/kernel-doc: Fix the regex for matching -Werror flag
docs: backporting: address feedback
Documentation: driver-api: pps: Update PPS generator documentation
speakup: Document USB support
doc: blk-ioprio: Bring the doc in line with the implementation
docs: usb: fix reference to nonexistent file in UVC Gadget
docs: doc-guide: mention 'make refcheckdocs'
Documentation: fix typo in dynamic-debug howto
scripts/kernel-doc: match -Werror flag strictly
Documentation/sphinx: Remove the repeated word "the" in comments.
docs: sparse: add SPDX-License-Identifier
docs/zh_CN: Add subsystem-apis Chinese translation
docs/zh_TW: update contents for zh_TW
docs: submitting-patches: encourage direct notifications to commenters
docs: add backporting and conflict resolution document
docs: move riscv under arch
docs: update link to powerpc/vmemmap_dedup.rst
mm/memory-hotplug: fix typo in documentation
docs: move powerpc under arch
PCI: Update the devres documentation regarding to pcim_*()
...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/arch')
44 files changed, 7854 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/index.rst b/Documentation/arch/index.rst index 194e7e797877f6..3f9962e45c098c 100644 --- a/Documentation/arch/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/arch/index.rst @@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ implementation. nios2/index openrisc/index parisc/index - ../powerpc/index - ../riscv/index + powerpc/index + riscv/index s390/index sh/index sparc/index diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/associativity.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/associativity.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..4d01c73685619f --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/associativity.rst @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +============================ +NUMA resource associativity +============================ + +Associativity represents the groupings of the various platform resources into +domains of substantially similar mean performance relative to resources outside +of that domain. Resources subsets of a given domain that exhibit better +performance relative to each other than relative to other resources subsets +are represented as being members of a sub-grouping domain. This performance +characteristic is presented in terms of NUMA node distance within the Linux kernel. +From the platform view, these groups are also referred to as domains. + +PAPR interface currently supports different ways of communicating these resource +grouping details to the OS. These are referred to as Form 0, Form 1 and Form2 +associativity grouping. Form 0 is the oldest format and is now considered deprecated. + +Hypervisor indicates the type/form of associativity used via "ibm,architecture-vec-5 property". +Bit 0 of byte 5 in the "ibm,architecture-vec-5" property indicates usage of Form 0 or Form 1. +A value of 1 indicates the usage of Form 1 associativity. For Form 2 associativity +bit 2 of byte 5 in the "ibm,architecture-vec-5" property is used. + +Form 0 +------ +Form 0 associativity supports only two NUMA distances (LOCAL and REMOTE). + +Form 1 +------ +With Form 1 a combination of ibm,associativity-reference-points, and ibm,associativity +device tree properties are used to determine the NUMA distance between resource groups/domains. + +The “ibm,associativity” property contains a list of one or more numbers (domainID) +representing the resource’s platform grouping domains. + +The “ibm,associativity-reference-points” property contains a list of one or more numbers +(domainID index) that represents the 1 based ordinal in the associativity lists. +The list of domainID indexes represents an increasing hierarchy of resource grouping. + +ex: +{ primary domainID index, secondary domainID index, tertiary domainID index.. } + +Linux kernel uses the domainID at the primary domainID index as the NUMA node id. +Linux kernel computes NUMA distance between two domains by recursively comparing +if they belong to the same higher-level domains. For mismatch at every higher +level of the resource group, the kernel doubles the NUMA distance between the +comparing domains. + +Form 2 +------- +Form 2 associativity format adds separate device tree properties representing NUMA node distance +thereby making the node distance computation flexible. Form 2 also allows flexible primary +domain numbering. With numa distance computation now detached from the index value in +"ibm,associativity-reference-points" property, Form 2 allows a large number of primary domain +ids at the same domainID index representing resource groups of different performance/latency +characteristics. + +Hypervisor indicates the usage of FORM2 associativity using bit 2 of byte 5 in the +"ibm,architecture-vec-5" property. + +"ibm,numa-lookup-index-table" property contains a list of one or more numbers representing +the domainIDs present in the system. The offset of the domainID in this property is +used as an index while computing numa distance information via "ibm,numa-distance-table". + +prop-encoded-array: The number N of the domainIDs encoded as with encode-int, followed by +N domainID encoded as with encode-int + +For ex: +"ibm,numa-lookup-index-table" = {4, 0, 8, 250, 252}. The offset of domainID 8 (2) is used when +computing the distance of domain 8 from other domains present in the system. For the rest of +this document, this offset will be referred to as domain distance offset. + +"ibm,numa-distance-table" property contains a list of one or more numbers representing the NUMA +distance between resource groups/domains present in the system. + +prop-encoded-array: The number N of the distance values encoded as with encode-int, followed by +N distance values encoded as with encode-bytes. The max distance value we could encode is 255. +The number N must be equal to the square of m where m is the number of domainIDs in the +numa-lookup-index-table. + +For ex: +ibm,numa-lookup-index-table = <3 0 8 40>; +ibm,numa-distace-table = <9>, /bits/ 8 < 10 20 80 20 10 160 80 160 10>; + +:: + + | 0 8 40 + --|------------ + | + 0 | 10 20 80 + | + 8 | 20 10 160 + | + 40| 80 160 10 + +A possible "ibm,associativity" property for resources in node 0, 8 and 40 + +{ 3, 6, 7, 0 } +{ 3, 6, 9, 8 } +{ 3, 6, 7, 40} + +With "ibm,associativity-reference-points" { 0x3 } + +"ibm,lookup-index-table" helps in having a compact representation of distance matrix. +Since domainID can be sparse, the matrix of distances can also be effectively sparse. +With "ibm,lookup-index-table" we can achieve a compact representation of +distance information. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/booting.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/booting.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..11aa440f98cc9c --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/booting.rst @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +DeviceTree Booting +------------------ + +During the development of the Linux/ppc64 kernel, and more specifically, the +addition of new platform types outside of the old IBM pSeries/iSeries pair, it +was decided to enforce some strict rules regarding the kernel entry and +bootloader <-> kernel interfaces, in order to avoid the degeneration that had +become the ppc32 kernel entry point and the way a new platform should be added +to the kernel. The legacy iSeries platform breaks those rules as it predates +this scheme, but no new board support will be accepted in the main tree that +doesn't follow them properly. In addition, since the advent of the arch/powerpc +merged architecture for ppc32 and ppc64, new 32-bit platforms and 32-bit +platforms which move into arch/powerpc will be required to use these rules as +well. + +The main requirement that will be defined in more detail below is the presence +of a device-tree whose format is defined after Open Firmware specification. +However, in order to make life easier to embedded board vendors, the kernel +doesn't require the device-tree to represent every device in the system and only +requires some nodes and properties to be present. For example, the kernel does +not require you to create a node for every PCI device in the system. It is a +requirement to have a node for PCI host bridges in order to provide interrupt +routing information and memory/IO ranges, among others. It is also recommended +to define nodes for on chip devices and other buses that don't specifically fit +in an existing OF specification. This creates a great flexibility in the way the +kernel can then probe those and match drivers to device, without having to hard +code all sorts of tables. It also makes it more flexible for board vendors to do +minor hardware upgrades without significantly impacting the kernel code or +cluttering it with special cases. + + +Entry point +~~~~~~~~~~~ + +There is one single entry point to the kernel, at the start +of the kernel image. That entry point supports two calling +conventions: + + a) Boot from Open Firmware. If your firmware is compatible + with Open Firmware (IEEE 1275) or provides an OF compatible + client interface API (support for "interpret" callback of + forth words isn't required), you can enter the kernel with: + + r5 : OF callback pointer as defined by IEEE 1275 + bindings to powerpc. Only the 32-bit client interface + is currently supported + + r3, r4 : address & length of an initrd if any or 0 + + The MMU is either on or off; the kernel will run the + trampoline located in arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c to + extract the device-tree and other information from open + firmware and build a flattened device-tree as described + in b). prom_init() will then re-enter the kernel using + the second method. This trampoline code runs in the + context of the firmware, which is supposed to handle all + exceptions during that time. + + b) Direct entry with a flattened device-tree block. This entry + point is called by a) after the OF trampoline and can also be + called directly by a bootloader that does not support the Open + Firmware client interface. It is also used by "kexec" to + implement "hot" booting of a new kernel from a previous + running one. This method is what I will describe in more + details in this document, as method a) is simply standard Open + Firmware, and thus should be implemented according to the + various standard documents defining it and its binding to the + PowerPC platform. The entry point definition then becomes: + + r3 : physical pointer to the device-tree block + (defined in chapter II) in RAM + + r4 : physical pointer to the kernel itself. This is + used by the assembly code to properly disable the MMU + in case you are entering the kernel with MMU enabled + and a non-1:1 mapping. + + r5 : NULL (as to differentiate with method a) + +Note about SMP entry: Either your firmware puts your other +CPUs in some sleep loop or spin loop in ROM where you can get +them out via a soft reset or some other means, in which case +you don't need to care, or you'll have to enter the kernel +with all CPUs. The way to do that with method b) will be +described in a later revision of this document. + +Board supports (platforms) are not exclusive config options. An +arbitrary set of board supports can be built in a single kernel +image. The kernel will "know" what set of functions to use for a +given platform based on the content of the device-tree. Thus, you +should: + + a) add your platform support as a _boolean_ option in + arch/powerpc/Kconfig, following the example of PPC_PSERIES, + PPC_PMAC and PPC_MAPLE. The latter is probably a good + example of a board support to start from. + + b) create your main platform file as + "arch/powerpc/platforms/myplatform/myboard_setup.c" and add it + to the Makefile under the condition of your ``CONFIG_`` + option. This file will define a structure of type "ppc_md" + containing the various callbacks that the generic code will + use to get to your platform specific code + +A kernel image may support multiple platforms, but only if the +platforms feature the same core architecture. A single kernel build +cannot support both configurations with Book E and configurations +with classic Powerpc architectures. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/bootwrapper.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/bootwrapper.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..cdfa2bc8425feb --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/bootwrapper.rst @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +======================== +The PowerPC boot wrapper +======================== + +Copyright (C) Secret Lab Technologies Ltd. + +PowerPC image targets compresses and wraps the kernel image (vmlinux) with +a boot wrapper to make it usable by the system firmware. There is no +standard PowerPC firmware interface, so the boot wrapper is designed to +be adaptable for each kind of image that needs to be built. + +The boot wrapper can be found in the arch/powerpc/boot/ directory. The +Makefile in that directory has targets for all the available image types. +The different image types are used to support all of the various firmware +interfaces found on PowerPC platforms. OpenFirmware is the most commonly +used firmware type on general purpose PowerPC systems from Apple, IBM and +others. U-Boot is typically found on embedded PowerPC hardware, but there +are a handful of other firmware implementations which are also popular. Each +firmware interface requires a different image format. + +The boot wrapper is built from the makefile in arch/powerpc/boot/Makefile and +it uses the wrapper script (arch/powerpc/boot/wrapper) to generate target +image. The details of the build system is discussed in the next section. +Currently, the following image format targets exist: + + ==================== ======================================================== + cuImage.%: Backwards compatible uImage for older version of + U-Boot (for versions that don't understand the device + tree). This image embeds a device tree blob inside + the image. The boot wrapper, kernel and device tree + are all embedded inside the U-Boot uImage file format + with boot wrapper code that extracts data from the old + bd_info structure and loads the data into the device + tree before jumping into the kernel. + + Because of the series of #ifdefs found in the + bd_info structure used in the old U-Boot interfaces, + cuImages are platform specific. Each specific + U-Boot platform has a different platform init file + which populates the embedded device tree with data + from the platform specific bd_info file. The platform + specific cuImage platform init code can be found in + `arch/powerpc/boot/cuboot.*.c`. Selection of the correct + cuImage init code for a specific board can be found in + the wrapper structure. + + dtbImage.%: Similar to zImage, except device tree blob is embedded + inside the image instead of provided by firmware. The + output image file can be either an elf file or a flat + binary depending on the platform. + + dtbImages are used on systems which do not have an + interface for passing a device tree directly. + dtbImages are similar to simpleImages except that + dtbImages have platform specific code for extracting + data from the board firmware, but simpleImages do not + talk to the firmware at all. + + PlayStation 3 support uses dtbImage. So do Embedded + Planet boards using the PlanetCore firmware. Board + specific initialization code is typically found in a + file named arch/powerpc/boot/<platform>.c; but this + can be overridden by the wrapper script. + + simpleImage.%: Firmware independent compressed image that does not + depend on any particular firmware interface and embeds + a device tree blob. This image is a flat binary that + can be loaded to any location in RAM and jumped to. + Firmware cannot pass any configuration data to the + kernel with this image type and it depends entirely on + the embedded device tree for all information. + + treeImage.%; Image format for used with OpenBIOS firmware found + on some ppc4xx hardware. This image embeds a device + tree blob inside the image. + + uImage: Native image format used by U-Boot. The uImage target + does not add any boot code. It just wraps a compressed + vmlinux in the uImage data structure. This image + requires a version of U-Boot that is able to pass + a device tree to the kernel at boot. If using an older + version of U-Boot, then you need to use a cuImage + instead. + + zImage.%: Image format which does not embed a device tree. + Used by OpenFirmware and other firmware interfaces + which are able to supply a device tree. This image + expects firmware to provide the device tree at boot. + Typically, if you have general purpose PowerPC + hardware then you want this image format. + ==================== ======================================================== + +Image types which embed a device tree blob (simpleImage, dtbImage, treeImage, +and cuImage) all generate the device tree blob from a file in the +arch/powerpc/boot/dts/ directory. The Makefile selects the correct device +tree source based on the name of the target. Therefore, if the kernel is +built with 'make treeImage.walnut', then the build system will use +arch/powerpc/boot/dts/walnut.dts to build treeImage.walnut. + +Two special targets called 'zImage' and 'zImage.initrd' also exist. These +targets build all the default images as selected by the kernel configuration. +Default images are selected by the boot wrapper Makefile +(arch/powerpc/boot/Makefile) by adding targets to the $image-y variable. Look +at the Makefile to see which default image targets are available. + +How it is built +--------------- +arch/powerpc is designed to support multiplatform kernels, which means +that a single vmlinux image can be booted on many different target boards. +It also means that the boot wrapper must be able to wrap for many kinds of +images on a single build. The design decision was made to not use any +conditional compilation code (#ifdef, etc) in the boot wrapper source code. +All of the boot wrapper pieces are buildable at any time regardless of the +kernel configuration. Building all the wrapper bits on every kernel build +also ensures that obscure parts of the wrapper are at the very least compile +tested in a large variety of environments. + +The wrapper is adapted for different image types at link time by linking in +just the wrapper bits that are appropriate for the image type. The 'wrapper +script' (found in arch/powerpc/boot/wrapper) is called by the Makefile and +is responsible for selecting the correct wrapper bits for the image type. +The arguments are well documented in the script's comment block, so they +are not repeated here. However, it is worth mentioning that the script +uses the -p (platform) argument as the main method of deciding which wrapper +bits to compile in. Look for the large 'case "$platform" in' block in the +middle of the script. This is also the place where platform specific fixups +can be selected by changing the link order. + +In particular, care should be taken when working with cuImages. cuImage +wrapper bits are very board specific and care should be taken to make sure +the target you are trying to build is supported by the wrapper bits. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/cpu_families.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/cpu_families.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..eb7e60649b4337 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/cpu_families.rst @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +============ +CPU Families +============ + +This document tries to summarise some of the different cpu families that exist +and are supported by arch/powerpc. + + +Book3S (aka sPAPR) +------------------ + +- Hash MMU (except 603 and e300) +- Radix MMU (POWER9 and later) +- Software loaded TLB (603 and e300) +- Selectable Software loaded TLB in addition to hash MMU (755, 7450, e600) +- Mix of 32 & 64 bit:: + + +--------------+ +----------------+ + | Old POWER | --------------> | RS64 (threads) | + +--------------+ +----------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ +----------------+ +------+ + | 601 | --------------> | 603 | ---> | e300 | + +--------------+ +----------------+ +------+ + | | + | | + v v + +--------------+ +-----+ +----------------+ +-------+ + | 604 | | 755 | <--- | 750 (G3) | ---> | 750CX | + +--------------+ +-----+ +----------------+ +-------+ + | | | + | | | + v v v + +--------------+ +----------------+ +-------+ + | 620 (64 bit) | | 7400 | | 750CL | + +--------------+ +----------------+ +-------+ + | | | + | | | + v v v + +--------------+ +----------------+ +-------+ + | POWER3/630 | | 7410 | | 750FX | + +--------------+ +----------------+ +-------+ + | | + | | + v v + +--------------+ +----------------+ + | POWER3+ | | 7450 | + +--------------+ +----------------+ + | | + | | + v v + +--------------+ +----------------+ + | POWER4 | | 7455 | + +--------------+ +----------------+ + | | + | | + v v + +--------------+ +-------+ +----------------+ + | POWER4+ | --> | 970 | | 7447 | + +--------------+ +-------+ +----------------+ + | | | + | | | + v v v + +--------------+ +-------+ +----------------+ + | POWER5 | | 970FX | | 7448 | + +--------------+ +-------+ +----------------+ + | | | + | | | + v v v + +--------------+ +-------+ +----------------+ + | POWER5+ | | 970MP | | e600 | + +--------------+ +-------+ +----------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ + | POWER5++ | + +--------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ +-------+ + | POWER6 | <-?-> | Cell | + +--------------+ +-------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ + | POWER7 | + +--------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ + | POWER7+ | + +--------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ + | POWER8 | + +--------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ + | POWER9 | + +--------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ + | POWER10 | + +--------------+ + + + +---------------+ + | PA6T (64 bit) | + +---------------+ + + +IBM BookE +--------- + +- Software loaded TLB. +- All 32 bit:: + + +--------------+ + | 401 | + +--------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ + | 403 | + +--------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ + | 405 | + +--------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ + | 440 | + +--------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ +----------------+ + | 450 | --> | BG/P | + +--------------+ +----------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ + | 460 | + +--------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ + | 476 | + +--------------+ + + +Motorola/Freescale 8xx +---------------------- + +- Software loaded with hardware assist. +- All 32 bit:: + + +-------------+ + | MPC8xx Core | + +-------------+ + + +Freescale BookE +--------------- + +- Software loaded TLB. +- e6500 adds HW loaded indirect TLB entries. +- Mix of 32 & 64 bit:: + + +--------------+ + | e200 | + +--------------+ + + + +--------------------------------+ + | e500 | + +--------------------------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------------------------+ + | e500v2 | + +--------------------------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------------------------+ + | e500mc (Book3e) | + +--------------------------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------------------------+ + | e5500 (64 bit) | + +--------------------------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------------------------+ + | e6500 (HW TLB) (Multithreaded) | + +--------------------------------+ + + +IBM A2 core +----------- + +- Book3E, software loaded TLB + HW loaded indirect TLB entries. +- 64 bit:: + + +--------------+ +----------------+ + | A2 core | --> | WSP | + +--------------+ +----------------+ + | + | + v + +--------------+ + | BG/Q | + +--------------+ diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/cpu_features.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/cpu_features.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..b7bcdd2f41bb66 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/cpu_features.rst @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +============ +CPU Features +============ + +Hollis Blanchard <hollis@austin.ibm.com> +5 Jun 2002 + +This document describes the system (including self-modifying code) used in the +PPC Linux kernel to support a variety of PowerPC CPUs without requiring +compile-time selection. + +Early in the boot process the ppc32 kernel detects the current CPU type and +chooses a set of features accordingly. Some examples include Altivec support, +split instruction and data caches, and if the CPU supports the DOZE and NAP +sleep modes. + +Detection of the feature set is simple. A list of processors can be found in +arch/powerpc/kernel/cputable.c. The PVR register is masked and compared with +each value in the list. If a match is found, the cpu_features of cur_cpu_spec +is assigned to the feature bitmask for this processor and a __setup_cpu +function is called. + +C code may test 'cur_cpu_spec[smp_processor_id()]->cpu_features' for a +particular feature bit. This is done in quite a few places, for example +in ppc_setup_l2cr(). + +Implementing cpufeatures in assembly is a little more involved. There are +several paths that are performance-critical and would suffer if an array +index, structure dereference, and conditional branch were added. To avoid the +performance penalty but still allow for runtime (rather than compile-time) CPU +selection, unused code is replaced by 'nop' instructions. This nop'ing is +based on CPU 0's capabilities, so a multi-processor system with non-identical +processors will not work (but such a system would likely have other problems +anyways). + +After detecting the processor type, the kernel patches out sections of code +that shouldn't be used by writing nop's over it. Using cpufeatures requires +just 2 macros (found in arch/powerpc/include/asm/cputable.h), as seen in head.S +transfer_to_handler:: + + #ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC + BEGIN_FTR_SECTION + mfspr r22,SPRN_VRSAVE /* if G4, save vrsave register value */ + stw r22,THREAD_VRSAVE(r23) + END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) + #endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */ + +If CPU 0 supports Altivec, the code is left untouched. If it doesn't, both +instructions are replaced with nop's. + +The END_FTR_SECTION macro has two simpler variations: END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET +and END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR. These simply test if a flag is set (in +cur_cpu_spec[0]->cpu_features) or is cleared, respectively. These two macros +should be used in the majority of cases. + +The END_FTR_SECTION macros are implemented by storing information about this +code in the '__ftr_fixup' ELF section. When do_cpu_ftr_fixups +(arch/powerpc/kernel/misc.S) is invoked, it will iterate over the records in +__ftr_fixup, and if the required feature is not present it will loop writing +nop's from each BEGIN_FTR_SECTION to END_FTR_SECTION. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/cxl.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/cxl.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..d2d77057610e4f --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/cxl.rst @@ -0,0 +1,469 @@ +==================================== +Coherent Accelerator Interface (CXL) +==================================== + +Introduction +============ + + The coherent accelerator interface is designed to allow the + coherent connection of accelerators (FPGAs and other devices) to a + POWER system. These devices need to adhere to the Coherent + Accelerator Interface Architecture (CAIA). + + IBM refers to this as the Coherent Accelerator Processor Interface + or CAPI. In the kernel it's referred to by the name CXL to avoid + confusion with the ISDN CAPI subsystem. + + Coherent in this context means that the accelerator and CPUs can + both access system memory directly and with the same effective + addresses. + + +Hardware overview +================= + + :: + + POWER8/9 FPGA + +----------+ +---------+ + | | | | + | CPU | | AFU | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + +----------+ +---------+ + | PHB | | | + | +------+ | PSL | + | | CAPP |<------>| | + +---+------+ PCIE +---------+ + + The POWER8/9 chip has a Coherently Attached Processor Proxy (CAPP) + unit which is part of the PCIe Host Bridge (PHB). This is managed + by Linux by calls into OPAL. Linux doesn't directly program the + CAPP. + + The FPGA (or coherently attached device) consists of two parts. + The POWER Service Layer (PSL) and the Accelerator Function Unit + (AFU). The AFU is used to implement specific functionality behind + the PSL. The PSL, among other things, provides memory address + translation services to allow each AFU direct access to userspace + memory. + + The AFU is the core part of the accelerator (eg. the compression, + crypto etc function). The kernel has no knowledge of the function + of the AFU. Only userspace interacts directly with the AFU. + + The PSL provides the translation and interrupt services that the + AFU needs. This is what the kernel interacts with. For example, if + the AFU needs to read a particular effective address, it sends + that address to the PSL, the PSL then translates it, fetches the + data from memory and returns it to the AFU. If the PSL has a + translation miss, it interrupts the kernel and the kernel services + the fault. The context to which this fault is serviced is based on + who owns that acceleration function. + + - POWER8 and PSL Version 8 are compliant to the CAIA Version 1.0. + - POWER9 and PSL Version 9 are compliant to the CAIA Version 2.0. + + This PSL Version 9 provides new features such as: + + * Interaction with the nest MMU on the P9 chip. + * Native DMA support. + * Supports sending ASB_Notify messages for host thread wakeup. + * Supports Atomic operations. + * etc. + + Cards with a PSL9 won't work on a POWER8 system and cards with a + PSL8 won't work on a POWER9 system. + +AFU Modes +========= + + There are two programming modes supported by the AFU. Dedicated + and AFU directed. AFU may support one or both modes. + + When using dedicated mode only one MMU context is supported. In + this mode, only one userspace process can use the accelerator at + time. + + When using AFU directed mode, up to 16K simultaneous contexts can + be supported. This means up to 16K simultaneous userspace + applications may use the accelerator (although specific AFUs may + support fewer). In this mode, the AFU sends a 16 bit context ID + with each of its requests. This tells the PSL which context is + associated with each operation. If the PSL can't translate an + operation, the ID can also be accessed by the kernel so it can + determine the userspace context associated with an operation. + + +MMIO space +========== + + A portion of the accelerator MMIO space can be directly mapped + from the AFU to userspace. Either the whole space can be mapped or + just a per context portion. The hardware is self describing, hence + the kernel can determine the offset and size of the per context + portion. + + +Interrupts +========== + + AFUs may generate interrupts that are destined for userspace. These + are received by the kernel as hardware interrupts and passed onto + userspace by a read syscall documented below. + + Data storage faults and error interrupts are handled by the kernel + driver. + + +Work Element Descriptor (WED) +============================= + + The WED is a 64-bit parameter passed to the AFU when a context is + started. Its format is up to the AFU hence the kernel has no + knowledge of what it represents. Typically it will be the + effective address of a work queue or status block where the AFU + and userspace can share control and status information. + + + + +User API +======== + +1. AFU character devices +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + For AFUs operating in AFU directed mode, two character device + files will be created. /dev/cxl/afu0.0m will correspond to a + master context and /dev/cxl/afu0.0s will correspond to a slave + context. Master contexts have access to the full MMIO space an + AFU provides. Slave contexts have access to only the per process + MMIO space an AFU provides. + + For AFUs operating in dedicated process mode, the driver will + only create a single character device per AFU called + /dev/cxl/afu0.0d. This will have access to the entire MMIO space + that the AFU provides (like master contexts in AFU directed). + + The types described below are defined in include/uapi/misc/cxl.h + + The following file operations are supported on both slave and + master devices. + + A userspace library libcxl is available here: + + https://github.com/ibm-capi/libcxl + + This provides a C interface to this kernel API. + +open +---- + + Opens the device and allocates a file descriptor to be used with + the rest of the API. + + A dedicated mode AFU only has one context and only allows the + device to be opened once. + + An AFU directed mode AFU can have many contexts, the device can be + opened once for each context that is available. + + When all available contexts are allocated the open call will fail + and return -ENOSPC. + + Note: + IRQs need to be allocated for each context, which may limit + the number of contexts that can be created, and therefore + how many times the device can be opened. The POWER8 CAPP + supports 2040 IRQs and 3 are used by the kernel, so 2037 are + left. If 1 IRQ is needed per context, then only 2037 + contexts can be allocated. If 4 IRQs are needed per context, + then only 2037/4 = 509 contexts can be allocated. + + +ioctl +----- + + CXL_IOCTL_START_WORK: + Starts the AFU context and associates it with the current + process. Once this ioctl is successfully executed, all memory + mapped into this process is accessible to this AFU context + using the same effective addresses. No additional calls are + required to map/unmap memory. The AFU memory context will be + updated as userspace allocates and frees memory. This ioctl + returns once the AFU context is started. + + Takes a pointer to a struct cxl_ioctl_start_work + + :: + + struct cxl_ioctl_start_work { + __u64 flags; + __u64 work_element_descriptor; + __u64 amr; + __s16 num_interrupts; + __s16 reserved1; + __s32 reserved2; + __u64 reserved3; + __u64 reserved4; + __u64 reserved5; + __u64 reserved6; + }; + + flags: + Indicates which optional fields in the structure are + valid. + + work_element_descriptor: + The Work Element Descriptor (WED) is a 64-bit argument + defined by the AFU. Typically this is an effective + address pointing to an AFU specific structure + describing what work to perform. + + amr: + Authority Mask Register (AMR), same as the powerpc + AMR. This field is only used by the kernel when the + corresponding CXL_START_WORK_AMR value is specified in + flags. If not specified the kernel will use a default + value of 0. + + num_interrupts: + Number of userspace interrupts to request. This field + is only used by the kernel when the corresponding + CXL_START_WORK_NUM_IRQS value is specified in flags. + If not specified the minimum number required by the + AFU will be allocated. The min and max number can be + obtained from sysfs. + + reserved fields: + For ABI padding and future extensions + + CXL_IOCTL_GET_PROCESS_ELEMENT: + Get the current context id, also known as the process element. + The value is returned from the kernel as a __u32. + + +mmap +---- + + An AFU may have an MMIO space to facilitate communication with the + AFU. If it does, the MMIO space can be accessed via mmap. The size + and contents of this area are specific to the particular AFU. The + size can be discovered via sysfs. + + In AFU directed mode, master contexts are allowed to map all of + the MMIO space and slave contexts are allowed to only map the per + process MMIO space associated with the context. In dedicated + process mode the entire MMIO space can always be mapped. + + This mmap call must be done after the START_WORK ioctl. + + Care should be taken when accessing MMIO space. Only 32 and 64-bit + accesses are supported by POWER8. Also, the AFU will be designed + with a specific endianness, so all MMIO accesses should consider + endianness (recommend endian(3) variants like: le64toh(), + be64toh() etc). These endian issues equally apply to shared memory + queues the WED may describe. + + +read +---- + + Reads events from the AFU. Blocks if no events are pending + (unless O_NONBLOCK is supplied). Returns -EIO in the case of an + unrecoverable error or if the card is removed. + + read() will always return an integral number of events. + + The buffer passed to read() must be at least 4K bytes. + + The result of the read will be a buffer of one or more events, + each event is of type struct cxl_event, of varying size:: + + struct cxl_event { + struct cxl_event_header header; + union { + struct cxl_event_afu_interrupt irq; + struct cxl_event_data_storage fault; + struct cxl_event_afu_error afu_error; + }; + }; + + The struct cxl_event_header is defined as + + :: + + struct cxl_event_header { + __u16 type; + __u16 size; + __u16 process_element; + __u16 reserved1; + }; + + type: + This defines the type of event. The type determines how + the rest of the event is structured. These types are + described below and defined by enum cxl_event_type. + + size: + This is the size of the event in bytes including the + struct cxl_event_header. The start of the next event can + be found at this offset from the start of the current + event. + + process_element: + Context ID of the event. + + reserved field: + For future extensions and padding. + + If the event type is CXL_EVENT_AFU_INTERRUPT then the event + structure is defined as + + :: + + struct cxl_event_afu_interrupt { + __u16 flags; + __u16 irq; /* Raised AFU interrupt number */ + __u32 reserved1; + }; + + flags: + These flags indicate which optional fields are present + in this struct. Currently all fields are mandatory. + + irq: + The IRQ number sent by the AFU. + + reserved field: + For future extensions and padding. + + If the event type is CXL_EVENT_DATA_STORAGE then the event + structure is defined as + + :: + + struct cxl_event_data_storage { + __u16 flags; + __u16 reserved1; + __u32 reserved2; + __u64 addr; + __u64 dsisr; + __u64 reserved3; + }; + + flags: + These flags indicate which optional fields are present in + this struct. Currently all fields are mandatory. + + address: + The address that the AFU unsuccessfully attempted to + access. Valid accesses will be handled transparently by the + kernel but invalid accesses will generate this event. + + dsisr: + This field gives information on the type of fault. It is a + copy of the DSISR from the PSL hardware when the address + fault occurred. The form of the DSISR is as defined in the + CAIA. + + reserved fields: + For future extensions + + If the event type is CXL_EVENT_AFU_ERROR then the event structure + is defined as + + :: + + struct cxl_event_afu_error { + __u16 flags; + __u16 reserved1; + __u32 reserved2; + __u64 error; + }; + + flags: + These flags indicate which optional fields are present in + this struct. Currently all fields are Mandatory. + + error: + Error status from the AFU. Defined by the AFU. + + reserved fields: + For future extensions and padding + + +2. Card character device (powerVM guest only) +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + In a powerVM guest, an extra character device is created for the + card. The device is only used to write (flash) a new image on the + FPGA accelerator. Once the image is written and verified, the + device tree is updated and the card is reset to reload the updated + image. + +open +---- + + Opens the device and allocates a file descriptor to be used with + the rest of the API. The device can only be opened once. + +ioctl +----- + +CXL_IOCTL_DOWNLOAD_IMAGE / CXL_IOCTL_VALIDATE_IMAGE: + Starts and controls flashing a new FPGA image. Partial + reconfiguration is not supported (yet), so the image must contain + a copy of the PSL and AFU(s). Since an image can be quite large, + the caller may have to iterate, splitting the image in smaller + chunks. + + Takes a pointer to a struct cxl_adapter_image:: + + struct cxl_adapter_image { + __u64 flags; + __u64 data; + __u64 len_data; + __u64 len_image; + __u64 reserved1; + __u64 reserved2; + __u64 reserved3; + __u64 reserved4; + }; + + flags: + These flags indicate which optional fields are present in + this struct. Currently all fields are mandatory. + + data: + Pointer to a buffer with part of the image to write to the + card. + + len_data: + Size of the buffer pointed to by data. + + len_image: + Full size of the image. + + +Sysfs Class +=========== + + A cxl sysfs class is added under /sys/class/cxl to facilitate + enumeration and tuning of the accelerators. Its layout is + described in Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-cxl + + +Udev rules +========== + + The following udev rules could be used to create a symlink to the + most logical chardev to use in any programming mode (afuX.Yd for + dedicated, afuX.Ys for afu directed), since the API is virtually + identical for each:: + + SUBSYSTEM=="cxl", ATTRS{mode}=="dedicated_process", SYMLINK="cxl/%b" + SUBSYSTEM=="cxl", ATTRS{mode}=="afu_directed", \ + KERNEL=="afu[0-9]*.[0-9]*s", SYMLINK="cxl/%b" diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/cxlflash.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/cxlflash.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..e8f488acfa41ae --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/cxlflash.rst @@ -0,0 +1,433 @@ +================================ +Coherent Accelerator (CXL) Flash +================================ + +Introduction +============ + + The IBM Power architecture provides support for CAPI (Coherent + Accelerator Power Interface), which is available to certain PCIe slots + on Power 8 systems. CAPI can be thought of as a special tunneling + protocol through PCIe that allow PCIe adapters to look like special + purpose co-processors which can read or write an application's + memory and generate page faults. As a result, the host interface to + an adapter running in CAPI mode does not require the data buffers to + be mapped to the device's memory (IOMMU bypass) nor does it require + memory to be pinned. + + On Linux, Coherent Accelerator (CXL) kernel services present CAPI + devices as a PCI device by implementing a virtual PCI host bridge. + This abstraction simplifies the infrastructure and programming + model, allowing for drivers to look similar to other native PCI + device drivers. + + CXL provides a mechanism by which user space applications can + directly talk to a device (network or storage) bypassing the typical + kernel/device driver stack. The CXL Flash Adapter Driver enables a + user space application direct access to Flash storage. + + The CXL Flash Adapter Driver is a kernel module that sits in the + SCSI stack as a low level device driver (below the SCSI disk and + protocol drivers) for the IBM CXL Flash Adapter. This driver is + responsible for the initialization of the adapter, setting up the + special path for user space access, and performing error recovery. It + communicates directly the Flash Accelerator Functional Unit (AFU) + as described in Documentation/arch/powerpc/cxl.rst. + + The cxlflash driver supports two, mutually exclusive, modes of + operation at the device (LUN) level: + + - Any flash device (LUN) can be configured to be accessed as a + regular disk device (i.e.: /dev/sdc). This is the default mode. + + - Any flash device (LUN) can be configured to be accessed from + user space with a special block library. This mode further + specifies the means of accessing the device and provides for + either raw access to the entire LUN (referred to as direct + or physical LUN access) or access to a kernel/AFU-mediated + partition of the LUN (referred to as virtual LUN access). The + segmentation of a disk device into virtual LUNs is assisted + by special translation services provided by the Flash AFU. + +Overview +======== + + The Coherent Accelerator Interface Architecture (CAIA) introduces a + concept of a master context. A master typically has special privileges + granted to it by the kernel or hypervisor allowing it to perform AFU + wide management and control. The master may or may not be involved + directly in each user I/O, but at the minimum is involved in the + initial setup before the user application is allowed to send requests + directly to the AFU. + + The CXL Flash Adapter Driver establishes a master context with the + AFU. It uses memory mapped I/O (MMIO) for this control and setup. The + Adapter Problem Space Memory Map looks like this:: + + +-------------------------------+ + | 512 * 64 KB User MMIO | + | (per context) | + | User Accessible | + +-------------------------------+ + | 512 * 128 B per context | + | Provisioning and Control | + | Trusted Process accessible | + +-------------------------------+ + | 64 KB Global | + | Trusted Process accessible | + +-------------------------------+ + + This driver configures itself into the SCSI software stack as an + adapter driver. The driver is the only entity that is considered a + Trusted Process to program the Provisioning and Control and Global + areas in the MMIO Space shown above. The master context driver + discovers all LUNs attached to the CXL Flash adapter and instantiates + scsi block devices (/dev/sdb, /dev/sdc etc.) for each unique LUN + seen from each path. + + Once these scsi block devices are instantiated, an application + written to a specification provided by the block library may get + access to the Flash from user space (without requiring a system call). + + This master context driver also provides a series of ioctls for this + block library to enable this user space access. The driver supports + two modes for accessing the block device. + + The first mode is called a virtual mode. In this mode a single scsi + block device (/dev/sdb) may be carved up into any number of distinct + virtual LUNs. The virtual LUNs may be resized as long as the sum of + the sizes of all the virtual LUNs, along with the meta-data associated + with it does not exceed the physical capacity. + + The second mode is called the physical mode. In this mode a single + block device (/dev/sdb) may be opened directly by the block library + and the entire space for the LUN is available to the application. + + Only the physical mode provides persistence of the data. i.e. The + data written to the block device will survive application exit and + restart and also reboot. The virtual LUNs do not persist (i.e. do + not survive after the application terminates or the system reboots). + + +Block library API +================= + + Applications intending to get access to the CXL Flash from user + space should use the block library, as it abstracts the details of + interfacing directly with the cxlflash driver that are necessary for + performing administrative actions (i.e.: setup, tear down, resize). + The block library can be thought of as a 'user' of services, + implemented as IOCTLs, that are provided by the cxlflash driver + specifically for devices (LUNs) operating in user space access + mode. While it is not a requirement that applications understand + the interface between the block library and the cxlflash driver, + a high-level overview of each supported service (IOCTL) is provided + below. + + The block library can be found on GitHub: + http://github.com/open-power/capiflash + + +CXL Flash Driver LUN IOCTLs +=========================== + + Users, such as the block library, that wish to interface with a flash + device (LUN) via user space access need to use the services provided + by the cxlflash driver. As these services are implemented as ioctls, + a file descriptor handle must first be obtained in order to establish + the communication channel between a user and the kernel. This file + descriptor is obtained by opening the device special file associated + with the scsi disk device (/dev/sdb) that was created during LUN + discovery. As per the location of the cxlflash driver within the + SCSI protocol stack, this open is actually not seen by the cxlflash + driver. Upon successful open, the user receives a file descriptor + (herein referred to as fd1) that should be used for issuing the + subsequent ioctls listed below. + + The structure definitions for these IOCTLs are available in: + uapi/scsi/cxlflash_ioctl.h + +DK_CXLFLASH_ATTACH +------------------ + + This ioctl obtains, initializes, and starts a context using the CXL + kernel services. These services specify a context id (u16) by which + to uniquely identify the context and its allocated resources. The + services additionally provide a second file descriptor (herein + referred to as fd2) that is used by the block library to initiate + memory mapped I/O (via mmap()) to the CXL flash device and poll for + completion events. This file descriptor is intentionally installed by + this driver and not the CXL kernel services to allow for intermediary + notification and access in the event of a non-user-initiated close(), + such as a killed process. This design point is described in further + detail in the description for the DK_CXLFLASH_DETACH ioctl. + + There are a few important aspects regarding the "tokens" (context id + and fd2) that are provided back to the user: + + - These tokens are only valid for the process under which they + were created. The child of a forked process cannot continue + to use the context id or file descriptor created by its parent + (see DK_CXLFLASH_VLUN_CLONE for further details). + + - These tokens are only valid for the lifetime of the context and + the process under which they were created. Once either is + destroyed, the tokens are to be considered stale and subsequent + usage will result in errors. + + - A valid adapter file descriptor (fd2 >= 0) is only returned on + the initial attach for a context. Subsequent attaches to an + existing context (DK_CXLFLASH_ATTACH_REUSE_CONTEXT flag present) + do not provide the adapter file descriptor as it was previously + made known to the application. + + - When a context is no longer needed, the user shall detach from + the context via the DK_CXLFLASH_DETACH ioctl. When this ioctl + returns with a valid adapter file descriptor and the return flag + DK_CXLFLASH_APP_CLOSE_ADAP_FD is present, the application _must_ + close the adapter file descriptor following a successful detach. + + - When this ioctl returns with a valid fd2 and the return flag + DK_CXLFLASH_APP_CLOSE_ADAP_FD is present, the application _must_ + close fd2 in the following circumstances: + + + Following a successful detach of the last user of the context + + Following a successful recovery on the context's original fd2 + + In the child process of a fork(), following a clone ioctl, + on the fd2 associated with the source context + + - At any time, a close on fd2 will invalidate the tokens. Applications + should exercise caution to only close fd2 when appropriate (outlined + in the previous bullet) to avoid premature loss of I/O. + +DK_CXLFLASH_USER_DIRECT +----------------------- + This ioctl is responsible for transitioning the LUN to direct + (physical) mode access and configuring the AFU for direct access from + user space on a per-context basis. Additionally, the block size and + last logical block address (LBA) are returned to the user. + + As mentioned previously, when operating in user space access mode, + LUNs may be accessed in whole or in part. Only one mode is allowed + at a time and if one mode is active (outstanding references exist), + requests to use the LUN in a different mode are denied. + + The AFU is configured for direct access from user space by adding an + entry to the AFU's resource handle table. The index of the entry is + treated as a resource handle that is returned to the user. The user + is then able to use the handle to reference the LUN during I/O. + +DK_CXLFLASH_USER_VIRTUAL +------------------------ + This ioctl is responsible for transitioning the LUN to virtual mode + of access and configuring the AFU for virtual access from user space + on a per-context basis. Additionally, the block size and last logical + block address (LBA) are returned to the user. + + As mentioned previously, when operating in user space access mode, + LUNs may be accessed in whole or in part. Only one mode is allowed + at a time and if one mode is active (outstanding references exist), + requests to use the LUN in a different mode are denied. + + The AFU is configured for virtual access from user space by adding + an entry to the AFU's resource handle table. The index of the entry + is treated as a resource handle that is returned to the user. The + user is then able to use the handle to reference the LUN during I/O. + + By default, the virtual LUN is created with a size of 0. The user + would need to use the DK_CXLFLASH_VLUN_RESIZE ioctl to adjust the grow + the virtual LUN to a desired size. To avoid having to perform this + resize for the initial creation of the virtual LUN, the user has the + option of specifying a size as part of the DK_CXLFLASH_USER_VIRTUAL + ioctl, such that when success is returned to the user, the + resource handle that is provided is already referencing provisioned + storage. This is reflected by the last LBA being a non-zero value. + + When a LUN is accessible from more than one port, this ioctl will + return with the DK_CXLFLASH_ALL_PORTS_ACTIVE return flag set. This + provides the user with a hint that I/O can be retried in the event + of an I/O error as the LUN can be reached over multiple paths. + +DK_CXLFLASH_VLUN_RESIZE +----------------------- + This ioctl is responsible for resizing a previously created virtual + LUN and will fail if invoked upon a LUN that is not in virtual + mode. Upon success, an updated last LBA is returned to the user + indicating the new size of the virtual LUN associated with the + resource handle. + + The partitioning of virtual LUNs is jointly mediated by the cxlflash + driver and the AFU. An allocation table is kept for each LUN that is + operating in the virtual mode and used to program a LUN translation + table that the AFU references when provided with a resource handle. + + This ioctl can return -EAGAIN if an AFU sync operation takes too long. + In addition to returning a failure to user, cxlflash will also schedule + an asynchronous AFU reset. Should the user choose to retry the operation, + it is expected to succeed. If this ioctl fails with -EAGAIN, the user + can either retry the operation or treat it as a failure. + +DK_CXLFLASH_RELEASE +------------------- + This ioctl is responsible for releasing a previously obtained + reference to either a physical or virtual LUN. This can be + thought of as the inverse of the DK_CXLFLASH_USER_DIRECT or + DK_CXLFLASH_USER_VIRTUAL ioctls. Upon success, the resource handle + is no longer valid and the entry in the resource handle table is + made available to be used again. + + As part of the release process for virtual LUNs, the virtual LUN + is first resized to 0 to clear out and free the translation tables + associated with the virtual LUN reference. + +DK_CXLFLASH_DETACH +------------------ + This ioctl is responsible for unregistering a context with the + cxlflash driver and release outstanding resources that were + not explicitly released via the DK_CXLFLASH_RELEASE ioctl. Upon + success, all "tokens" which had been provided to the user from the + DK_CXLFLASH_ATTACH onward are no longer valid. + + When the DK_CXLFLASH_APP_CLOSE_ADAP_FD flag was returned on a successful + attach, the application _must_ close the fd2 associated with the context + following the detach of the final user of the context. + +DK_CXLFLASH_VLUN_CLONE +---------------------- + This ioctl is responsible for cloning a previously created + context to a more recently created context. It exists solely to + support maintaining user space access to storage after a process + forks. Upon success, the child process (which invoked the ioctl) + will have access to the same LUNs via the same resource handle(s) + as the parent, but under a different context. + + Context sharing across processes is not supported with CXL and + therefore each fork must be met with establishing a new context + for the child process. This ioctl simplifies the state management + and playback required by a user in such a scenario. When a process + forks, child process can clone the parents context by first creating + a context (via DK_CXLFLASH_ATTACH) and then using this ioctl to + perform the clone from the parent to the child. + + The clone itself is fairly simple. The resource handle and lun + translation tables are copied from the parent context to the child's + and then synced with the AFU. + + When the DK_CXLFLASH_APP_CLOSE_ADAP_FD flag was returned on a successful + attach, the application _must_ close the fd2 associated with the source + context (still resident/accessible in the parent process) following the + clone. This is to avoid a stale entry in the file descriptor table of the + child process. + + This ioctl can return -EAGAIN if an AFU sync operation takes too long. + In addition to returning a failure to user, cxlflash will also schedule + an asynchronous AFU reset. Should the user choose to retry the operation, + it is expected to succeed. If this ioctl fails with -EAGAIN, the user + can either retry the operation or treat it as a failure. + +DK_CXLFLASH_VERIFY +------------------ + This ioctl is used to detect various changes such as the capacity of + the disk changing, the number of LUNs visible changing, etc. In cases + where the changes affect the application (such as a LUN resize), the + cxlflash driver will report the changed state to the application. + + The user calls in when they want to validate that a LUN hasn't been + changed in response to a check condition. As the user is operating out + of band from the kernel, they will see these types of events without + the kernel's knowledge. When encountered, the user's architected + behavior is to call in to this ioctl, indicating what they want to + verify and passing along any appropriate information. For now, only + verifying a LUN change (ie: size different) with sense data is + supported. + +DK_CXLFLASH_RECOVER_AFU +----------------------- + This ioctl is used to drive recovery (if such an action is warranted) + of a specified user context. Any state associated with the user context + is re-established upon successful recovery. + + User contexts are put into an error condition when the device needs to + be reset or is terminating. Users are notified of this error condition + by seeing all 0xF's on an MMIO read. Upon encountering this, the + architected behavior for a user is to call into this ioctl to recover + their context. A user may also call into this ioctl at any time to + check if the device is operating normally. If a failure is returned + from this ioctl, the user is expected to gracefully clean up their + context via release/detach ioctls. Until they do, the context they + hold is not relinquished. The user may also optionally exit the process + at which time the context/resources they held will be freed as part of + the release fop. + + When the DK_CXLFLASH_APP_CLOSE_ADAP_FD flag was returned on a successful + attach, the application _must_ unmap and close the fd2 associated with the + original context following this ioctl returning success and indicating that + the context was recovered (DK_CXLFLASH_RECOVER_AFU_CONTEXT_RESET). + +DK_CXLFLASH_MANAGE_LUN +---------------------- + This ioctl is used to switch a LUN from a mode where it is available + for file-system access (legacy), to a mode where it is set aside for + exclusive user space access (superpipe). In case a LUN is visible + across multiple ports and adapters, this ioctl is used to uniquely + identify each LUN by its World Wide Node Name (WWNN). + + +CXL Flash Driver Host IOCTLs +============================ + + Each host adapter instance that is supported by the cxlflash driver + has a special character device associated with it to enable a set of + host management function. These character devices are hosted in a + class dedicated for cxlflash and can be accessed via `/dev/cxlflash/*`. + + Applications can be written to perform various functions using the + host ioctl APIs below. + + The structure definitions for these IOCTLs are available in: + uapi/scsi/cxlflash_ioctl.h + +HT_CXLFLASH_LUN_PROVISION +------------------------- + This ioctl is used to create and delete persistent LUNs on cxlflash + devices that lack an external LUN management interface. It is only + valid when used with AFUs that support the LUN provision capability. + + When sufficient space is available, LUNs can be created by specifying + the target port to host the LUN and a desired size in 4K blocks. Upon + success, the LUN ID and WWID of the created LUN will be returned and + the SCSI bus can be scanned to detect the change in LUN topology. Note + that partial allocations are not supported. Should a creation fail due + to a space issue, the target port can be queried for its current LUN + geometry. + + To remove a LUN, the device must first be disassociated from the Linux + SCSI subsystem. The LUN deletion can then be initiated by specifying a + target port and LUN ID. Upon success, the LUN geometry associated with + the port will be updated to reflect new number of provisioned LUNs and + available capacity. + + To query the LUN geometry of a port, the target port is specified and + upon success, the following information is presented: + + - Maximum number of provisioned LUNs allowed for the port + - Current number of provisioned LUNs for the port + - Maximum total capacity of provisioned LUNs for the port (4K blocks) + - Current total capacity of provisioned LUNs for the port (4K blocks) + + With this information, the number of available LUNs and capacity can be + can be calculated. + +HT_CXLFLASH_AFU_DEBUG +--------------------- + This ioctl is used to debug AFUs by supporting a command pass-through + interface. It is only valid when used with AFUs that support the AFU + debug capability. + + With exception of buffer management, AFU debug commands are opaque to + cxlflash and treated as pass-through. For debug commands that do require + data transfer, the user supplies an adequately sized data buffer and must + specify the data transfer direction with respect to the host. There is a + maximum transfer size of 256K imposed. Note that partial read completions + are not supported - when errors are experienced with a host read data + transfer, the data buffer is not copied back to the user. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/dawr-power9.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/dawr-power9.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..310f2e0cea812a --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/dawr-power9.rst @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +===================== +DAWR issues on POWER9 +===================== + +On older POWER9 processors, the Data Address Watchpoint Register (DAWR) can +cause a checkstop if it points to cache inhibited (CI) memory. Currently Linux +has no way to distinguish CI memory when configuring the DAWR, so on affected +systems, the DAWR is disabled. + +Affected processor revisions +============================ + +This issue is only present on processors prior to v2.3. The revision can be +found in /proc/cpuinfo:: + + processor : 0 + cpu : POWER9, altivec supported + clock : 3800.000000MHz + revision : 2.3 (pvr 004e 1203) + +On a system with the issue, the DAWR is disabled as detailed below. + +Technical Details: +================== + +DAWR has 6 different ways of being set. +1) ptrace +2) h_set_mode(DAWR) +3) h_set_dabr() +4) kvmppc_set_one_reg() +5) xmon + +For ptrace, we now advertise zero breakpoints on POWER9 via the +PPC_PTRACE_GETHWDBGINFO call. This results in GDB falling back to +software emulation of the watchpoint (which is slow). + +h_set_mode(DAWR) and h_set_dabr() will now return an error to the +guest on a POWER9 host. Current Linux guests ignore this error, so +they will silently not get the DAWR. + +kvmppc_set_one_reg() will store the value in the vcpu but won't +actually set it on POWER9 hardware. This is done so we don't break +migration from POWER8 to POWER9, at the cost of silently losing the +DAWR on the migration. + +For xmon, the 'bd' command will return an error on P9. + +Consequences for users +====================== + +For GDB watchpoints (ie 'watch' command) on POWER9 bare metal , GDB +will accept the command. Unfortunately since there is no hardware +support for the watchpoint, GDB will software emulate the watchpoint +making it run very slowly. + +The same will also be true for any guests started on a POWER9 +host. The watchpoint will fail and GDB will fall back to software +emulation. + +If a guest is started on a POWER8 host, GDB will accept the watchpoint +and configure the hardware to use the DAWR. This will run at full +speed since it can use the hardware emulation. Unfortunately if this +guest is migrated to a POWER9 host, the watchpoint will be lost on the +POWER9. Loads and stores to the watchpoint locations will not be +trapped in GDB. The watchpoint is remembered, so if the guest is +migrated back to the POWER8 host, it will start working again. + +Force enabling the DAWR +======================= +Kernels (since ~v5.2) have an option to force enable the DAWR via:: + + echo Y > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dawr_enable_dangerous + +This enables the DAWR even on POWER9. + +This is a dangerous setting, USE AT YOUR OWN RISK. + +Some users may not care about a bad user crashing their box +(ie. single user/desktop systems) and really want the DAWR. This +allows them to force enable DAWR. + +This flag can also be used to disable DAWR access. Once this is +cleared, all DAWR access should be cleared immediately and your +machine once again safe from crashing. + +Userspace may get confused by toggling this. If DAWR is force +enabled/disabled between getting the number of breakpoints (via +PTRACE_GETHWDBGINFO) and setting the breakpoint, userspace will get an +inconsistent view of what's available. Similarly for guests. + +For the DAWR to be enabled in a KVM guest, the DAWR needs to be force +enabled in the host AND the guest. For this reason, this won't work on +POWERVM as it doesn't allow the HCALL to work. Writes of 'Y' to the +dawr_enable_dangerous file will fail if the hypervisor doesn't support +writing the DAWR. + +To double check the DAWR is working, run this kernel selftest: + + tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/ptrace-hwbreak.c + +Any errors/failures/skips mean something is wrong. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/dexcr.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/dexcr.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..615a631f51fa1b --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/dexcr.rst @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + +========================================== +DEXCR (Dynamic Execution Control Register) +========================================== + +Overview +======== + +The DEXCR is a privileged special purpose register (SPR) introduced in +PowerPC ISA 3.1B (Power10) that allows per-cpu control over several dynamic +execution behaviours. These behaviours include speculation (e.g., indirect +branch target prediction) and enabling return-oriented programming (ROP) +protection instructions. + +The execution control is exposed in hardware as up to 32 bits ('aspects') in +the DEXCR. Each aspect controls a certain behaviour, and can be set or cleared +to enable/disable the aspect. There are several variants of the DEXCR for +different purposes: + +DEXCR + A privileged SPR that can control aspects for userspace and kernel space +HDEXCR + A hypervisor-privileged SPR that can control aspects for the hypervisor and + enforce aspects for the kernel and userspace. +UDEXCR + An optional ultravisor-privileged SPR that can control aspects for the ultravisor. + +Userspace can examine the current DEXCR state using a dedicated SPR that +provides a non-privileged read-only view of the userspace DEXCR aspects. +There is also an SPR that provides a read-only view of the hypervisor enforced +aspects, which ORed with the userspace DEXCR view gives the effective DEXCR +state for a process. + + +Configuration +============= + +The DEXCR is currently unconfigurable. All threads are run with the +NPHIE aspect enabled. + + +coredump and ptrace +=================== + +The userspace values of the DEXCR and HDEXCR (in this order) are exposed under +``NT_PPC_DEXCR``. These are each 64 bits and readonly, and are intended to +assist with core dumps. The DEXCR may be made writable in future. The top 32 +bits of both registers (corresponding to the non-userspace bits) are masked off. + +If the kernel config ``CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE`` is enabled, then +``NT_PPC_HASHKEYR`` is available and exposes the HASHKEYR value of the process +for reading and writing. This is a tradeoff between increased security and +checkpoint/restore support: a process should normally have no need to know its +secret key, but restoring a process requires setting its original key. The key +therefore appears in core dumps, and an attacker may be able to retrieve it from +a coredump and effectively bypass ROP protection on any threads that share this +key (potentially all threads from the same parent that have not run ``exec()``). diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/dscr.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/dscr.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..f735ec5375d557 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/dscr.rst @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +=================================== +DSCR (Data Stream Control Register) +=================================== + +DSCR register in powerpc allows user to have some control of prefetch of data +stream in the processor. Please refer to the ISA documents or related manual +for more detailed information regarding how to use this DSCR to attain this +control of the prefetches . This document here provides an overview of kernel +support for DSCR, related kernel objects, its functionalities and exported +user interface. + +(A) Data Structures: + + (1) thread_struct:: + + dscr /* Thread DSCR value */ + dscr_inherit /* Thread has changed default DSCR */ + + (2) PACA:: + + dscr_default /* per-CPU DSCR default value */ + + (3) sysfs.c:: + + dscr_default /* System DSCR default value */ + +(B) Scheduler Changes: + + Scheduler will write the per-CPU DSCR default which is stored in the + CPU's PACA value into the register if the thread has dscr_inherit value + cleared which means that it has not changed the default DSCR till now. + If the dscr_inherit value is set which means that it has changed the + default DSCR value, scheduler will write the changed value which will + now be contained in thread struct's dscr into the register instead of + the per-CPU default PACA based DSCR value. + + NOTE: Please note here that the system wide global DSCR value never + gets used directly in the scheduler process context switch at all. + +(C) SYSFS Interface: + + - Global DSCR default: /sys/devices/system/cpu/dscr_default + - CPU specific DSCR default: /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpuN/dscr + + Changing the global DSCR default in the sysfs will change all the CPU + specific DSCR defaults immediately in their PACA structures. Again if + the current process has the dscr_inherit clear, it also writes the new + value into every CPU's DSCR register right away and updates the current + thread's DSCR value as well. + + Changing the CPU specific DSCR default value in the sysfs does exactly + the same thing as above but unlike the global one above, it just changes + stuff for that particular CPU instead for all the CPUs on the system. + +(D) User Space Instructions: + + The DSCR register can be accessed in the user space using any of these + two SPR numbers available for that purpose. + + (1) Problem state SPR: 0x03 (Un-privileged, POWER8 only) + (2) Privileged state SPR: 0x11 (Privileged) + + Accessing DSCR through privileged SPR number (0x11) from user space + works, as it is emulated following an illegal instruction exception + inside the kernel. Both mfspr and mtspr instructions are emulated. + + Accessing DSCR through user level SPR (0x03) from user space will first + create a facility unavailable exception. Inside this exception handler + all mfspr instruction based read attempts will get emulated and returned + where as the first mtspr instruction based write attempts will enable + the DSCR facility for the next time around (both for read and write) by + setting DSCR facility in the FSCR register. + +(E) Specifics about 'dscr_inherit': + + The thread struct element 'dscr_inherit' represents whether the thread + in question has attempted and changed the DSCR itself using any of the + following methods. This element signifies whether the thread wants to + use the CPU default DSCR value or its own changed DSCR value in the + kernel. + + (1) mtspr instruction (SPR number 0x03) + (2) mtspr instruction (SPR number 0x11) + (3) ptrace interface (Explicitly set user DSCR value) + + Any child of the process created after this event in the process inherits + this same behaviour as well. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/eeh-pci-error-recovery.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/eeh-pci-error-recovery.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..d6643a91bdf871 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/eeh-pci-error-recovery.rst @@ -0,0 +1,336 @@ +========================== +PCI Bus EEH Error Recovery +========================== + +Linas Vepstas <linas@austin.ibm.com> + +12 January 2005 + + +Overview: +--------- +The IBM POWER-based pSeries and iSeries computers include PCI bus +controller chips that have extended capabilities for detecting and +reporting a large variety of PCI bus error conditions. These features +go under the name of "EEH", for "Enhanced Error Handling". The EEH +hardware features allow PCI bus errors to be cleared and a PCI +card to be "rebooted", without also having to reboot the operating +system. + +This is in contrast to traditional PCI error handling, where the +PCI chip is wired directly to the CPU, and an error would cause +a CPU machine-check/check-stop condition, halting the CPU entirely. +Another "traditional" technique is to ignore such errors, which +can lead to data corruption, both of user data or of kernel data, +hung/unresponsive adapters, or system crashes/lockups. Thus, +the idea behind EEH is that the operating system can become more +reliable and robust by protecting it from PCI errors, and giving +the OS the ability to "reboot"/recover individual PCI devices. + +Future systems from other vendors, based on the PCI-E specification, +may contain similar features. + + +Causes of EEH Errors +-------------------- +EEH was originally designed to guard against hardware failure, such +as PCI cards dying from heat, humidity, dust, vibration and bad +electrical connections. The vast majority of EEH errors seen in +"real life" are due to either poorly seated PCI cards, or, +unfortunately quite commonly, due to device driver bugs, device firmware +bugs, and sometimes PCI card hardware bugs. + +The most common software bug, is one that causes the device to +attempt to DMA to a location in system memory that has not been +reserved for DMA access for that card. This is a powerful feature, +as it prevents what; otherwise, would have been silent memory +corruption caused by the bad DMA. A number of device driver +bugs have been found and fixed in this way over the past few +years. Other possible causes of EEH errors include data or +address line parity errors (for example, due to poor electrical +connectivity due to a poorly seated card), and PCI-X split-completion +errors (due to software, device firmware, or device PCI hardware bugs). +The vast majority of "true hardware failures" can be cured by +physically removing and re-seating the PCI card. + + +Detection and Recovery +---------------------- +In the following discussion, a generic overview of how to detect +and recover from EEH errors will be presented. This is followed +by an overview of how the current implementation in the Linux +kernel does it. The actual implementation is subject to change, +and some of the finer points are still being debated. These +may in turn be swayed if or when other architectures implement +similar functionality. + +When a PCI Host Bridge (PHB, the bus controller connecting the +PCI bus to the system CPU electronics complex) detects a PCI error +condition, it will "isolate" the affected PCI card. Isolation +will block all writes (either to the card from the system, or +from the card to the system), and it will cause all reads to +return all-ff's (0xff, 0xffff, 0xffffffff for 8/16/32-bit reads). +This value was chosen because it is the same value you would +get if the device was physically unplugged from the slot. +This includes access to PCI memory, I/O space, and PCI config +space. Interrupts; however, will continue to be delivered. + +Detection and recovery are performed with the aid of ppc64 +firmware. The programming interfaces in the Linux kernel +into the firmware are referred to as RTAS (Run-Time Abstraction +Services). The Linux kernel does not (should not) access +the EEH function in the PCI chipsets directly, primarily because +there are a number of different chipsets out there, each with +different interfaces and quirks. The firmware provides a +uniform abstraction layer that will work with all pSeries +and iSeries hardware (and be forwards-compatible). + +If the OS or device driver suspects that a PCI slot has been +EEH-isolated, there is a firmware call it can make to determine if +this is the case. If so, then the device driver should put itself +into a consistent state (given that it won't be able to complete any +pending work) and start recovery of the card. Recovery normally +would consist of resetting the PCI device (holding the PCI #RST +line high for two seconds), followed by setting up the device +config space (the base address registers (BAR's), latency timer, +cache line size, interrupt line, and so on). This is followed by a +reinitialization of the device driver. In a worst-case scenario, +the power to the card can be toggled, at least on hot-plug-capable +slots. In principle, layers far above the device driver probably +do not need to know that the PCI card has been "rebooted" in this +way; ideally, there should be at most a pause in Ethernet/disk/USB +I/O while the card is being reset. + +If the card cannot be recovered after three or four resets, the +kernel/device driver should assume the worst-case scenario, that the +card has died completely, and report this error to the sysadmin. +In addition, error messages are reported through RTAS and also through +syslogd (/var/log/messages) to alert the sysadmin of PCI resets. +The correct way to deal with failed adapters is to use the standard +PCI hotplug tools to remove and replace the dead card. + + +Current PPC64 Linux EEH Implementation +-------------------------------------- +At this time, a generic EEH recovery mechanism has been implemented, +so that individual device drivers do not need to be modified to support +EEH recovery. This generic mechanism piggy-backs on the PCI hotplug +infrastructure, and percolates events up through the userspace/udev +infrastructure. Following is a detailed description of how this is +accomplished. + +EEH must be enabled in the PHB's very early during the boot process, +and if a PCI slot is hot-plugged. The former is performed by +eeh_init() in arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh.c, and the later by +drivers/pci/hotplug/pSeries_pci.c calling in to the eeh.c code. +EEH must be enabled before a PCI scan of the device can proceed. +Current Power5 hardware will not work unless EEH is enabled; +although older Power4 can run with it disabled. Effectively, +EEH can no longer be turned off. PCI devices *must* be +registered with the EEH code; the EEH code needs to know about +the I/O address ranges of the PCI device in order to detect an +error. Given an arbitrary address, the routine +pci_get_device_by_addr() will find the pci device associated +with that address (if any). + +The default arch/powerpc/include/asm/io.h macros readb(), inb(), insb(), +etc. include a check to see if the i/o read returned all-0xff's. +If so, these make a call to eeh_dn_check_failure(), which in turn +asks the firmware if the all-ff's value is the sign of a true EEH +error. If it is not, processing continues as normal. The grand +total number of these false alarms or "false positives" can be +seen in /proc/ppc64/eeh (subject to change). Normally, almost +all of these occur during boot, when the PCI bus is scanned, where +a large number of 0xff reads are part of the bus scan procedure. + +If a frozen slot is detected, code in +arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh.c will print a stack trace to +syslog (/var/log/messages). This stack trace has proven to be very +useful to device-driver authors for finding out at what point the EEH +error was detected, as the error itself usually occurs slightly +beforehand. + +Next, it uses the Linux kernel notifier chain/work queue mechanism to +allow any interested parties to find out about the failure. Device +drivers, or other parts of the kernel, can use +`eeh_register_notifier(struct notifier_block *)` to find out about EEH +events. The event will include a pointer to the pci device, the +device node and some state info. Receivers of the event can "do as +they wish"; the default handler will be described further in this +section. + +To assist in the recovery of the device, eeh.c exports the +following functions: + +rtas_set_slot_reset() + assert the PCI #RST line for 1/8th of a second +rtas_configure_bridge() + ask firmware to configure any PCI bridges + located topologically under the pci slot. +eeh_save_bars() and eeh_restore_bars(): + save and restore the PCI + config-space info for a device and any devices under it. + + +A handler for the EEH notifier_block events is implemented in +drivers/pci/hotplug/pSeries_pci.c, called handle_eeh_events(). +It saves the device BAR's and then calls rpaphp_unconfig_pci_adapter(). +This last call causes the device driver for the card to be stopped, +which causes uevents to go out to user space. This triggers +user-space scripts that might issue commands such as "ifdown eth0" +for ethernet cards, and so on. This handler then sleeps for 5 seconds, +hoping to give the user-space scripts enough time to complete. +It then resets the PCI card, reconfigures the device BAR's, and +any bridges underneath. It then calls rpaphp_enable_pci_slot(), +which restarts the device driver and triggers more user-space +events (for example, calling "ifup eth0" for ethernet cards). + + +Device Shutdown and User-Space Events +------------------------------------- +This section documents what happens when a pci slot is unconfigured, +focusing on how the device driver gets shut down, and on how the +events get delivered to user-space scripts. + +Following is an example sequence of events that cause a device driver +close function to be called during the first phase of an EEH reset. +The following sequence is an example of the pcnet32 device driver:: + + rpa_php_unconfig_pci_adapter (struct slot *) // in rpaphp_pci.c + { + calls + pci_remove_bus_device (struct pci_dev *) // in /drivers/pci/remove.c + { + calls + pci_destroy_dev (struct pci_dev *) + { + calls + device_unregister (&dev->dev) // in /drivers/base/core.c + { + calls + device_del (struct device *) + { + calls + bus_remove_device() // in /drivers/base/bus.c + { + calls + device_release_driver() + { + calls + struct device_driver->remove() which is just + pci_device_remove() // in /drivers/pci/pci_driver.c + { + calls + struct pci_driver->remove() which is just + pcnet32_remove_one() // in /drivers/net/pcnet32.c + { + calls + unregister_netdev() // in /net/core/dev.c + { + calls + dev_close() // in /net/core/dev.c + { + calls dev->stop(); + which is just pcnet32_close() // in pcnet32.c + { + which does what you wanted + to stop the device + } + } + } + which + frees pcnet32 device driver memory + } + }}}}}} + + +in drivers/pci/pci_driver.c, +struct device_driver->remove() is just pci_device_remove() +which calls struct pci_driver->remove() which is pcnet32_remove_one() +which calls unregister_netdev() (in net/core/dev.c) +which calls dev_close() (in net/core/dev.c) +which calls dev->stop() which is pcnet32_close() +which then does the appropriate shutdown. + +--- + +Following is the analogous stack trace for events sent to user-space +when the pci device is unconfigured:: + + rpa_php_unconfig_pci_adapter() { // in rpaphp_pci.c + calls + pci_remove_bus_device (struct pci_dev *) { // in /drivers/pci/remove.c + calls + pci_destroy_dev (struct pci_dev *) { + calls + device_unregister (&dev->dev) { // in /drivers/base/core.c + calls + device_del(struct device * dev) { // in /drivers/base/core.c + calls + kobject_del() { //in /libs/kobject.c + calls + kobject_uevent() { // in /libs/kobject.c + calls + kset_uevent() { // in /lib/kobject.c + calls + kset->uevent_ops->uevent() // which is really just + a call to + dev_uevent() { // in /drivers/base/core.c + calls + dev->bus->uevent() which is really just a call to + pci_uevent () { // in drivers/pci/hotplug.c + which prints device name, etc.... + } + } + then kobject_uevent() sends a netlink uevent to userspace + --> userspace uevent + (during early boot, nobody listens to netlink events and + kobject_uevent() executes uevent_helper[], which runs the + event process /sbin/hotplug) + } + } + kobject_del() then calls sysfs_remove_dir(), which would + trigger any user-space daemon that was watching /sysfs, + and notice the delete event. + + +Pro's and Con's of the Current Design +------------------------------------- +There are several issues with the current EEH software recovery design, +which may be addressed in future revisions. But first, note that the +big plus of the current design is that no changes need to be made to +individual device drivers, so that the current design throws a wide net. +The biggest negative of the design is that it potentially disturbs +network daemons and file systems that didn't need to be disturbed. + +- A minor complaint is that resetting the network card causes + user-space back-to-back ifdown/ifup burps that potentially disturb + network daemons, that didn't need to even know that the pci + card was being rebooted. + +- A more serious concern is that the same reset, for SCSI devices, + causes havoc to mounted file systems. Scripts cannot post-facto + unmount a file system without flushing pending buffers, but this + is impossible, because I/O has already been stopped. Thus, + ideally, the reset should happen at or below the block layer, + so that the file systems are not disturbed. + + Reiserfs does not tolerate errors returned from the block device. + Ext3fs seems to be tolerant, retrying reads/writes until it does + succeed. Both have been only lightly tested in this scenario. + + The SCSI-generic subsystem already has built-in code for performing + SCSI device resets, SCSI bus resets, and SCSI host-bus-adapter + (HBA) resets. These are cascaded into a chain of attempted + resets if a SCSI command fails. These are completely hidden + from the block layer. It would be very natural to add an EEH + reset into this chain of events. + +- If a SCSI error occurs for the root device, all is lost unless + the sysadmin had the foresight to run /bin, /sbin, /etc, /var + and so on, out of ramdisk/tmpfs. + + +Conclusions +----------- +There's forward progress ... diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/elf_hwcaps.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/elf_hwcaps.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..4c896cf077c205 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/elf_hwcaps.rst @@ -0,0 +1,231 @@ +.. _elf_hwcaps_powerpc: + +================== +POWERPC ELF HWCAPs +================== + +This document describes the usage and semantics of the powerpc ELF HWCAPs. + + +1. Introduction +--------------- + +Some hardware or software features are only available on some CPU +implementations, and/or with certain kernel configurations, but have no other +discovery mechanism available to userspace code. The kernel exposes the +presence of these features to userspace through a set of flags called HWCAPs, +exposed in the auxiliary vector. + +Userspace software can test for features by acquiring the AT_HWCAP or +AT_HWCAP2 entry of the auxiliary vector, and testing whether the relevant +flags are set, e.g.:: + + bool floating_point_is_present(void) + { + unsigned long HWCAPs = getauxval(AT_HWCAP); + if (HWCAPs & PPC_FEATURE_HAS_FPU) + return true; + + return false; + } + +Where software relies on a feature described by a HWCAP, it should check the +relevant HWCAP flag to verify that the feature is present before attempting to +make use of the feature. + +HWCAP is the preferred method to test for the presence of a feature rather +than probing through other means, which may not be reliable or may cause +unpredictable behaviour. + +Software that targets a particular platform does not necessarily have to +test for required or implied features. For example if the program requires +FPU, VMX, VSX, it is not necessary to test those HWCAPs, and it may be +impossible to do so if the compiler generates code requiring those features. + +2. Facilities +------------- + +The Power ISA uses the term "facility" to describe a class of instructions, +registers, interrupts, etc. The presence or absence of a facility indicates +whether this class is available to be used, but the specifics depend on the +ISA version. For example, if the VSX facility is available, the VSX +instructions that can be used differ between the v3.0B and v3.1B ISA +versions. + +3. Categories +------------- + +The Power ISA before v3.0 uses the term "category" to describe certain +classes of instructions and operating modes which may be optional or +mutually exclusive, the exact meaning of the HWCAP flag may depend on +context, e.g., the presence of the BOOKE feature implies that the server +category is not implemented. + +4. HWCAP allocation +------------------- + +HWCAPs are allocated as described in Power Architecture 64-Bit ELF V2 ABI +Specification (which will be reflected in the kernel's uapi headers). + +5. The HWCAPs exposed in AT_HWCAP +--------------------------------- + +PPC_FEATURE_32 + 32-bit CPU + +PPC_FEATURE_64 + 64-bit CPU (userspace may be running in 32-bit mode). + +PPC_FEATURE_601_INSTR + The processor is PowerPC 601. + Unused in the kernel since f0ed73f3fa2c ("powerpc: Remove PowerPC 601") + +PPC_FEATURE_HAS_ALTIVEC + Vector (aka Altivec, VMX) facility is available. + +PPC_FEATURE_HAS_FPU + Floating point facility is available. + +PPC_FEATURE_HAS_MMU + Memory management unit is present and enabled. + +PPC_FEATURE_HAS_4xxMAC + The processor is 40x or 44x family. + +PPC_FEATURE_UNIFIED_CACHE + The processor has a unified L1 cache for instructions and data, as + found in NXP e200. + Unused in the kernel since 39c8bf2b3cc1 ("powerpc: Retire e200 core (mpc555x processor)") + +PPC_FEATURE_HAS_SPE + Signal Processing Engine facility is available. + +PPC_FEATURE_HAS_EFP_SINGLE + Embedded Floating Point single precision operations are available. + +PPC_FEATURE_HAS_EFP_DOUBLE + Embedded Floating Point double precision operations are available. + +PPC_FEATURE_NO_TB + The timebase facility (mftb instruction) is not available. + This is a 601 specific HWCAP, so if it is known that the processor + running is not a 601, via other HWCAPs or other means, it is not + required to test this bit before using the timebase. + Unused in the kernel since f0ed73f3fa2c ("powerpc: Remove PowerPC 601") + +PPC_FEATURE_POWER4 + The processor is POWER4 or PPC970/FX/MP. + POWER4 support dropped from the kernel since 471d7ff8b51b ("powerpc/64s: Remove POWER4 support") + +PPC_FEATURE_POWER5 + The processor is POWER5. + +PPC_FEATURE_POWER5_PLUS + The processor is POWER5+. + +PPC_FEATURE_CELL + The processor is Cell. + +PPC_FEATURE_BOOKE + The processor implements the embedded category ("BookE") architecture. + +PPC_FEATURE_SMT + The processor implements SMT. + +PPC_FEATURE_ICACHE_SNOOP + The processor icache is coherent with the dcache, and instruction storage + can be made consistent with data storage for the purpose of executing + instructions with the sequence (as described in, e.g., POWER9 Processor + User's Manual, 4.6.2.2 Instruction Cache Block Invalidate (icbi)):: + + sync + icbi (to any address) + isync + +PPC_FEATURE_ARCH_2_05 + The processor supports the v2.05 userlevel architecture. Processors + supporting later architectures DO NOT set this feature. + +PPC_FEATURE_PA6T + The processor is PA6T. + +PPC_FEATURE_HAS_DFP + DFP facility is available. + +PPC_FEATURE_POWER6_EXT + The processor is POWER6. + +PPC_FEATURE_ARCH_2_06 + The processor supports the v2.06 userlevel architecture. Processors + supporting later architectures also set this feature. + +PPC_FEATURE_HAS_VSX + VSX facility is available. + +PPC_FEATURE_PSERIES_PERFMON_COMPAT + The processor supports architected PMU events in the range 0xE0-0xFF. + +PPC_FEATURE_TRUE_LE + The processor supports true little-endian mode. + +PPC_FEATURE_PPC_LE + The processor supports "PowerPC Little-Endian", that uses address + munging to make storage access appear to be little-endian, but the + data is stored in a different format that is unsuitable to be + accessed by other agents not running in this mode. + +6. The HWCAPs exposed in AT_HWCAP2 +---------------------------------- + +PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_2_07 + The processor supports the v2.07 userlevel architecture. Processors + supporting later architectures also set this feature. + +PPC_FEATURE2_HTM + Transactional Memory feature is available. + +PPC_FEATURE2_DSCR + DSCR facility is available. + +PPC_FEATURE2_EBB + EBB facility is available. + +PPC_FEATURE2_ISEL + isel instruction is available. This is superseded by ARCH_2_07 and + later. + +PPC_FEATURE2_TAR + TAR facility is available. + +PPC_FEATURE2_VEC_CRYPTO + v2.07 crypto instructions are available. + +PPC_FEATURE2_HTM_NOSC + System calls fail if called in a transactional state, see + Documentation/arch/powerpc/syscall64-abi.rst + +PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_3_00 + The processor supports the v3.0B / v3.0C userlevel architecture. Processors + supporting later architectures also set this feature. + +PPC_FEATURE2_HAS_IEEE128 + IEEE 128-bit binary floating point is supported with VSX + quad-precision instructions and data types. + +PPC_FEATURE2_DARN + darn instruction is available. + +PPC_FEATURE2_SCV + The scv 0 instruction may be used for system calls, see + Documentation/arch/powerpc/syscall64-abi.rst. + +PPC_FEATURE2_HTM_NO_SUSPEND + A limited Transactional Memory facility that does not support suspend is + available, see Documentation/arch/powerpc/transactional_memory.rst. + +PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_3_1 + The processor supports the v3.1 userlevel architecture. Processors + supporting later architectures also set this feature. + +PPC_FEATURE2_MMA + MMA facility is available. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/elfnote.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/elfnote.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..3ec8d61e9a33fb --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/elfnote.rst @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +========================== +ELF Note PowerPC Namespace +========================== + +The PowerPC namespace in an ELF Note of the kernel binary is used to store +capabilities and information which can be used by a bootloader or userland. + +Types and Descriptors +--------------------- + +The types to be used with the "PowerPC" namespace are defined in [#f1]_. + + 1) PPC_ELFNOTE_CAPABILITIES + +Define the capabilities supported/required by the kernel. This type uses a +bitmap as "descriptor" field. Each bit is described below: + +- Ultravisor-capable bit (PowerNV only). + +.. code-block:: c + + #define PPCCAP_ULTRAVISOR_BIT (1 << 0) + +Indicate that the powerpc kernel binary knows how to run in an +ultravisor-enabled system. + +In an ultravisor-enabled system, some machine resources are now controlled +by the ultravisor. If the kernel is not ultravisor-capable, but it ends up +being run on a machine with ultravisor, the kernel will probably crash +trying to access ultravisor resources. For instance, it may crash in early +boot trying to set the partition table entry 0. + +In an ultravisor-enabled system, a bootloader could warn the user or prevent +the kernel from being run if the PowerPC ultravisor capability doesn't exist +or the Ultravisor-capable bit is not set. + +References +---------- + +.. [#f1] arch/powerpc/include/asm/elfnote.h + diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/features.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/features.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..aeae73df86b0c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/features.rst @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +.. kernel-feat:: $srctree/Documentation/features powerpc diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/firmware-assisted-dump.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/firmware-assisted-dump.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..e363fc48529a0a --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/firmware-assisted-dump.rst @@ -0,0 +1,381 @@ +====================== +Firmware-Assisted Dump +====================== + +July 2011 + +The goal of firmware-assisted dump is to enable the dump of +a crashed system, and to do so from a fully-reset system, and +to minimize the total elapsed time until the system is back +in production use. + +- Firmware-Assisted Dump (FADump) infrastructure is intended to replace + the existing phyp assisted dump. +- Fadump uses the same firmware interfaces and memory reservation model + as phyp assisted dump. +- Unlike phyp dump, FADump exports the memory dump through /proc/vmcore + in the ELF format in the same way as kdump. This helps us reuse the + kdump infrastructure for dump capture and filtering. +- Unlike phyp dump, userspace tool does not need to refer any sysfs + interface while reading /proc/vmcore. +- Unlike phyp dump, FADump allows user to release all the memory reserved + for dump, with a single operation of echo 1 > /sys/kernel/fadump_release_mem. +- Once enabled through kernel boot parameter, FADump can be + started/stopped through /sys/kernel/fadump_registered interface (see + sysfs files section below) and can be easily integrated with kdump + service start/stop init scripts. + +Comparing with kdump or other strategies, firmware-assisted +dump offers several strong, practical advantages: + +- Unlike kdump, the system has been reset, and loaded + with a fresh copy of the kernel. In particular, + PCI and I/O devices have been reinitialized and are + in a clean, consistent state. +- Once the dump is copied out, the memory that held the dump + is immediately available to the running kernel. And therefore, + unlike kdump, FADump doesn't need a 2nd reboot to get back + the system to the production configuration. + +The above can only be accomplished by coordination with, +and assistance from the Power firmware. The procedure is +as follows: + +- The first kernel registers the sections of memory with the + Power firmware for dump preservation during OS initialization. + These registered sections of memory are reserved by the first + kernel during early boot. + +- When system crashes, the Power firmware will copy the registered + low memory regions (boot memory) from source to destination area. + It will also save hardware PTE's. + + NOTE: + The term 'boot memory' means size of the low memory chunk + that is required for a kernel to boot successfully when + booted with restricted memory. By default, the boot memory + size will be the larger of 5% of system RAM or 256MB. + Alternatively, user can also specify boot memory size + through boot parameter 'crashkernel=' which will override + the default calculated size. Use this option if default + boot memory size is not sufficient for second kernel to + boot successfully. For syntax of crashkernel= parameter, + refer to Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/kdump.rst. If any + offset is provided in crashkernel= parameter, it will be + ignored as FADump uses a predefined offset to reserve memory + for boot memory dump preservation in case of a crash. + +- After the low memory (boot memory) area has been saved, the + firmware will reset PCI and other hardware state. It will + *not* clear the RAM. It will then launch the bootloader, as + normal. + +- The freshly booted kernel will notice that there is a new node + (rtas/ibm,kernel-dump on pSeries or ibm,opal/dump/mpipl-boot + on OPAL platform) in the device tree, indicating that + there is crash data available from a previous boot. During + the early boot OS will reserve rest of the memory above + boot memory size effectively booting with restricted memory + size. This will make sure that this kernel (also, referred + to as second kernel or capture kernel) will not touch any + of the dump memory area. + +- User-space tools will read /proc/vmcore to obtain the contents + of memory, which holds the previous crashed kernel dump in ELF + format. The userspace tools may copy this info to disk, or + network, nas, san, iscsi, etc. as desired. + +- Once the userspace tool is done saving dump, it will echo + '1' to /sys/kernel/fadump_release_mem to release the reserved + memory back to general use, except the memory required for + next firmware-assisted dump registration. + + e.g.:: + + # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/fadump_release_mem + +Please note that the firmware-assisted dump feature +is only available on POWER6 and above systems on pSeries +(PowerVM) platform and POWER9 and above systems with OP940 +or later firmware versions on PowerNV (OPAL) platform. +Note that, OPAL firmware exports ibm,opal/dump node when +FADump is supported on PowerNV platform. + +On OPAL based machines, system first boots into an intermittent +kernel (referred to as petitboot kernel) before booting into the +capture kernel. This kernel would have minimal kernel and/or +userspace support to process crash data. Such kernel needs to +preserve previously crash'ed kernel's memory for the subsequent +capture kernel boot to process this crash data. Kernel config +option CONFIG_PRESERVE_FA_DUMP has to be enabled on such kernel +to ensure that crash data is preserved to process later. + +-- On OPAL based machines (PowerNV), if the kernel is build with + CONFIG_OPAL_CORE=y, OPAL memory at the time of crash is also + exported as /sys/firmware/opal/mpipl/core file. This procfs file is + helpful in debugging OPAL crashes with GDB. The kernel memory + used for exporting this procfs file can be released by echo'ing + '1' to /sys/firmware/opal/mpipl/release_core node. + + e.g. + # echo 1 > /sys/firmware/opal/mpipl/release_core + +Implementation details: +----------------------- + +During boot, a check is made to see if firmware supports +this feature on that particular machine. If it does, then +we check to see if an active dump is waiting for us. If yes +then everything but boot memory size of RAM is reserved during +early boot (See Fig. 2). This area is released once we finish +collecting the dump from user land scripts (e.g. kdump scripts) +that are run. If there is dump data, then the +/sys/kernel/fadump_release_mem file is created, and the reserved +memory is held. + +If there is no waiting dump data, then only the memory required to +hold CPU state, HPTE region, boot memory dump, FADump header and +elfcore header, is usually reserved at an offset greater than boot +memory size (see Fig. 1). This area is *not* released: this region +will be kept permanently reserved, so that it can act as a receptacle +for a copy of the boot memory content in addition to CPU state and +HPTE region, in the case a crash does occur. + +Since this reserved memory area is used only after the system crash, +there is no point in blocking this significant chunk of memory from +production kernel. Hence, the implementation uses the Linux kernel's +Contiguous Memory Allocator (CMA) for memory reservation if CMA is +configured for kernel. With CMA reservation this memory will be +available for applications to use it, while kernel is prevented from +using it. With this FADump will still be able to capture all of the +kernel memory and most of the user space memory except the user pages +that were present in CMA region:: + + o Memory Reservation during first kernel + + Low memory Top of memory + 0 boot memory size |<--- Reserved dump area --->| | + | | | Permanent Reservation | | + V V | | V + +-----------+-----/ /---+---+----+-------+-----+-----+----+--+ + | | |///|////| DUMP | HDR | ELF |////| | + +-----------+-----/ /---+---+----+-------+-----+-----+----+--+ + | ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ + | | | | | | + \ CPU HPTE / | | + ------------------------------ | | + Boot memory content gets transferred | | + to reserved area by firmware at the | | + time of crash. | | + FADump Header | + (meta area) | + | + | + Metadata: This area holds a metadata structure whose + address is registered with f/w and retrieved in the + second kernel after crash, on platforms that support + tags (OPAL). Having such structure with info needed + to process the crashdump eases dump capture process. + + Fig. 1 + + + o Memory Reservation during second kernel after crash + + Low memory Top of memory + 0 boot memory size | + | |<------------ Crash preserved area ------------>| + V V |<--- Reserved dump area --->| | + +-----------+-----/ /---+---+----+-------+-----+-----+----+--+ + | | |///|////| DUMP | HDR | ELF |////| | + +-----------+-----/ /---+---+----+-------+-----+-----+----+--+ + | | + V V + Used by second /proc/vmcore + kernel to boot + + +---+ + |///| -> Regions (CPU, HPTE & Metadata) marked like this in the above + +---+ figures are not always present. For example, OPAL platform + does not have CPU & HPTE regions while Metadata region is + not supported on pSeries currently. + + Fig. 2 + + +Currently the dump will be copied from /proc/vmcore to a new file upon +user intervention. The dump data available through /proc/vmcore will be +in ELF format. Hence the existing kdump infrastructure (kdump scripts) +to save the dump works fine with minor modifications. KDump scripts on +major Distro releases have already been modified to work seamlessly (no +user intervention in saving the dump) when FADump is used, instead of +KDump, as dump mechanism. + +The tools to examine the dump will be same as the ones +used for kdump. + +How to enable firmware-assisted dump (FADump): +---------------------------------------------- + +1. Set config option CONFIG_FA_DUMP=y and build kernel. +2. Boot into linux kernel with 'fadump=on' kernel cmdline option. + By default, FADump reserved memory will be initialized as CMA area. + Alternatively, user can boot linux kernel with 'fadump=nocma' to + prevent FADump to use CMA. +3. Optionally, user can also set 'crashkernel=' kernel cmdline + to specify size of the memory to reserve for boot memory dump + preservation. + +NOTE: + 1. 'fadump_reserve_mem=' parameter has been deprecated. Instead + use 'crashkernel=' to specify size of the memory to reserve + for boot memory dump preservation. + 2. If firmware-assisted dump fails to reserve memory then it + will fallback to existing kdump mechanism if 'crashkernel=' + option is set at kernel cmdline. + 3. if user wants to capture all of user space memory and ok with + reserved memory not available to production system, then + 'fadump=nocma' kernel parameter can be used to fallback to + old behaviour. + +Sysfs/debugfs files: +-------------------- + +Firmware-assisted dump feature uses sysfs file system to hold +the control files and debugfs file to display memory reserved region. + +Here is the list of files under kernel sysfs: + + /sys/kernel/fadump_enabled + This is used to display the FADump status. + + - 0 = FADump is disabled + - 1 = FADump is enabled + + This interface can be used by kdump init scripts to identify if + FADump is enabled in the kernel and act accordingly. + + /sys/kernel/fadump_registered + This is used to display the FADump registration status as well + as to control (start/stop) the FADump registration. + + - 0 = FADump is not registered. + - 1 = FADump is registered and ready to handle system crash. + + To register FADump echo 1 > /sys/kernel/fadump_registered and + echo 0 > /sys/kernel/fadump_registered for un-register and stop the + FADump. Once the FADump is un-registered, the system crash will not + be handled and vmcore will not be captured. This interface can be + easily integrated with kdump service start/stop. + + /sys/kernel/fadump/mem_reserved + + This is used to display the memory reserved by FADump for saving the + crash dump. + + /sys/kernel/fadump_release_mem + This file is available only when FADump is active during + second kernel. This is used to release the reserved memory + region that are held for saving crash dump. To release the + reserved memory echo 1 to it:: + + echo 1 > /sys/kernel/fadump_release_mem + + After echo 1, the content of the /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/fadump_region + file will change to reflect the new memory reservations. + + The existing userspace tools (kdump infrastructure) can be easily + enhanced to use this interface to release the memory reserved for + dump and continue without 2nd reboot. + +Note: /sys/kernel/fadump_release_opalcore sysfs has moved to + /sys/firmware/opal/mpipl/release_core + + /sys/firmware/opal/mpipl/release_core + + This file is available only on OPAL based machines when FADump is + active during capture kernel. This is used to release the memory + used by the kernel to export /sys/firmware/opal/mpipl/core file. To + release this memory, echo '1' to it: + + echo 1 > /sys/firmware/opal/mpipl/release_core + +Note: The following FADump sysfs files are deprecated. + ++----------------------------------+--------------------------------+ +| Deprecated | Alternative | ++----------------------------------+--------------------------------+ +| /sys/kernel/fadump_enabled | /sys/kernel/fadump/enabled | ++----------------------------------+--------------------------------+ +| /sys/kernel/fadump_registered | /sys/kernel/fadump/registered | ++----------------------------------+--------------------------------+ +| /sys/kernel/fadump_release_mem | /sys/kernel/fadump/release_mem | ++----------------------------------+--------------------------------+ + +Here is the list of files under powerpc debugfs: +(Assuming debugfs is mounted on /sys/kernel/debug directory.) + + /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/fadump_region + This file shows the reserved memory regions if FADump is + enabled otherwise this file is empty. The output format + is:: + + <region>: [<start>-<end>] <reserved-size> bytes, Dumped: <dump-size> + + and for kernel DUMP region is: + + DUMP: Src: <src-addr>, Dest: <dest-addr>, Size: <size>, Dumped: # bytes + + e.g. + Contents when FADump is registered during first kernel:: + + # cat /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/fadump_region + CPU : [0x0000006ffb0000-0x0000006fff001f] 0x40020 bytes, Dumped: 0x0 + HPTE: [0x0000006fff0020-0x0000006fff101f] 0x1000 bytes, Dumped: 0x0 + DUMP: [0x0000006fff1020-0x0000007fff101f] 0x10000000 bytes, Dumped: 0x0 + + Contents when FADump is active during second kernel:: + + # cat /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/fadump_region + CPU : [0x0000006ffb0000-0x0000006fff001f] 0x40020 bytes, Dumped: 0x40020 + HPTE: [0x0000006fff0020-0x0000006fff101f] 0x1000 bytes, Dumped: 0x1000 + DUMP: [0x0000006fff1020-0x0000007fff101f] 0x10000000 bytes, Dumped: 0x10000000 + : [0x00000010000000-0x0000006ffaffff] 0x5ffb0000 bytes, Dumped: 0x5ffb0000 + + +NOTE: + Please refer to Documentation/filesystems/debugfs.rst on + how to mount the debugfs filesystem. + + +TODO: +----- + - Need to come up with the better approach to find out more + accurate boot memory size that is required for a kernel to + boot successfully when booted with restricted memory. + - The FADump implementation introduces a FADump crash info structure + in the scratch area before the ELF core header. The idea of introducing + this structure is to pass some important crash info data to the second + kernel which will help second kernel to populate ELF core header with + correct data before it gets exported through /proc/vmcore. The current + design implementation does not address a possibility of introducing + additional fields (in future) to this structure without affecting + compatibility. Need to come up with the better approach to address this. + + The possible approaches are: + + 1. Introduce version field for version tracking, bump up the version + whenever a new field is added to the structure in future. The version + field can be used to find out what fields are valid for the current + version of the structure. + 2. Reserve the area of predefined size (say PAGE_SIZE) for this + structure and have unused area as reserved (initialized to zero) + for future field additions. + + The advantage of approach 1 over 2 is we don't need to reserve extra space. + +Author: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com> + +This document is based on the original documentation written for phyp + +assisted dump by Linas Vepstas and Manish Ahuja. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/hvcs.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/hvcs.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..6808acde672f44 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/hvcs.rst @@ -0,0 +1,581 @@ +=============================================================== +HVCS IBM "Hypervisor Virtual Console Server" Installation Guide +=============================================================== + +for Linux Kernel 2.6.4+ + +Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation + +.. =========================================================================== +.. NOTE:Eight space tabs are the optimum editor setting for reading this file. +.. =========================================================================== + + +Author(s): Ryan S. Arnold <rsa@us.ibm.com> + +Date Created: March, 02, 2004 +Last Changed: August, 24, 2004 + +.. Table of contents: + + 1. Driver Introduction: + 2. System Requirements + 3. Build Options: + 3.1 Built-in: + 3.2 Module: + 4. Installation: + 5. Connection: + 6. Disconnection: + 7. Configuration: + 8. Questions & Answers: + 9. Reporting Bugs: + +1. Driver Introduction: +======================= + +This is the device driver for the IBM Hypervisor Virtual Console Server, +"hvcs". The IBM hvcs provides a tty driver interface to allow Linux user +space applications access to the system consoles of logically partitioned +operating systems (Linux and AIX) running on the same partitioned Power5 +ppc64 system. Physical hardware consoles per partition are not practical +on this hardware so system consoles are accessed by this driver using +firmware interfaces to virtual terminal devices. + +2. System Requirements: +======================= + +This device driver was written using 2.6.4 Linux kernel APIs and will only +build and run on kernels of this version or later. + +This driver was written to operate solely on IBM Power5 ppc64 hardware +though some care was taken to abstract the architecture dependent firmware +calls from the driver code. + +Sysfs must be mounted on the system so that the user can determine which +major and minor numbers are associated with each vty-server. Directions +for sysfs mounting are outside the scope of this document. + +3. Build Options: +================= + +The hvcs driver registers itself as a tty driver. The tty layer +dynamically allocates a block of major and minor numbers in a quantity +requested by the registering driver. The hvcs driver asks the tty layer +for 64 of these major/minor numbers by default to use for hvcs device node +entries. + +If the default number of device entries is adequate then this driver can be +built into the kernel. If not, the default can be over-ridden by inserting +the driver as a module with insmod parameters. + +3.1 Built-in: +------------- + +The following menuconfig example demonstrates selecting to build this +driver into the kernel:: + + Device Drivers ---> + Character devices ---> + <*> IBM Hypervisor Virtual Console Server Support + +Begin the kernel make process. + +3.2 Module: +----------- + +The following menuconfig example demonstrates selecting to build this +driver as a kernel module:: + + Device Drivers ---> + Character devices ---> + <M> IBM Hypervisor Virtual Console Server Support + +The make process will build the following kernel modules: + + - hvcs.ko + - hvcserver.ko + +To insert the module with the default allocation execute the following +commands in the order they appear:: + + insmod hvcserver.ko + insmod hvcs.ko + +The hvcserver module contains architecture specific firmware calls and must +be inserted first, otherwise the hvcs module will not find some of the +symbols it expects. + +To override the default use an insmod parameter as follows (requesting 4 +tty devices as an example):: + + insmod hvcs.ko hvcs_parm_num_devs=4 + +There is a maximum number of dev entries that can be specified on insmod. +We think that 1024 is currently a decent maximum number of server adapters +to allow. This can always be changed by modifying the constant in the +source file before building. + +NOTE: The length of time it takes to insmod the driver seems to be related +to the number of tty interfaces the registering driver requests. + +In order to remove the driver module execute the following command:: + + rmmod hvcs.ko + +The recommended method for installing hvcs as a module is to use depmod to +build a current modules.dep file in /lib/modules/`uname -r` and then +execute:: + + modprobe hvcs hvcs_parm_num_devs=4 + +The modules.dep file indicates that hvcserver.ko needs to be inserted +before hvcs.ko and modprobe uses this file to smartly insert the modules in +the proper order. + +The following modprobe command is used to remove hvcs and hvcserver in the +proper order:: + + modprobe -r hvcs + +4. Installation: +================ + +The tty layer creates sysfs entries which contain the major and minor +numbers allocated for the hvcs driver. The following snippet of "tree" +output of the sysfs directory shows where these numbers are presented:: + + sys/ + |-- *other sysfs base dirs* + | + |-- class + | |-- *other classes of devices* + | | + | `-- tty + | |-- *other tty devices* + | | + | |-- hvcs0 + | | `-- dev + | |-- hvcs1 + | | `-- dev + | |-- hvcs2 + | | `-- dev + | |-- hvcs3 + | | `-- dev + | | + | |-- *other tty devices* + | + |-- *other sysfs base dirs* + +For the above examples the following output is a result of cat'ing the +"dev" entry in the hvcs directory:: + + Pow5:/sys/class/tty/hvcs0/ # cat dev + 254:0 + + Pow5:/sys/class/tty/hvcs1/ # cat dev + 254:1 + + Pow5:/sys/class/tty/hvcs2/ # cat dev + 254:2 + + Pow5:/sys/class/tty/hvcs3/ # cat dev + 254:3 + +The output from reading the "dev" attribute is the char device major and +minor numbers that the tty layer has allocated for this driver's use. Most +systems running hvcs will already have the device entries created or udev +will do it automatically. + +Given the example output above, to manually create a /dev/hvcs* node entry +mknod can be used as follows:: + + mknod /dev/hvcs0 c 254 0 + mknod /dev/hvcs1 c 254 1 + mknod /dev/hvcs2 c 254 2 + mknod /dev/hvcs3 c 254 3 + +Using mknod to manually create the device entries makes these device nodes +persistent. Once created they will exist prior to the driver insmod. + +Attempting to connect an application to /dev/hvcs* prior to insertion of +the hvcs module will result in an error message similar to the following:: + + "/dev/hvcs*: No such device". + +NOTE: Just because there is a device node present doesn't mean that there +is a vty-server device configured for that node. + +5. Connection +============= + +Since this driver controls devices that provide a tty interface a user can +interact with the device node entries using any standard tty-interactive +method (e.g. "cat", "dd", "echo"). The intent of this driver however, is +to provide real time console interaction with a Linux partition's console, +which requires the use of applications that provide bi-directional, +interactive I/O with a tty device. + +Applications (e.g. "minicom" and "screen") that act as terminal emulators +or perform terminal type control sequence conversion on the data being +passed through them are NOT acceptable for providing interactive console +I/O. These programs often emulate antiquated terminal types (vt100 and +ANSI) and expect inbound data to take the form of one of these supported +terminal types but they either do not convert, or do not _adequately_ +convert, outbound data into the terminal type of the terminal which invoked +them (though screen makes an attempt and can apparently be configured with +much termcap wrestling.) + +For this reason kermit and cu are two of the recommended applications for +interacting with a Linux console via an hvcs device. These programs simply +act as a conduit for data transfer to and from the tty device. They do not +require inbound data to take the form of a particular terminal type, nor do +they cook outbound data to a particular terminal type. + +In order to ensure proper functioning of console applications one must make +sure that once connected to a /dev/hvcs console that the console's $TERM +env variable is set to the exact terminal type of the terminal emulator +used to launch the interactive I/O application. If one is using xterm and +kermit to connect to /dev/hvcs0 when the console prompt becomes available +one should "export TERM=xterm" on the console. This tells ncurses +applications that are invoked from the console that they should output +control sequences that xterm can understand. + +As a precautionary measure an hvcs user should always "exit" from their +session before disconnecting an application such as kermit from the device +node. If this is not done, the next user to connect to the console will +continue using the previous user's logged in session which includes +using the $TERM variable that the previous user supplied. + +Hotplug add and remove of vty-server adapters affects which /dev/hvcs* node +is used to connect to each vty-server adapter. In order to determine which +vty-server adapter is associated with which /dev/hvcs* node a special sysfs +attribute has been added to each vty-server sysfs entry. This entry is +called "index" and showing it reveals an integer that refers to the +/dev/hvcs* entry to use to connect to that device. For instance cating the +index attribute of vty-server adapter 30000004 shows the following:: + + Pow5:/sys/bus/vio/drivers/hvcs/30000004 # cat index + 2 + +This index of '2' means that in order to connect to vty-server adapter +30000004 the user should interact with /dev/hvcs2. + +It should be noted that due to the system hotplug I/O capabilities of a +system the /dev/hvcs* entry that interacts with a particular vty-server +adapter is not guaranteed to remain the same across system reboots. Look +in the Q & A section for more on this issue. + +6. Disconnection +================ + +As a security feature to prevent the delivery of stale data to an +unintended target the Power5 system firmware disables the fetching of data +and discards that data when a connection between a vty-server and a vty has +been severed. As an example, when a vty-server is immediately disconnected +from a vty following output of data to the vty the vty adapter may not have +enough time between when it received the data interrupt and when the +connection was severed to fetch the data from firmware before the fetch is +disabled by firmware. + +When hvcs is being used to serve consoles this behavior is not a huge issue +because the adapter stays connected for large amounts of time following +almost all data writes. When hvcs is being used as a tty conduit to tunnel +data between two partitions [see Q & A below] this is a huge problem +because the standard Linux behavior when cat'ing or dd'ing data to a device +is to open the tty, send the data, and then close the tty. If this driver +manually terminated vty-server connections on tty close this would close +the vty-server and vty connection before the target vty has had a chance to +fetch the data. + +Additionally, disconnecting a vty-server and vty only on module removal or +adapter removal is impractical because other vty-servers in other +partitions may require the usage of the target vty at any time. + +Due to this behavioral restriction disconnection of vty-servers from the +connected vty is a manual procedure using a write to a sysfs attribute +outlined below, on the other hand the initial vty-server connection to a +vty is established automatically by this driver. Manual vty-server +connection is never required. + +In order to terminate the connection between a vty-server and vty the +"vterm_state" sysfs attribute within each vty-server's sysfs entry is used. +Reading this attribute reveals the current connection state of the +vty-server adapter. A zero means that the vty-server is not connected to a +vty. A one indicates that a connection is active. + +Writing a '0' (zero) to the vterm_state attribute will disconnect the VTERM +connection between the vty-server and target vty ONLY if the vterm_state +previously read '1'. The write directive is ignored if the vterm_state +read '0' or if any value other than '0' was written to the vterm_state +attribute. The following example will show the method used for verifying +the vty-server connection status and disconnecting a vty-server connection:: + + Pow5:/sys/bus/vio/drivers/hvcs/30000004 # cat vterm_state + 1 + + Pow5:/sys/bus/vio/drivers/hvcs/30000004 # echo 0 > vterm_state + + Pow5:/sys/bus/vio/drivers/hvcs/30000004 # cat vterm_state + 0 + +All vty-server connections are automatically terminated when the device is +hotplug removed and when the module is removed. + +7. Configuration +================ + +Each vty-server has a sysfs entry in the /sys/devices/vio directory, which +is symlinked in several other sysfs tree directories, notably under the +hvcs driver entry, which looks like the following example:: + + Pow5:/sys/bus/vio/drivers/hvcs # ls + . .. 30000003 30000004 rescan + +By design, firmware notifies the hvcs driver of vty-server lifetimes and +partner vty removals but not the addition of partner vtys. Since an HMC +Super Admin can add partner info dynamically we have provided the hvcs +driver sysfs directory with the "rescan" update attribute which will query +firmware and update the partner info for all the vty-servers that this +driver manages. Writing a '1' to the attribute triggers the update. An +explicit example follows: + + Pow5:/sys/bus/vio/drivers/hvcs # echo 1 > rescan + +Reading the attribute will indicate a state of '1' or '0'. A one indicates +that an update is in process. A zero indicates that an update has +completed or was never executed. + +Vty-server entries in this directory are a 32 bit partition unique unit +address that is created by firmware. An example vty-server sysfs entry +looks like the following:: + + Pow5:/sys/bus/vio/drivers/hvcs/30000004 # ls + . current_vty devspec name partner_vtys + .. index partner_clcs vterm_state + +Each entry is provided, by default with a "name" attribute. Reading the +"name" attribute will reveal the device type as shown in the following +example:: + + Pow5:/sys/bus/vio/drivers/hvcs/30000003 # cat name + vty-server + +Each entry is also provided, by default, with a "devspec" attribute which +reveals the full device specification when read, as shown in the following +example:: + + Pow5:/sys/bus/vio/drivers/hvcs/30000004 # cat devspec + /vdevice/vty-server@30000004 + +Each vty-server sysfs dir is provided with two read-only attributes that +provide lists of easily parsed partner vty data: "partner_vtys" and +"partner_clcs":: + + Pow5:/sys/bus/vio/drivers/hvcs/30000004 # cat partner_vtys + 30000000 + 30000001 + 30000002 + 30000000 + 30000000 + + Pow5:/sys/bus/vio/drivers/hvcs/30000004 # cat partner_clcs + U5112.428.103048A-V3-C0 + U5112.428.103048A-V3-C2 + U5112.428.103048A-V3-C3 + U5112.428.103048A-V4-C0 + U5112.428.103048A-V5-C0 + +Reading partner_vtys returns a list of partner vtys. Vty unit address +numbering is only per-partition-unique so entries will frequently repeat. + +Reading partner_clcs returns a list of "converged location codes" which are +composed of a system serial number followed by "-V*", where the '*' is the +target partition number, and "-C*", where the '*' is the slot of the +adapter. The first vty partner corresponds to the first clc item, the +second vty partner to the second clc item, etc. + +A vty-server can only be connected to a single vty at a time. The entry, +"current_vty" prints the clc of the currently selected partner vty when +read. + +The current_vty can be changed by writing a valid partner clc to the entry +as in the following example:: + + Pow5:/sys/bus/vio/drivers/hvcs/30000004 # echo U5112.428.10304 + 8A-V4-C0 > current_vty + +Changing the current_vty when a vty-server is already connected to a vty +does not affect the current connection. The change takes effect when the +currently open connection is freed. + +Information on the "vterm_state" attribute was covered earlier on the +chapter entitled "disconnection". + +8. Questions & Answers: +======================= + +Q: What are the security concerns involving hvcs? + +A: There are three main security concerns: + + 1. The creator of the /dev/hvcs* nodes has the ability to restrict + the access of the device entries to certain users or groups. It + may be best to create a special hvcs group privilege for providing + access to system consoles. + + 2. To provide network security when grabbing the console it is + suggested that the user connect to the console hosting partition + using a secure method, such as SSH or sit at a hardware console. + + 3. Make sure to exit the user session when done with a console or + the next vty-server connection (which may be from another + partition) will experience the previously logged in session. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Q: How do I multiplex a console that I grab through hvcs so that other +people can see it: + +A: You can use "screen" to directly connect to the /dev/hvcs* device and +setup a session on your machine with the console group privileges. As +pointed out earlier by default screen doesn't provide the termcap settings +for most terminal emulators to provide adequate character conversion from +term type "screen" to others. This means that curses based programs may +not display properly in screen sessions. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Q: Why are the colors all messed up? +Q: Why are the control characters acting strange or not working? +Q: Why is the console output all strange and unintelligible? + +A: Please see the preceding section on "Connection" for a discussion of how +applications can affect the display of character control sequences. +Additionally, just because you logged into the console using and xterm +doesn't mean someone else didn't log into the console with the HMC console +(vt320) before you and leave the session logged in. The best thing to do +is to export TERM to the terminal type of your terminal emulator when you +get the console. Additionally make sure to "exit" the console before you +disconnect from the console. This will ensure that the next user gets +their own TERM type set when they login. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Q: When I try to CONNECT kermit to an hvcs device I get: +"Sorry, can't open connection: /dev/hvcs*"What is happening? + +A: Some other Power5 console mechanism has a connection to the vty and +isn't giving it up. You can try to force disconnect the consoles from the +HMC by right clicking on the partition and then selecting "close terminal". +Otherwise you have to hunt down the people who have console authority. It +is possible that you already have the console open using another kermit +session and just forgot about it. Please review the console options for +Power5 systems to determine the many ways a system console can be held. + +OR + +A: Another user may not have a connectivity method currently attached to a +/dev/hvcs device but the vterm_state may reveal that they still have the +vty-server connection established. They need to free this using the method +outlined in the section on "Disconnection" in order for others to connect +to the target vty. + +OR + +A: The user profile you are using to execute kermit probably doesn't have +permissions to use the /dev/hvcs* device. + +OR + +A: You probably haven't inserted the hvcs.ko module yet but the /dev/hvcs* +entry still exists (on systems without udev). + +OR + +A: There is not a corresponding vty-server device that maps to an existing +/dev/hvcs* entry. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Q: When I try to CONNECT kermit to an hvcs device I get: +"Sorry, write access to UUCP lockfile directory denied." + +A: The /dev/hvcs* entry you have specified doesn't exist where you said it +does? Maybe you haven't inserted the module (on systems with udev). + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Q: If I already have one Linux partition installed can I use hvcs on said +partition to provide the console for the install of a second Linux +partition? + +A: Yes granted that your are connected to the /dev/hvcs* device using +kermit or cu or some other program that doesn't provide terminal emulation. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Q: Can I connect to more than one partition's console at a time using this +driver? + +A: Yes. Of course this means that there must be more than one vty-server +configured for this partition and each must point to a disconnected vty. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Q: Does the hvcs driver support dynamic (hotplug) addition of devices? + +A: Yes, if you have dlpar and hotplug enabled for your system and it has +been built into the kernel the hvcs drivers is configured to dynamically +handle additions of new devices and removals of unused devices. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Q: For some reason /dev/hvcs* doesn't map to the same vty-server adapter +after a reboot. What happened? + +A: Assignment of vty-server adapters to /dev/hvcs* entries is always done +in the order that the adapters are exposed. Due to hotplug capabilities of +this driver assignment of hotplug added vty-servers may be in a different +order than how they would be exposed on module load. Rebooting or +reloading the module after dynamic addition may result in the /dev/hvcs* +and vty-server coupling changing if a vty-server adapter was added in a +slot between two other vty-server adapters. Refer to the section above +on how to determine which vty-server goes with which /dev/hvcs* node. +Hint; look at the sysfs "index" attribute for the vty-server. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Q: Can I use /dev/hvcs* as a conduit to another partition and use a tty +device on that partition as the other end of the pipe? + +A: Yes, on Power5 platforms the hvc_console driver provides a tty interface +for extra /dev/hvc* devices (where /dev/hvc0 is most likely the console). +In order to get a tty conduit working between the two partitions the HMC +Super Admin must create an additional "serial server" for the target +partition with the HMC gui which will show up as /dev/hvc* when the target +partition is rebooted. + +The HMC Super Admin then creates an additional "serial client" for the +current partition and points this at the target partition's newly created +"serial server" adapter (remember the slot). This shows up as an +additional /dev/hvcs* device. + +Now a program on the target system can be configured to read or write to +/dev/hvc* and another program on the current partition can be configured to +read or write to /dev/hvcs*. Now you have a tty conduit between two +partitions. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +9. Reporting Bugs: +================== + +The proper channel for reporting bugs is either through the Linux OS +distribution company that provided your OS or by posting issues to the +PowerPC development mailing list at: + +linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org + +This request is to provide a documented and searchable public exchange +of the problems and solutions surrounding this driver for the benefit of +all users. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/imc.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/imc.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..633bcee7dc8554 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/imc.rst @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +.. _imc: + +=================================== +IMC (In-Memory Collection Counters) +=================================== + +Anju T Sudhakar, 10 May 2019 + +.. contents:: + :depth: 3 + + +Basic overview +============== + +IMC (In-Memory collection counters) is a hardware monitoring facility that +collects large numbers of hardware performance events at Nest level (these are +on-chip but off-core), Core level and Thread level. + +The Nest PMU counters are handled by a Nest IMC microcode which runs in the OCC +(On-Chip Controller) complex. The microcode collects the counter data and moves +the nest IMC counter data to memory. + +The Core and Thread IMC PMU counters are handled in the core. Core level PMU +counters give us the IMC counters' data per core and thread level PMU counters +give us the IMC counters' data per CPU thread. + +OPAL obtains the IMC PMU and supported events information from the IMC Catalog +and passes on to the kernel via the device tree. The event's information +contains: + +- Event name +- Event Offset +- Event description + +and possibly also: + +- Event scale +- Event unit + +Some PMUs may have a common scale and unit values for all their supported +events. For those cases, the scale and unit properties for those events must be +inherited from the PMU. + +The event offset in the memory is where the counter data gets accumulated. + +IMC catalog is available at: + https://github.com/open-power/ima-catalog + +The kernel discovers the IMC counters information in the device tree at the +`imc-counters` device node which has a compatible field +`ibm,opal-in-memory-counters`. From the device tree, the kernel parses the PMUs +and their event's information and register the PMU and its attributes in the +kernel. + +IMC example usage +================= + +.. code-block:: sh + + # perf list + [...] + nest_mcs01/PM_MCS01_64B_RD_DISP_PORT01/ [Kernel PMU event] + nest_mcs01/PM_MCS01_64B_RD_DISP_PORT23/ [Kernel PMU event] + [...] + core_imc/CPM_0THRD_NON_IDLE_PCYC/ [Kernel PMU event] + core_imc/CPM_1THRD_NON_IDLE_INST/ [Kernel PMU event] + [...] + thread_imc/CPM_0THRD_NON_IDLE_PCYC/ [Kernel PMU event] + thread_imc/CPM_1THRD_NON_IDLE_INST/ [Kernel PMU event] + +To see per chip data for nest_mcs0/PM_MCS_DOWN_128B_DATA_XFER_MC0/: + +.. code-block:: sh + + # ./perf stat -e "nest_mcs01/PM_MCS01_64B_WR_DISP_PORT01/" -a --per-socket + +To see non-idle instructions for core 0: + +.. code-block:: sh + + # ./perf stat -e "core_imc/CPM_NON_IDLE_INST/" -C 0 -I 1000 + +To see non-idle instructions for a "make": + +.. code-block:: sh + + # ./perf stat -e "thread_imc/CPM_NON_IDLE_PCYC/" make + + +IMC Trace-mode +=============== + +POWER9 supports two modes for IMC which are the Accumulation mode and Trace +mode. In Accumulation mode, event counts are accumulated in system Memory. +Hypervisor then reads the posted counts periodically or when requested. In IMC +Trace mode, the 64 bit trace SCOM value is initialized with the event +information. The CPMCxSEL and CPMC_LOAD in the trace SCOM, specifies the event +to be monitored and the sampling duration. On each overflow in the CPMCxSEL, +hardware snapshots the program counter along with event counts and writes into +memory pointed by LDBAR. + +LDBAR is a 64 bit special purpose per thread register, it has bits to indicate +whether hardware is configured for accumulation or trace mode. + +LDBAR Register Layout +--------------------- + + +-------+----------------------+ + | 0 | Enable/Disable | + +-------+----------------------+ + | 1 | 0: Accumulation Mode | + | +----------------------+ + | | 1: Trace Mode | + +-------+----------------------+ + | 2:3 | Reserved | + +-------+----------------------+ + | 4-6 | PB scope | + +-------+----------------------+ + | 7 | Reserved | + +-------+----------------------+ + | 8:50 | Counter Address | + +-------+----------------------+ + | 51:63 | Reserved | + +-------+----------------------+ + +TRACE_IMC_SCOM bit representation +--------------------------------- + + +-------+------------+ + | 0:1 | SAMPSEL | + +-------+------------+ + | 2:33 | CPMC_LOAD | + +-------+------------+ + | 34:40 | CPMC1SEL | + +-------+------------+ + | 41:47 | CPMC2SEL | + +-------+------------+ + | 48:50 | BUFFERSIZE | + +-------+------------+ + | 51:63 | RESERVED | + +-------+------------+ + +CPMC_LOAD contains the sampling duration. SAMPSEL and CPMCxSEL determines the +event to count. BUFFERSIZE indicates the memory range. On each overflow, +hardware snapshots the program counter along with event counts and updates the +memory and reloads the CMPC_LOAD value for the next sampling duration. IMC +hardware does not support exceptions, so it quietly wraps around if memory +buffer reaches the end. + +*Currently the event monitored for trace-mode is fixed as cycle.* + +Trace IMC example usage +======================= + +.. code-block:: sh + + # perf list + [....] + trace_imc/trace_cycles/ [Kernel PMU event] + +To record an application/process with trace-imc event: + +.. code-block:: sh + + # perf record -e trace_imc/trace_cycles/ yes > /dev/null + [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] + [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.012 MB perf.data (21 samples) ] + +The `perf.data` generated, can be read using perf report. + +Benefits of using IMC trace-mode +================================ + +PMI (Performance Monitoring Interrupts) interrupt handling is avoided, since IMC +trace mode snapshots the program counter and updates to the memory. And this +also provide a way for the operating system to do instruction sampling in real +time without PMI processing overhead. + +Performance data using `perf top` with and without trace-imc event. + +PMI interrupts count when `perf top` command is executed without trace-imc event. + +.. code-block:: sh + + # grep PMI /proc/interrupts + PMI: 0 0 0 0 Performance monitoring interrupts + # ./perf top + ... + # grep PMI /proc/interrupts + PMI: 39735 8710 17338 17801 Performance monitoring interrupts + # ./perf top -e trace_imc/trace_cycles/ + ... + # grep PMI /proc/interrupts + PMI: 39735 8710 17338 17801 Performance monitoring interrupts + + +That is, the PMI interrupt counts do not increment when using the `trace_imc` event. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/index.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..a5083479845432 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +======= +powerpc +======= + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + associativity + booting + bootwrapper + cpu_families + cpu_features + cxl + cxlflash + dawr-power9 + dexcr + dscr + eeh-pci-error-recovery + elf_hwcaps + elfnote + firmware-assisted-dump + hvcs + imc + isa-versions + kaslr-booke32 + mpc52xx + papr_hcalls + pci_iov_resource_on_powernv + pmu-ebb + ptrace + qe_firmware + syscall64-abi + transactional_memory + ultravisor + vas-api + vcpudispatch_stats + vmemmap_dedup + + features + +.. only:: subproject and html + + Indices + ======= + + * :ref:`genindex` diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/isa-versions.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/isa-versions.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..a8d6b6028b3ec7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/isa-versions.rst @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +========================== +CPU to ISA Version Mapping +========================== + +Mapping of some CPU versions to relevant ISA versions. + +Note Power4 and Power4+ are not supported. + +========= ==================================================================== +CPU Architecture version +========= ==================================================================== +Power10 Power ISA v3.1 +Power9 Power ISA v3.0B +Power8 Power ISA v2.07 +e6500 Power ISA v2.06 with some exceptions +e5500 Power ISA v2.06 with some exceptions, no Altivec +Power7 Power ISA v2.06 +Power6 Power ISA v2.05 +PA6T Power ISA v2.04 +Cell PPU - Power ISA v2.02 with some minor exceptions + - Plus Altivec/VMX ~= 2.03 +Power5++ Power ISA v2.04 (no VMX) +Power5+ Power ISA v2.03 +Power5 - PowerPC User Instruction Set Architecture Book I v2.02 + - PowerPC Virtual Environment Architecture Book II v2.02 + - PowerPC Operating Environment Architecture Book III v2.02 +PPC970 - PowerPC User Instruction Set Architecture Book I v2.01 + - PowerPC Virtual Environment Architecture Book II v2.01 + - PowerPC Operating Environment Architecture Book III v2.01 + - Plus Altivec/VMX ~= 2.03 +Power4+ - PowerPC User Instruction Set Architecture Book I v2.01 + - PowerPC Virtual Environment Architecture Book II v2.01 + - PowerPC Operating Environment Architecture Book III v2.01 +Power4 - PowerPC User Instruction Set Architecture Book I v2.00 + - PowerPC Virtual Environment Architecture Book II v2.00 + - PowerPC Operating Environment Architecture Book III v2.00 +========= ==================================================================== + + +Key Features +------------ + +========== ================== +CPU VMX (aka. Altivec) +========== ================== +Power10 Yes +Power9 Yes +Power8 Yes +e6500 Yes +e5500 No +Power7 Yes +Power6 Yes +PA6T Yes +Cell PPU Yes +Power5++ No +Power5+ No +Power5 No +PPC970 Yes +Power4+ No +Power4 No +========== ================== + +========== ==== +CPU VSX +========== ==== +Power10 Yes +Power9 Yes +Power8 Yes +e6500 No +e5500 No +Power7 Yes +Power6 No +PA6T No +Cell PPU No +Power5++ No +Power5+ No +Power5 No +PPC970 No +Power4+ No +Power4 No +========== ==== + +========== ==================================== +CPU Transactional Memory +========== ==================================== +Power10 No (* see Power ISA v3.1, "Appendix A. Notes on the Removal of Transactional Memory from the Architecture") +Power9 Yes (* see transactional_memory.txt) +Power8 Yes +e6500 No +e5500 No +Power7 No +Power6 No +PA6T No +Cell PPU No +Power5++ No +Power5+ No +Power5 No +PPC970 No +Power4+ No +Power4 No +========== ==================================== diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/kasan.txt b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/kasan.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..a4f647e4fffa9f --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/kasan.txt @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +KASAN is supported on powerpc on 32-bit and Radix 64-bit only. + +32 bit support +============== + +KASAN is supported on both hash and nohash MMUs on 32-bit. + +The shadow area sits at the top of the kernel virtual memory space above the +fixmap area and occupies one eighth of the total kernel virtual memory space. + +Instrumentation of the vmalloc area is optional, unless built with modules, +in which case it is required. + +64 bit support +============== + +Currently, only the radix MMU is supported. There have been versions for hash +and Book3E processors floating around on the mailing list, but nothing has been +merged. + +KASAN support on Book3S is a bit tricky to get right: + + - It would be good to support inline instrumentation so as to be able to catch + stack issues that cannot be caught with outline mode. + + - Inline instrumentation requires a fixed offset. + + - Book3S runs code with translations off ("real mode") during boot, including a + lot of generic device-tree parsing code which is used to determine MMU + features. + + - Some code - most notably a lot of KVM code - also runs with translations off + after boot. + + - Therefore any offset has to point to memory that is valid with + translations on or off. + +One approach is just to give up on inline instrumentation. This way boot-time +checks can be delayed until after the MMU is set is up, and we can just not +instrument any code that runs with translations off after booting. This is the +current approach. + +To avoid this limitation, the KASAN shadow would have to be placed inside the +linear mapping, using the same high-bits trick we use for the rest of the linear +mapping. This is tricky: + + - We'd like to place it near the start of physical memory. In theory we can do + this at run-time based on how much physical memory we have, but this requires + being able to arbitrarily relocate the kernel, which is basically the tricky + part of KASLR. Not being game to implement both tricky things at once, this + is hopefully something we can revisit once we get KASLR for Book3S. + + - Alternatively, we can place the shadow at the _end_ of memory, but this + requires knowing how much contiguous physical memory a system has _at compile + time_. This is a big hammer, and has some unfortunate consequences: inablity + to handle discontiguous physical memory, total failure to boot on machines + with less memory than specified, and that machines with more memory than + specified can't use it. This was deemed unacceptable. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/kaslr-booke32.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/kaslr-booke32.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..5681c1d1b65b5d --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/kaslr-booke32.rst @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +=========================== +KASLR for Freescale BookE32 +=========================== + +The word KASLR stands for Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization. + +This document tries to explain the implementation of the KASLR for +Freescale BookE32. KASLR is a security feature that deters exploit +attempts relying on knowledge of the location of kernel internals. + +Since CONFIG_RELOCATABLE has already supported, what we need to do is +map or copy kernel to a proper place and relocate. Freescale Book-E +parts expect lowmem to be mapped by fixed TLB entries(TLB1). The TLB1 +entries are not suitable to map the kernel directly in a randomized +region, so we chose to copy the kernel to a proper place and restart to +relocate. + +Entropy is derived from the banner and timer base, which will change every +build and boot. This not so much safe so additionally the bootloader may +pass entropy via the /chosen/kaslr-seed node in device tree. + +We will use the first 512M of the low memory to randomize the kernel +image. The memory will be split in 64M zones. We will use the lower 8 +bit of the entropy to decide the index of the 64M zone. Then we chose a +16K aligned offset inside the 64M zone to put the kernel in:: + + KERNELBASE + + |--> 64M <--| + | | + +---------------+ +----------------+---------------+ + | |....| |kernel| | | + +---------------+ +----------------+---------------+ + | | + |-----> offset <-----| + + kernstart_virt_addr + +To enable KASLR, set CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE = y. If KASLR is enabled and you +want to disable it at runtime, add "nokaslr" to the kernel cmdline. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/mpc52xx.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/mpc52xx.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..5243b1763fad0b --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/mpc52xx.rst @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +============================= +Linux 2.6.x on MPC52xx family +============================= + +For the latest info, go to https://www.246tNt.com/mpc52xx/ + +To compile/use : + + - U-Boot:: + + # <edit Makefile to set ARCH=ppc & CROSS_COMPILE=... ( also EXTRAVERSION + if you wish to ). + # make lite5200_defconfig + # make uImage + + then, on U-boot: + => tftpboot 200000 uImage + => tftpboot 400000 pRamdisk + => bootm 200000 400000 + + - DBug:: + + # <edit Makefile to set ARCH=ppc & CROSS_COMPILE=... ( also EXTRAVERSION + if you wish to ). + # make lite5200_defconfig + # cp your_initrd.gz arch/ppc/boot/images/ramdisk.image.gz + # make zImage.initrd + # make + + then in DBug: + DBug> dn -i zImage.initrd.lite5200 + + +Some remarks: + + - The port is named mpc52xxx, and config options are PPC_MPC52xx. The MGT5100 + is not supported, and I'm not sure anyone is interested in working on it + so. I didn't took 5xxx because there's apparently a lot of 5xxx that have + nothing to do with the MPC5200. I also included the 'MPC' for the same + reason. + - Of course, I inspired myself from the 2.4 port. If you think I forgot to + mention you/your company in the copyright of some code, I'll correct it + ASAP. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/papr_hcalls.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/papr_hcalls.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..80d2c0aadab511 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/papr_hcalls.rst @@ -0,0 +1,302 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +=========================== +Hypercall Op-codes (hcalls) +=========================== + +Overview +========= + +Virtualization on 64-bit Power Book3S Platforms is based on the PAPR +specification [1]_ which describes the run-time environment for a guest +operating system and how it should interact with the hypervisor for +privileged operations. Currently there are two PAPR compliant hypervisors: + +- **IBM PowerVM (PHYP)**: IBM's proprietary hypervisor that supports AIX, + IBM-i and Linux as supported guests (termed as Logical Partitions + or LPARS). It supports the full PAPR specification. + +- **Qemu/KVM**: Supports PPC64 linux guests running on a PPC64 linux host. + Though it only implements a subset of PAPR specification called LoPAPR [2]_. + +On PPC64 arch a guest kernel running on top of a PAPR hypervisor is called +a *pSeries guest*. A pseries guest runs in a supervisor mode (HV=0) and must +issue hypercalls to the hypervisor whenever it needs to perform an action +that is hypervisor privileged [3]_ or for other services managed by the +hypervisor. + +Hence a Hypercall (hcall) is essentially a request by the pseries guest +asking hypervisor to perform a privileged operation on behalf of the guest. The +guest issues a with necessary input operands. The hypervisor after performing +the privilege operation returns a status code and output operands back to the +guest. + +HCALL ABI +========= +The ABI specification for a hcall between a pseries guest and PAPR hypervisor +is covered in section 14.5.3 of ref [2]_. Switch to the Hypervisor context is +done via the instruction **HVCS** that expects the Opcode for hcall is set in *r3* +and any in-arguments for the hcall are provided in registers *r4-r12*. If values +have to be passed through a memory buffer, the data stored in that buffer should be +in Big-endian byte order. + +Once control returns back to the guest after hypervisor has serviced the +'HVCS' instruction the return value of the hcall is available in *r3* and any +out values are returned in registers *r4-r12*. Again like in case of in-arguments, +any out values stored in a memory buffer will be in Big-endian byte order. + +Powerpc arch code provides convenient wrappers named **plpar_hcall_xxx** defined +in a arch specific header [4]_ to issue hcalls from the linux kernel +running as pseries guest. + +Register Conventions +==================== + +Any hcall should follow same register convention as described in section 2.2.1.1 +of "64-Bit ELF V2 ABI Specification: Power Architecture"[5]_. Table below +summarizes these conventions: + ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| Register |Volatile | Purpose | +| Range |(Y/N) | | ++==========+==========+===========================================+ +| r0 | Y | Optional-usage | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| r1 | N | Stack Pointer | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| r2 | N | TOC | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| r3 | Y | hcall opcode/return value | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| r4-r10 | Y | in and out values | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| r11 | Y | Optional-usage/Environmental pointer | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| r12 | Y | Optional-usage/Function entry address at | +| | | global entry point | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| r13 | N | Thread-Pointer | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| r14-r31 | N | Local Variables | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| LR | Y | Link Register | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| CTR | Y | Loop Counter | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| XER | Y | Fixed-point exception register. | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| CR0-1 | Y | Condition register fields. | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| CR2-4 | N | Condition register fields. | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| CR5-7 | Y | Condition register fields. | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ +| Others | N | | ++----------+----------+-------------------------------------------+ + +DRC & DRC Indexes +================= +:: + + DR1 Guest + +--+ +------------+ +---------+ + | | <----> | | | User | + +--+ DRC1 | | DRC | Space | + | PAPR | Index +---------+ + DR2 | Hypervisor | | | + +--+ | | <-----> | Kernel | + | | <----> | | Hcall | | + +--+ DRC2 +------------+ +---------+ + +PAPR hypervisor terms shared hardware resources like PCI devices, NVDIMMs etc +available for use by LPARs as Dynamic Resource (DR). When a DR is allocated to +an LPAR, PHYP creates a data-structure called Dynamic Resource Connector (DRC) +to manage LPAR access. An LPAR refers to a DRC via an opaque 32-bit number +called DRC-Index. The DRC-index value is provided to the LPAR via device-tree +where its present as an attribute in the device tree node associated with the +DR. + +HCALL Return-values +=================== + +After servicing the hcall, hypervisor sets the return-value in *r3* indicating +success or failure of the hcall. In case of a failure an error code indicates +the cause for error. These codes are defined and documented in arch specific +header [4]_. + +In some cases a hcall can potentially take a long time and need to be issued +multiple times in order to be completely serviced. These hcalls will usually +accept an opaque value *continue-token* within there argument list and a +return value of *H_CONTINUE* indicates that hypervisor hasn't still finished +servicing the hcall yet. + +To make such hcalls the guest need to set *continue-token == 0* for the +initial call and use the hypervisor returned value of *continue-token* +for each subsequent hcall until hypervisor returns a non *H_CONTINUE* +return value. + +HCALL Op-codes +============== + +Below is a partial list of HCALLs that are supported by PHYP. For the +corresponding opcode values please look into the arch specific header [4]_: + +**H_SCM_READ_METADATA** + +| Input: *drcIndex, offset, buffer-address, numBytesToRead* +| Out: *numBytesRead* +| Return Value: *H_Success, H_Parameter, H_P2, H_P3, H_Hardware* + +Given a DRC Index of an NVDIMM, read N-bytes from the metadata area +associated with it, at a specified offset and copy it to provided buffer. +The metadata area stores configuration information such as label information, +bad-blocks etc. The metadata area is located out-of-band of NVDIMM storage +area hence a separate access semantics is provided. + +**H_SCM_WRITE_METADATA** + +| Input: *drcIndex, offset, data, numBytesToWrite* +| Out: *None* +| Return Value: *H_Success, H_Parameter, H_P2, H_P4, H_Hardware* + +Given a DRC Index of an NVDIMM, write N-bytes to the metadata area +associated with it, at the specified offset and from the provided buffer. + +**H_SCM_BIND_MEM** + +| Input: *drcIndex, startingScmBlockIndex, numScmBlocksToBind,* +| *targetLogicalMemoryAddress, continue-token* +| Out: *continue-token, targetLogicalMemoryAddress, numScmBlocksToBound* +| Return Value: *H_Success, H_Parameter, H_P2, H_P3, H_P4, H_Overlap,* +| *H_Too_Big, H_P5, H_Busy* + +Given a DRC-Index of an NVDIMM, map a continuous SCM blocks range +*(startingScmBlockIndex, startingScmBlockIndex+numScmBlocksToBind)* to the guest +at *targetLogicalMemoryAddress* within guest physical address space. In +case *targetLogicalMemoryAddress == 0xFFFFFFFF_FFFFFFFF* then hypervisor +assigns a target address to the guest. The HCALL can fail if the Guest has +an active PTE entry to the SCM block being bound. + +**H_SCM_UNBIND_MEM** +| Input: drcIndex, startingScmLogicalMemoryAddress, numScmBlocksToUnbind +| Out: numScmBlocksUnbound +| Return Value: *H_Success, H_Parameter, H_P2, H_P3, H_In_Use, H_Overlap,* +| *H_Busy, H_LongBusyOrder1mSec, H_LongBusyOrder10mSec* + +Given a DRC-Index of an NVDimm, unmap *numScmBlocksToUnbind* SCM blocks starting +at *startingScmLogicalMemoryAddress* from guest physical address space. The +HCALL can fail if the Guest has an active PTE entry to the SCM block being +unbound. + +**H_SCM_QUERY_BLOCK_MEM_BINDING** + +| Input: *drcIndex, scmBlockIndex* +| Out: *Guest-Physical-Address* +| Return Value: *H_Success, H_Parameter, H_P2, H_NotFound* + +Given a DRC-Index and an SCM Block index return the guest physical address to +which the SCM block is mapped to. + +**H_SCM_QUERY_LOGICAL_MEM_BINDING** + +| Input: *Guest-Physical-Address* +| Out: *drcIndex, scmBlockIndex* +| Return Value: *H_Success, H_Parameter, H_P2, H_NotFound* + +Given a guest physical address return which DRC Index and SCM block is mapped +to that address. + +**H_SCM_UNBIND_ALL** + +| Input: *scmTargetScope, drcIndex* +| Out: *None* +| Return Value: *H_Success, H_Parameter, H_P2, H_P3, H_In_Use, H_Busy,* +| *H_LongBusyOrder1mSec, H_LongBusyOrder10mSec* + +Depending on the Target scope unmap all SCM blocks belonging to all NVDIMMs +or all SCM blocks belonging to a single NVDIMM identified by its drcIndex +from the LPAR memory. + +**H_SCM_HEALTH** + +| Input: drcIndex +| Out: *health-bitmap (r4), health-bit-valid-bitmap (r5)* +| Return Value: *H_Success, H_Parameter, H_Hardware* + +Given a DRC Index return the info on predictive failure and overall health of +the PMEM device. The asserted bits in the health-bitmap indicate one or more states +(described in table below) of the PMEM device and health-bit-valid-bitmap indicate +which bits in health-bitmap are valid. The bits are reported in +reverse bit ordering for example a value of 0xC400000000000000 +indicates bits 0, 1, and 5 are valid. + +Health Bitmap Flags: + ++------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Bit | Definition | ++======+=======================================================================+ +| 00 | PMEM device is unable to persist memory contents. | +| | If the system is powered down, nothing will be saved. | ++------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| 01 | PMEM device failed to persist memory contents. Either contents were | +| | not saved successfully on power down or were not restored properly on | +| | power up. | ++------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| 02 | PMEM device contents are persisted from previous IPL. The data from | +| | the last boot were successfully restored. | ++------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| 03 | PMEM device contents are not persisted from previous IPL. There was no| +| | data to restore from the last boot. | ++------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| 04 | PMEM device memory life remaining is critically low | ++------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| 05 | PMEM device will be garded off next IPL due to failure | ++------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| 06 | PMEM device contents cannot persist due to current platform health | +| | status. A hardware failure may prevent data from being saved or | +| | restored. | ++------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| 07 | PMEM device is unable to persist memory contents in certain conditions| ++------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| 08 | PMEM device is encrypted | ++------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| 09 | PMEM device has successfully completed a requested erase or secure | +| | erase procedure. | ++------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +|10:63 | Reserved / Unused | ++------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ + +**H_SCM_PERFORMANCE_STATS** + +| Input: drcIndex, resultBuffer Addr +| Out: None +| Return Value: *H_Success, H_Parameter, H_Unsupported, H_Hardware, H_Authority, H_Privilege* + +Given a DRC Index collect the performance statistics for NVDIMM and copy them +to the resultBuffer. + +**H_SCM_FLUSH** + +| Input: *drcIndex, continue-token* +| Out: *continue-token* +| Return Value: *H_SUCCESS, H_Parameter, H_P2, H_BUSY* + +Given a DRC Index Flush the data to backend NVDIMM device. + +The hcall returns H_BUSY when the flush takes longer time and the hcall needs +to be issued multiple times in order to be completely serviced. The +*continue-token* from the output to be passed in the argument list of +subsequent hcalls to the hypervisor until the hcall is completely serviced +at which point H_SUCCESS or other error is returned by the hypervisor. + +References +========== +.. [1] "Power Architecture Platform Reference" + https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_Architecture_Platform_Reference +.. [2] "Linux on Power Architecture Platform Reference" + https://members.openpowerfoundation.org/document/dl/469 +.. [3] "Definitions and Notation" Book III-Section 14.5.3 + https://openpowerfoundation.org/?resource_lib=power-isa-version-3-0 +.. [4] arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h +.. [5] "64-Bit ELF V2 ABI Specification: Power Architecture" + https://openpowerfoundation.org/?resource_lib=64-bit-elf-v2-abi-specification-power-architecture diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/pci_iov_resource_on_powernv.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/pci_iov_resource_on_powernv.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..f5a5793e16139b --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/pci_iov_resource_on_powernv.rst @@ -0,0 +1,312 @@ +=================================================== +PCI Express I/O Virtualization Resource on Powerenv +=================================================== + +Wei Yang <weiyang@linux.vnet.ibm.com> + +Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@au1.ibm.com> + +Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> + +26 Aug 2014 + +This document describes the requirement from hardware for PCI MMIO resource +sizing and assignment on PowerKVM and how generic PCI code handles this +requirement. The first two sections describe the concepts of Partitionable +Endpoints and the implementation on P8 (IODA2). The next two sections talks +about considerations on enabling SRIOV on IODA2. + +1. Introduction to Partitionable Endpoints +========================================== + +A Partitionable Endpoint (PE) is a way to group the various resources +associated with a device or a set of devices to provide isolation between +partitions (i.e., filtering of DMA, MSIs etc.) and to provide a mechanism +to freeze a device that is causing errors in order to limit the possibility +of propagation of bad data. + +There is thus, in HW, a table of PE states that contains a pair of "frozen" +state bits (one for MMIO and one for DMA, they get set together but can be +cleared independently) for each PE. + +When a PE is frozen, all stores in any direction are dropped and all loads +return all 1's value. MSIs are also blocked. There's a bit more state that +captures things like the details of the error that caused the freeze etc., but +that's not critical. + +The interesting part is how the various PCIe transactions (MMIO, DMA, ...) +are matched to their corresponding PEs. + +The following section provides a rough description of what we have on P8 +(IODA2). Keep in mind that this is all per PHB (PCI host bridge). Each PHB +is a completely separate HW entity that replicates the entire logic, so has +its own set of PEs, etc. + +2. Implementation of Partitionable Endpoints on P8 (IODA2) +========================================================== + +P8 supports up to 256 Partitionable Endpoints per PHB. + + * Inbound + + For DMA, MSIs and inbound PCIe error messages, we have a table (in + memory but accessed in HW by the chip) that provides a direct + correspondence between a PCIe RID (bus/dev/fn) with a PE number. + We call this the RTT. + + - For DMA we then provide an entire address space for each PE that can + contain two "windows", depending on the value of PCI address bit 59. + Each window can be configured to be remapped via a "TCE table" (IOMMU + translation table), which has various configurable characteristics + not described here. + + - For MSIs, we have two windows in the address space (one at the top of + the 32-bit space and one much higher) which, via a combination of the + address and MSI value, will result in one of the 2048 interrupts per + bridge being triggered. There's a PE# in the interrupt controller + descriptor table as well which is compared with the PE# obtained from + the RTT to "authorize" the device to emit that specific interrupt. + + - Error messages just use the RTT. + + * Outbound. That's where the tricky part is. + + Like other PCI host bridges, the Power8 IODA2 PHB supports "windows" + from the CPU address space to the PCI address space. There is one M32 + window and sixteen M64 windows. They have different characteristics. + First what they have in common: they forward a configurable portion of + the CPU address space to the PCIe bus and must be naturally aligned + power of two in size. The rest is different: + + - The M32 window: + + * Is limited to 4GB in size. + + * Drops the top bits of the address (above the size) and replaces + them with a configurable value. This is typically used to generate + 32-bit PCIe accesses. We configure that window at boot from FW and + don't touch it from Linux; it's usually set to forward a 2GB + portion of address space from the CPU to PCIe + 0x8000_0000..0xffff_ffff. (Note: The top 64KB are actually + reserved for MSIs but this is not a problem at this point; we just + need to ensure Linux doesn't assign anything there, the M32 logic + ignores that however and will forward in that space if we try). + + * It is divided into 256 segments of equal size. A table in the chip + maps each segment to a PE#. That allows portions of the MMIO space + to be assigned to PEs on a segment granularity. For a 2GB window, + the segment granularity is 2GB/256 = 8MB. + + Now, this is the "main" window we use in Linux today (excluding + SR-IOV). We basically use the trick of forcing the bridge MMIO windows + onto a segment alignment/granularity so that the space behind a bridge + can be assigned to a PE. + + Ideally we would like to be able to have individual functions in PEs + but that would mean using a completely different address allocation + scheme where individual function BARs can be "grouped" to fit in one or + more segments. + + - The M64 windows: + + * Must be at least 256MB in size. + + * Do not translate addresses (the address on PCIe is the same as the + address on the PowerBus). There is a way to also set the top 14 + bits which are not conveyed by PowerBus but we don't use this. + + * Can be configured to be segmented. When not segmented, we can + specify the PE# for the entire window. When segmented, a window + has 256 segments; however, there is no table for mapping a segment + to a PE#. The segment number *is* the PE#. + + * Support overlaps. If an address is covered by multiple windows, + there's a defined ordering for which window applies. + + We have code (fairly new compared to the M32 stuff) that exploits that + for large BARs in 64-bit space: + + We configure an M64 window to cover the entire region of address space + that has been assigned by FW for the PHB (about 64GB, ignore the space + for the M32, it comes out of a different "reserve"). We configure it + as segmented. + + Then we do the same thing as with M32, using the bridge alignment + trick, to match to those giant segments. + + Since we cannot remap, we have two additional constraints: + + - We do the PE# allocation *after* the 64-bit space has been assigned + because the addresses we use directly determine the PE#. We then + update the M32 PE# for the devices that use both 32-bit and 64-bit + spaces or assign the remaining PE# to 32-bit only devices. + + - We cannot "group" segments in HW, so if a device ends up using more + than one segment, we end up with more than one PE#. There is a HW + mechanism to make the freeze state cascade to "companion" PEs but + that only works for PCIe error messages (typically used so that if + you freeze a switch, it freezes all its children). So we do it in + SW. We lose a bit of effectiveness of EEH in that case, but that's + the best we found. So when any of the PEs freezes, we freeze the + other ones for that "domain". We thus introduce the concept of + "master PE" which is the one used for DMA, MSIs, etc., and "secondary + PEs" that are used for the remaining M64 segments. + + We would like to investigate using additional M64 windows in "single + PE" mode to overlay over specific BARs to work around some of that, for + example for devices with very large BARs, e.g., GPUs. It would make + sense, but we haven't done it yet. + +3. Considerations for SR-IOV on PowerKVM +======================================== + + * SR-IOV Background + + The PCIe SR-IOV feature allows a single Physical Function (PF) to + support several Virtual Functions (VFs). Registers in the PF's SR-IOV + Capability control the number of VFs and whether they are enabled. + + When VFs are enabled, they appear in Configuration Space like normal + PCI devices, but the BARs in VF config space headers are unusual. For + a non-VF device, software uses BARs in the config space header to + discover the BAR sizes and assign addresses for them. For VF devices, + software uses VF BAR registers in the *PF* SR-IOV Capability to + discover sizes and assign addresses. The BARs in the VF's config space + header are read-only zeros. + + When a VF BAR in the PF SR-IOV Capability is programmed, it sets the + base address for all the corresponding VF(n) BARs. For example, if the + PF SR-IOV Capability is programmed to enable eight VFs, and it has a + 1MB VF BAR0, the address in that VF BAR sets the base of an 8MB region. + This region is divided into eight contiguous 1MB regions, each of which + is a BAR0 for one of the VFs. Note that even though the VF BAR + describes an 8MB region, the alignment requirement is for a single VF, + i.e., 1MB in this example. + + There are several strategies for isolating VFs in PEs: + + - M32 window: There's one M32 window, and it is split into 256 + equally-sized segments. The finest granularity possible is a 256MB + window with 1MB segments. VF BARs that are 1MB or larger could be + mapped to separate PEs in this window. Each segment can be + individually mapped to a PE via the lookup table, so this is quite + flexible, but it works best when all the VF BARs are the same size. If + they are different sizes, the entire window has to be small enough that + the segment size matches the smallest VF BAR, which means larger VF + BARs span several segments. + + - Non-segmented M64 window: A non-segmented M64 window is mapped entirely + to a single PE, so it could only isolate one VF. + + - Single segmented M64 windows: A segmented M64 window could be used just + like the M32 window, but the segments can't be individually mapped to + PEs (the segment number is the PE#), so there isn't as much + flexibility. A VF with multiple BARs would have to be in a "domain" of + multiple PEs, which is not as well isolated as a single PE. + + - Multiple segmented M64 windows: As usual, each window is split into 256 + equally-sized segments, and the segment number is the PE#. But if we + use several M64 windows, they can be set to different base addresses + and different segment sizes. If we have VFs that each have a 1MB BAR + and a 32MB BAR, we could use one M64 window to assign 1MB segments and + another M64 window to assign 32MB segments. + + Finally, the plan to use M64 windows for SR-IOV, which will be described + more in the next two sections. For a given VF BAR, we need to + effectively reserve the entire 256 segments (256 * VF BAR size) and + position the VF BAR to start at the beginning of a free range of + segments/PEs inside that M64 window. + + The goal is of course to be able to give a separate PE for each VF. + + The IODA2 platform has 16 M64 windows, which are used to map MMIO + range to PE#. Each M64 window defines one MMIO range and this range is + divided into 256 segments, with each segment corresponding to one PE. + + We decide to leverage this M64 window to map VFs to individual PEs, since + SR-IOV VF BARs are all the same size. + + But doing so introduces another problem: total_VFs is usually smaller + than the number of M64 window segments, so if we map one VF BAR directly + to one M64 window, some part of the M64 window will map to another + device's MMIO range. + + IODA supports 256 PEs, so segmented windows contain 256 segments, so if + total_VFs is less than 256, we have the situation in Figure 1.0, where + segments [total_VFs, 255] of the M64 window may map to some MMIO range on + other devices:: + + 0 1 total_VFs - 1 + +------+------+- -+------+------+ + | | | ... | | | + +------+------+- -+------+------+ + + VF(n) BAR space + + 0 1 total_VFs - 1 255 + +------+------+- -+------+------+- -+------+------+ + | | | ... | | | ... | | | + +------+------+- -+------+------+- -+------+------+ + + M64 window + + Figure 1.0 Direct map VF(n) BAR space + + Our current solution is to allocate 256 segments even if the VF(n) BAR + space doesn't need that much, as shown in Figure 1.1:: + + 0 1 total_VFs - 1 255 + +------+------+- -+------+------+- -+------+------+ + | | | ... | | | ... | | | + +------+------+- -+------+------+- -+------+------+ + + VF(n) BAR space + extra + + 0 1 total_VFs - 1 255 + +------+------+- -+------+------+- -+------+------+ + | | | ... | | | ... | | | + +------+------+- -+------+------+- -+------+------+ + + M64 window + + Figure 1.1 Map VF(n) BAR space + extra + + Allocating the extra space ensures that the entire M64 window will be + assigned to this one SR-IOV device and none of the space will be + available for other devices. Note that this only expands the space + reserved in software; there are still only total_VFs VFs, and they only + respond to segments [0, total_VFs - 1]. There's nothing in hardware that + responds to segments [total_VFs, 255]. + +4. Implications for the Generic PCI Code +======================================== + +The PCIe SR-IOV spec requires that the base of the VF(n) BAR space be +aligned to the size of an individual VF BAR. + +In IODA2, the MMIO address determines the PE#. If the address is in an M32 +window, we can set the PE# by updating the table that translates segments +to PE#s. Similarly, if the address is in an unsegmented M64 window, we can +set the PE# for the window. But if it's in a segmented M64 window, the +segment number is the PE#. + +Therefore, the only way to control the PE# for a VF is to change the base +of the VF(n) BAR space in the VF BAR. If the PCI core allocates the exact +amount of space required for the VF(n) BAR space, the VF BAR value is fixed +and cannot be changed. + +On the other hand, if the PCI core allocates additional space, the VF BAR +value can be changed as long as the entire VF(n) BAR space remains inside +the space allocated by the core. + +Ideally the segment size will be the same as an individual VF BAR size. +Then each VF will be in its own PE. The VF BARs (and therefore the PE#s) +are contiguous. If VF0 is in PE(x), then VF(n) is in PE(x+n). If we +allocate 256 segments, there are (256 - numVFs) choices for the PE# of VF0. + +If the segment size is smaller than the VF BAR size, it will take several +segments to cover a VF BAR, and a VF will be in several PEs. This is +possible, but the isolation isn't as good, and it reduces the number of PE# +choices because instead of consuming only numVFs segments, the VF(n) BAR +space will consume (numVFs * n) segments. That means there aren't as many +available segments for adjusting base of the VF(n) BAR space. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/pmu-ebb.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/pmu-ebb.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..4f474758eb55f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/pmu-ebb.rst @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +======================== +PMU Event Based Branches +======================== + +Event Based Branches (EBBs) are a feature which allows the hardware to +branch directly to a specified user space address when certain events occur. + +The full specification is available in Power ISA v2.07: + + https://www.power.org/documentation/power-isa-version-2-07/ + +One type of event for which EBBs can be configured is PMU exceptions. This +document describes the API for configuring the Power PMU to generate EBBs, +using the Linux perf_events API. + + +Terminology +----------- + +Throughout this document we will refer to an "EBB event" or "EBB events". This +just refers to a struct perf_event which has set the "EBB" flag in its +attr.config. All events which can be configured on the hardware PMU are +possible "EBB events". + + +Background +---------- + +When a PMU EBB occurs it is delivered to the currently running process. As such +EBBs can only sensibly be used by programs for self-monitoring. + +It is a feature of the perf_events API that events can be created on other +processes, subject to standard permission checks. This is also true of EBB +events, however unless the target process enables EBBs (via mtspr(BESCR)) no +EBBs will ever be delivered. + +This makes it possible for a process to enable EBBs for itself, but not +actually configure any events. At a later time another process can come along +and attach an EBB event to the process, which will then cause EBBs to be +delivered to the first process. It's not clear if this is actually useful. + + +When the PMU is configured for EBBs, all PMU interrupts are delivered to the +user process. This means once an EBB event is scheduled on the PMU, no non-EBB +events can be configured. This means that EBB events can not be run +concurrently with regular 'perf' commands, or any other perf events. + +It is however safe to run 'perf' commands on a process which is using EBBs. The +kernel will in general schedule the EBB event, and perf will be notified that +its events could not run. + +The exclusion between EBB events and regular events is implemented using the +existing "pinned" and "exclusive" attributes of perf_events. This means EBB +events will be given priority over other events, unless they are also pinned. +If an EBB event and a regular event are both pinned, then whichever is enabled +first will be scheduled and the other will be put in error state. See the +section below titled "Enabling an EBB event" for more information. + + +Creating an EBB event +--------------------- + +To request that an event is counted using EBB, the event code should have bit +63 set. + +EBB events must be created with a particular, and restrictive, set of +attributes - this is so that they interoperate correctly with the rest of the +perf_events subsystem. + +An EBB event must be created with the "pinned" and "exclusive" attributes set. +Note that if you are creating a group of EBB events, only the leader can have +these attributes set. + +An EBB event must NOT set any of the "inherit", "sample_period", "freq" or +"enable_on_exec" attributes. + +An EBB event must be attached to a task. This is specified to perf_event_open() +by passing a pid value, typically 0 indicating the current task. + +All events in a group must agree on whether they want EBB. That is all events +must request EBB, or none may request EBB. + +EBB events must specify the PMC they are to be counted on. This ensures +userspace is able to reliably determine which PMC the event is scheduled on. + + +Enabling an EBB event +--------------------- + +Once an EBB event has been successfully opened, it must be enabled with the +perf_events API. This can be achieved either via the ioctl() interface, or the +prctl() interface. + +However, due to the design of the perf_events API, enabling an event does not +guarantee that it has been scheduled on the PMU. To ensure that the EBB event +has been scheduled on the PMU, you must perform a read() on the event. If the +read() returns EOF, then the event has not been scheduled and EBBs are not +enabled. + +This behaviour occurs because the EBB event is pinned and exclusive. When the +EBB event is enabled it will force all other non-pinned events off the PMU. In +this case the enable will be successful. However if there is already an event +pinned on the PMU then the enable will not be successful. + + +Reading an EBB event +-------------------- + +It is possible to read() from an EBB event. However the results are +meaningless. Because interrupts are being delivered to the user process the +kernel is not able to count the event, and so will return a junk value. + + +Closing an EBB event +-------------------- + +When an EBB event is finished with, you can close it using close() as for any +regular event. If this is the last EBB event the PMU will be deconfigured and +no further PMU EBBs will be delivered. + + +EBB Handler +----------- + +The EBB handler is just regular userspace code, however it must be written in +the style of an interrupt handler. When the handler is entered all registers +are live (possibly) and so must be saved somehow before the handler can invoke +other code. + +It's up to the program how to handle this. For C programs a relatively simple +option is to create an interrupt frame on the stack and save registers there. + +Fork +---- + +EBB events are not inherited across fork. If the child process wishes to use +EBBs it should open a new event for itself. Similarly the EBB state in +BESCR/EBBHR/EBBRR is cleared across fork(). diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/ptrace.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/ptrace.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..5629edf4d56ec3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/ptrace.rst @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +====== +Ptrace +====== + +GDB intends to support the following hardware debug features of BookE +processors: + +4 hardware breakpoints (IAC) +2 hardware watchpoints (read, write and read-write) (DAC) +2 value conditions for the hardware watchpoints (DVC) + +For that, we need to extend ptrace so that GDB can query and set these +resources. Since we're extending, we're trying to create an interface +that's extendable and that covers both BookE and server processors, so +that GDB doesn't need to special-case each of them. We added the +following 3 new ptrace requests. + +1. PPC_PTRACE_GETHWDBGINFO +============================ + +Query for GDB to discover the hardware debug features. The main info to +be returned here is the minimum alignment for the hardware watchpoints. +BookE processors don't have restrictions here, but server processors have +an 8-byte alignment restriction for hardware watchpoints. We'd like to avoid +adding special cases to GDB based on what it sees in AUXV. + +Since we're at it, we added other useful info that the kernel can return to +GDB: this query will return the number of hardware breakpoints, hardware +watchpoints and whether it supports a range of addresses and a condition. +The query will fill the following structure provided by the requesting process:: + + struct ppc_debug_info { + unit32_t version; + unit32_t num_instruction_bps; + unit32_t num_data_bps; + unit32_t num_condition_regs; + unit32_t data_bp_alignment; + unit32_t sizeof_condition; /* size of the DVC register */ + uint64_t features; /* bitmask of the individual flags */ + }; + +features will have bits indicating whether there is support for:: + + #define PPC_DEBUG_FEATURE_INSN_BP_RANGE 0x1 + #define PPC_DEBUG_FEATURE_INSN_BP_MASK 0x2 + #define PPC_DEBUG_FEATURE_DATA_BP_RANGE 0x4 + #define PPC_DEBUG_FEATURE_DATA_BP_MASK 0x8 + #define PPC_DEBUG_FEATURE_DATA_BP_DAWR 0x10 + #define PPC_DEBUG_FEATURE_DATA_BP_ARCH_31 0x20 + +2. PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG + +Sets a hardware breakpoint or watchpoint, according to the provided structure:: + + struct ppc_hw_breakpoint { + uint32_t version; + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_EXECUTE 0x1 + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_READ 0x2 + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_WRITE 0x4 + uint32_t trigger_type; /* only some combinations allowed */ + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_EXACT 0x0 + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_RANGE_INCLUSIVE 0x1 + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_RANGE_EXCLUSIVE 0x2 + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_MASK 0x3 + uint32_t addr_mode; /* address match mode */ + + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_MODE 0x3 + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_NONE 0x0 + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_AND 0x1 + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_EXACT 0x1 /* different name for the same thing as above */ + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_OR 0x2 + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_AND_OR 0x3 + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_BE_ALL 0x00ff0000 /* byte enable bits */ + #define PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_BE(n) (1<<((n)+16)) + uint32_t condition_mode; /* break/watchpoint condition flags */ + + uint64_t addr; + uint64_t addr2; + uint64_t condition_value; + }; + +A request specifies one event, not necessarily just one register to be set. +For instance, if the request is for a watchpoint with a condition, both the +DAC and DVC registers will be set in the same request. + +With this GDB can ask for all kinds of hardware breakpoints and watchpoints +that the BookE supports. COMEFROM breakpoints available in server processors +are not contemplated, but that is out of the scope of this work. + +ptrace will return an integer (handle) uniquely identifying the breakpoint or +watchpoint just created. This integer will be used in the PPC_PTRACE_DELHWDEBUG +request to ask for its removal. Return -ENOSPC if the requested breakpoint +can't be allocated on the registers. + +Some examples of using the structure to: + +- set a breakpoint in the first breakpoint register:: + + p.version = PPC_DEBUG_CURRENT_VERSION; + p.trigger_type = PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_EXECUTE; + p.addr_mode = PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_EXACT; + p.condition_mode = PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_NONE; + p.addr = (uint64_t) address; + p.addr2 = 0; + p.condition_value = 0; + +- set a watchpoint which triggers on reads in the second watchpoint register:: + + p.version = PPC_DEBUG_CURRENT_VERSION; + p.trigger_type = PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_READ; + p.addr_mode = PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_EXACT; + p.condition_mode = PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_NONE; + p.addr = (uint64_t) address; + p.addr2 = 0; + p.condition_value = 0; + +- set a watchpoint which triggers only with a specific value:: + + p.version = PPC_DEBUG_CURRENT_VERSION; + p.trigger_type = PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_READ; + p.addr_mode = PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_EXACT; + p.condition_mode = PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_AND | PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_BE_ALL; + p.addr = (uint64_t) address; + p.addr2 = 0; + p.condition_value = (uint64_t) condition; + +- set a ranged hardware breakpoint:: + + p.version = PPC_DEBUG_CURRENT_VERSION; + p.trigger_type = PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_EXECUTE; + p.addr_mode = PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_RANGE_INCLUSIVE; + p.condition_mode = PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_NONE; + p.addr = (uint64_t) begin_range; + p.addr2 = (uint64_t) end_range; + p.condition_value = 0; + +- set a watchpoint in server processors (BookS):: + + p.version = 1; + p.trigger_type = PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_RW; + p.addr_mode = PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_RANGE_INCLUSIVE; + or + p.addr_mode = PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_EXACT; + + p.condition_mode = PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_NONE; + p.addr = (uint64_t) begin_range; + /* For PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_RANGE_INCLUSIVE addr2 needs to be specified, where + * addr2 - addr <= 8 Bytes. + */ + p.addr2 = (uint64_t) end_range; + p.condition_value = 0; + +3. PPC_PTRACE_DELHWDEBUG + +Takes an integer which identifies an existing breakpoint or watchpoint +(i.e., the value returned from PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG), and deletes the +corresponding breakpoint or watchpoint.. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/qe_firmware.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/qe_firmware.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..a358f152b7e7e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/qe_firmware.rst @@ -0,0 +1,296 @@ +========================================= +Freescale QUICC Engine Firmware Uploading +========================================= + +(c) 2007 Timur Tabi <timur at freescale.com>, + Freescale Semiconductor + +.. Table of Contents + + I - Software License for Firmware + + II - Microcode Availability + + III - Description and Terminology + + IV - Microcode Programming Details + + V - Firmware Structure Layout + + VI - Sample Code for Creating Firmware Files + +Revision Information +==================== + +November 30, 2007: Rev 1.0 - Initial version + +I - Software License for Firmware +================================= + +Each firmware file comes with its own software license. For information on +the particular license, please see the license text that is distributed with +the firmware. + +II - Microcode Availability +=========================== + +Firmware files are distributed through various channels. Some are available on +http://opensource.freescale.com. For other firmware files, please contact +your Freescale representative or your operating system vendor. + +III - Description and Terminology +================================= + +In this document, the term 'microcode' refers to the sequence of 32-bit +integers that compose the actual QE microcode. + +The term 'firmware' refers to a binary blob that contains the microcode as +well as other data that + + 1) describes the microcode's purpose + 2) describes how and where to upload the microcode + 3) specifies the values of various registers + 4) includes additional data for use by specific device drivers + +Firmware files are binary files that contain only a firmware. + +IV - Microcode Programming Details +=================================== + +The QE architecture allows for only one microcode present in I-RAM for each +RISC processor. To replace any current microcode, a full QE reset (which +disables the microcode) must be performed first. + +QE microcode is uploaded using the following procedure: + +1) The microcode is placed into I-RAM at a specific location, using the + IRAM.IADD and IRAM.IDATA registers. + +2) The CERCR.CIR bit is set to 0 or 1, depending on whether the firmware + needs split I-RAM. Split I-RAM is only meaningful for SOCs that have + QEs with multiple RISC processors, such as the 8360. Splitting the I-RAM + allows each processor to run a different microcode, effectively creating an + asymmetric multiprocessing (AMP) system. + +3) The TIBCR trap registers are loaded with the addresses of the trap handlers + in the microcode. + +4) The RSP.ECCR register is programmed with the value provided. + +5) If necessary, device drivers that need the virtual traps and extended mode + data will use them. + +Virtual Microcode Traps + +These virtual traps are conditional branches in the microcode. These are +"soft" provisional introduced in the ROMcode in order to enable higher +flexibility and save h/w traps If new features are activated or an issue is +being fixed in the RAM package utilizing they should be activated. This data +structure signals the microcode which of these virtual traps is active. + +This structure contains 6 words that the application should copy to some +specific been defined. This table describes the structure:: + + --------------------------------------------------------------- + | Offset in | | Destination Offset | Size of | + | array | Protocol | within PRAM | Operand | + --------------------------------------------------------------| + | 0 | Ethernet | 0xF8 | 4 bytes | + | | interworking | | | + --------------------------------------------------------------- + | 4 | ATM | 0xF8 | 4 bytes | + | | interworking | | | + --------------------------------------------------------------- + | 8 | PPP | 0xF8 | 4 bytes | + | | interworking | | | + --------------------------------------------------------------- + | 12 | Ethernet RX | 0x22 | 1 byte | + | | Distributor Page | | | + --------------------------------------------------------------- + | 16 | ATM Globtal | 0x28 | 1 byte | + | | Params Table | | | + --------------------------------------------------------------- + | 20 | Insert Frame | 0xF8 | 4 bytes | + --------------------------------------------------------------- + + +Extended Modes + +This is a double word bit array (64 bits) that defines special functionality +which has an impact on the software drivers. Each bit has its own impact +and has special instructions for the s/w associated with it. This structure is +described in this table:: + + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + | Bit # | Name | Description | + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + | 0 | General | Indicates that prior to each host command | + | | push command | given by the application, the software must | + | | | assert a special host command (push command)| + | | | CECDR = 0x00800000. | + | | | CECR = 0x01c1000f. | + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + | 1 | UCC ATM | Indicates that after issuing ATM RX INIT | + | | RX INIT | command, the host must issue another special| + | | push command | command (push command) and immediately | + | | | following that re-issue the ATM RX INIT | + | | | command. (This makes the sequence of | + | | | initializing the ATM receiver a sequence of | + | | | three host commands) | + | | | CECDR = 0x00800000. | + | | | CECR = 0x01c1000f. | + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + | 2 | Add/remove | Indicates that following the specific host | + | | command | command: "Add/Remove entry in Hash Lookup | + | | validation | Table" used in Interworking setup, the user | + | | | must issue another command. | + | | | CECDR = 0xce000003. | + | | | CECR = 0x01c10f58. | + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + | 3 | General push | Indicates that the s/w has to initialize | + | | command | some pointers in the Ethernet thread pages | + | | | which are used when Header Compression is | + | | | activated. The full details of these | + | | | pointers is located in the software drivers.| + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + | 4 | General push | Indicates that after issuing Ethernet TX | + | | command | INIT command, user must issue this command | + | | | for each SNUM of Ethernet TX thread. | + | | | CECDR = 0x00800003. | + | | | CECR = 0x7'b{0}, 8'b{Enet TX thread SNUM}, | + | | | 1'b{1}, 12'b{0}, 4'b{1} | + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + | 5 - 31 | N/A | Reserved, set to zero. | + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + +V - Firmware Structure Layout +============================== + +QE microcode from Freescale is typically provided as a header file. This +header file contains macros that define the microcode binary itself as well as +some other data used in uploading that microcode. The format of these files +do not lend themselves to simple inclusion into other code. Hence, +the need for a more portable format. This section defines that format. + +Instead of distributing a header file, the microcode and related data are +embedded into a binary blob. This blob is passed to the qe_upload_firmware() +function, which parses the blob and performs everything necessary to upload +the microcode. + +All integers are big-endian. See the comments for function +qe_upload_firmware() for up-to-date implementation information. + +This structure supports versioning, where the version of the structure is +embedded into the structure itself. To ensure forward and backwards +compatibility, all versions of the structure must use the same 'qe_header' +structure at the beginning. + +'header' (type: struct qe_header): + The 'length' field is the size, in bytes, of the entire structure, + including all the microcode embedded in it, as well as the CRC (if + present). + + The 'magic' field is an array of three bytes that contains the letters + 'Q', 'E', and 'F'. This is an identifier that indicates that this + structure is a QE Firmware structure. + + The 'version' field is a single byte that indicates the version of this + structure. If the layout of the structure should ever need to be + changed to add support for additional types of microcode, then the + version number should also be changed. + +The 'id' field is a null-terminated string(suitable for printing) that +identifies the firmware. + +The 'count' field indicates the number of 'microcode' structures. There +must be one and only one 'microcode' structure for each RISC processor. +Therefore, this field also represents the number of RISC processors for this +SOC. + +The 'soc' structure contains the SOC numbers and revisions used to match +the microcode to the SOC itself. Normally, the microcode loader should +check the data in this structure with the SOC number and revisions, and +only upload the microcode if there's a match. However, this check is not +made on all platforms. + +Although it is not recommended, you can specify '0' in the soc.model +field to skip matching SOCs altogether. + +The 'model' field is a 16-bit number that matches the actual SOC. The +'major' and 'minor' fields are the major and minor revision numbers, +respectively, of the SOC. + +For example, to match the 8323, revision 1.0:: + + soc.model = 8323 + soc.major = 1 + soc.minor = 0 + +'padding' is necessary for structure alignment. This field ensures that the +'extended_modes' field is aligned on a 64-bit boundary. + +'extended_modes' is a bitfield that defines special functionality which has an +impact on the device drivers. Each bit has its own impact and has special +instructions for the driver associated with it. This field is stored in +the QE library and available to any driver that calls qe_get_firmware_info(). + +'vtraps' is an array of 8 words that contain virtual trap values for each +virtual traps. As with 'extended_modes', this field is stored in the QE +library and available to any driver that calls qe_get_firmware_info(). + +'microcode' (type: struct qe_microcode): + For each RISC processor there is one 'microcode' structure. The first + 'microcode' structure is for the first RISC, and so on. + + The 'id' field is a null-terminated string suitable for printing that + identifies this particular microcode. + + 'traps' is an array of 16 words that contain hardware trap values + for each of the 16 traps. If trap[i] is 0, then this particular + trap is to be ignored (i.e. not written to TIBCR[i]). The entire value + is written as-is to the TIBCR[i] register, so be sure to set the EN + and T_IBP bits if necessary. + + 'eccr' is the value to program into the ECCR register. + + 'iram_offset' is the offset into IRAM to start writing the + microcode. + + 'count' is the number of 32-bit words in the microcode. + + 'code_offset' is the offset, in bytes, from the beginning of this + structure where the microcode itself can be found. The first + microcode binary should be located immediately after the 'microcode' + array. + + 'major', 'minor', and 'revision' are the major, minor, and revision + version numbers, respectively, of the microcode. If all values are 0, + then these fields are ignored. + + 'reserved' is necessary for structure alignment. Since 'microcode' + is an array, the 64-bit 'extended_modes' field needs to be aligned + on a 64-bit boundary, and this can only happen if the size of + 'microcode' is a multiple of 8 bytes. To ensure that, we add + 'reserved'. + +After the last microcode is a 32-bit CRC. It can be calculated using +this algorithm:: + + u32 crc32(const u8 *p, unsigned int len) + { + unsigned int i; + u32 crc = 0; + + while (len--) { + crc ^= *p++; + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + crc = (crc >> 1) ^ ((crc & 1) ? 0xedb88320 : 0); + } + return crc; + } + +VI - Sample Code for Creating Firmware Files +============================================ + +A Python program that creates firmware binaries from the header files normally +distributed by Freescale can be found on http://opensource.freescale.com. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/syscall64-abi.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/syscall64-abi.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..56490c4c0c07a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/syscall64-abi.rst @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +=============================================== +Power Architecture 64-bit Linux system call ABI +=============================================== + +syscall +======= + +Invocation +---------- +The syscall is made with the sc instruction, and returns with execution +continuing at the instruction following the sc instruction. + +If PPC_FEATURE2_SCV appears in the AT_HWCAP2 ELF auxiliary vector, the +scv 0 instruction is an alternative that may provide better performance, +with some differences to calling sequence. + +syscall calling sequence\ [1]_ matches the Power Architecture 64-bit ELF ABI +specification C function calling sequence, including register preservation +rules, with the following differences. + +.. [1] Some syscalls (typically low-level management functions) may have + different calling sequences (e.g., rt_sigreturn). + +Parameters +---------- +The system call number is specified in r0. + +There is a maximum of 6 integer parameters to a syscall, passed in r3-r8. + +Return value +------------ +- For the sc instruction, both a value and an error condition are returned. + cr0.SO is the error condition, and r3 is the return value. When cr0.SO is + clear, the syscall succeeded and r3 is the return value. When cr0.SO is set, + the syscall failed and r3 is the error value (that normally corresponds to + errno). + +- For the scv 0 instruction, the return value indicates failure if it is + -4095..-1 (i.e., it is >= -MAX_ERRNO (-4095) as an unsigned comparison), + in which case the error value is the negated return value. + +Stack +----- +System calls do not modify the caller's stack frame. For example, the caller's +stack frame LR and CR save fields are not used. + +Register preservation rules +--------------------------- +Register preservation rules match the ELF ABI calling sequence with some +differences. + +For the sc instruction, the differences from the ELF ABI are as follows: + ++--------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------+ +| Register | Preservation Rules | Purpose | ++==============+====================+=========================================+ +| r0 | Volatile | (System call number.) | ++--------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------+ +| r3 | Volatile | (Parameter 1, and return value.) | ++--------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------+ +| r4-r8 | Volatile | (Parameters 2-6.) | ++--------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------+ +| cr0 | Volatile | (cr0.SO is the return error condition.) | ++--------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------+ +| cr1, cr5-7 | Nonvolatile | | ++--------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------+ +| lr | Nonvolatile | | ++--------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------+ + +For the scv 0 instruction, the differences from the ELF ABI are as follows: + ++--------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------+ +| Register | Preservation Rules | Purpose | ++==============+====================+=========================================+ +| r0 | Volatile | (System call number.) | ++--------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------+ +| r3 | Volatile | (Parameter 1, and return value.) | ++--------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------+ +| r4-r8 | Volatile | (Parameters 2-6.) | ++--------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------+ + +All floating point and vector data registers as well as control and status +registers are nonvolatile. + +Transactional Memory +-------------------- +Syscall behavior can change if the processor is in transactional or suspended +transaction state, and the syscall can affect the behavior of the transaction. + +If the processor is in suspended state when a syscall is made, the syscall +will be performed as normal, and will return as normal. The syscall will be +performed in suspended state, so its side effects will be persistent according +to the usual transactional memory semantics. A syscall may or may not result +in the transaction being doomed by hardware. + +If the processor is in transactional state when a syscall is made, then the +behavior depends on the presence of PPC_FEATURE2_HTM_NOSC in the AT_HWCAP2 ELF +auxiliary vector. + +- If present, which is the case for newer kernels, then the syscall will not + be performed and the transaction will be doomed by the kernel with the + failure code TM_CAUSE_SYSCALL | TM_CAUSE_PERSISTENT in the TEXASR SPR. + +- If not present (older kernels), then the kernel will suspend the + transactional state and the syscall will proceed as in the case of a + suspended state syscall, and will resume the transactional state before + returning to the caller. This case is not well defined or supported, so this + behavior should not be relied upon. + +scv 0 syscalls will always behave as PPC_FEATURE2_HTM_NOSC. + +ptrace +------ +When ptracing system calls (PTRACE_SYSCALL), the pt_regs.trap value contains +the system call type that can be used to distinguish between sc and scv 0 +system calls, and the different register conventions can be accounted for. + +If the value of (pt_regs.trap & 0xfff0) is 0xc00 then the system call was +performed with the sc instruction, if it is 0x3000 then the system call was +performed with the scv 0 instruction. + +vsyscall +======== + +vsyscall calling sequence matches the syscall calling sequence, with the +following differences. Some vsyscalls may have different calling sequences. + +Parameters and return value +--------------------------- +r0 is not used as an input. The vsyscall is selected by its address. + +Stack +----- +The vsyscall may or may not use the caller's stack frame save areas. + +Register preservation rules +--------------------------- + +=========== ======== +r0 Volatile +cr1, cr5-7 Volatile +lr Volatile +=========== ======== + +Invocation +---------- +The vsyscall is performed with a branch-with-link instruction to the vsyscall +function address. + +Transactional Memory +-------------------- +vsyscalls will run in the same transactional state as the caller. A vsyscall +may or may not result in the transaction being doomed by hardware. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/transactional_memory.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/transactional_memory.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..040a20675fd14d --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/transactional_memory.rst @@ -0,0 +1,274 @@ +============================ +Transactional Memory support +============================ + +POWER kernel support for this feature is currently limited to supporting +its use by user programs. It is not currently used by the kernel itself. + +This file aims to sum up how it is supported by Linux and what behaviour you +can expect from your user programs. + + +Basic overview +============== + +Hardware Transactional Memory is supported on POWER8 processors, and is a +feature that enables a different form of atomic memory access. Several new +instructions are presented to delimit transactions; transactions are +guaranteed to either complete atomically or roll back and undo any partial +changes. + +A simple transaction looks like this:: + + begin_move_money: + tbegin + beq abort_handler + + ld r4, SAVINGS_ACCT(r3) + ld r5, CURRENT_ACCT(r3) + subi r5, r5, 1 + addi r4, r4, 1 + std r4, SAVINGS_ACCT(r3) + std r5, CURRENT_ACCT(r3) + + tend + + b continue + + abort_handler: + ... test for odd failures ... + + /* Retry the transaction if it failed because it conflicted with + * someone else: */ + b begin_move_money + + +The 'tbegin' instruction denotes the start point, and 'tend' the end point. +Between these points the processor is in 'Transactional' state; any memory +references will complete in one go if there are no conflicts with other +transactional or non-transactional accesses within the system. In this +example, the transaction completes as though it were normal straight-line code +IF no other processor has touched SAVINGS_ACCT(r3) or CURRENT_ACCT(r3); an +atomic move of money from the current account to the savings account has been +performed. Even though the normal ld/std instructions are used (note no +lwarx/stwcx), either *both* SAVINGS_ACCT(r3) and CURRENT_ACCT(r3) will be +updated, or neither will be updated. + +If, in the meantime, there is a conflict with the locations accessed by the +transaction, the transaction will be aborted by the CPU. Register and memory +state will roll back to that at the 'tbegin', and control will continue from +'tbegin+4'. The branch to abort_handler will be taken this second time; the +abort handler can check the cause of the failure, and retry. + +Checkpointed registers include all GPRs, FPRs, VRs/VSRs, LR, CCR/CR, CTR, FPCSR +and a few other status/flag regs; see the ISA for details. + +Causes of transaction aborts +============================ + +- Conflicts with cache lines used by other processors +- Signals +- Context switches +- See the ISA for full documentation of everything that will abort transactions. + + +Syscalls +======== + +Syscalls made from within an active transaction will not be performed and the +transaction will be doomed by the kernel with the failure code TM_CAUSE_SYSCALL +| TM_CAUSE_PERSISTENT. + +Syscalls made from within a suspended transaction are performed as normal and +the transaction is not explicitly doomed by the kernel. However, what the +kernel does to perform the syscall may result in the transaction being doomed +by the hardware. The syscall is performed in suspended mode so any side +effects will be persistent, independent of transaction success or failure. No +guarantees are provided by the kernel about which syscalls will affect +transaction success. + +Care must be taken when relying on syscalls to abort during active transactions +if the calls are made via a library. Libraries may cache values (which may +give the appearance of success) or perform operations that cause transaction +failure before entering the kernel (which may produce different failure codes). +Examples are glibc's getpid() and lazy symbol resolution. + + +Signals +======= + +Delivery of signals (both sync and async) during transactions provides a second +thread state (ucontext/mcontext) to represent the second transactional register +state. Signal delivery 'treclaim's to capture both register states, so signals +abort transactions. The usual ucontext_t passed to the signal handler +represents the checkpointed/original register state; the signal appears to have +arisen at 'tbegin+4'. + +If the sighandler ucontext has uc_link set, a second ucontext has been +delivered. For future compatibility the MSR.TS field should be checked to +determine the transactional state -- if so, the second ucontext in uc->uc_link +represents the active transactional registers at the point of the signal. + +For 64-bit processes, uc->uc_mcontext.regs->msr is a full 64-bit MSR and its TS +field shows the transactional mode. + +For 32-bit processes, the mcontext's MSR register is only 32 bits; the top 32 +bits are stored in the MSR of the second ucontext, i.e. in +uc->uc_link->uc_mcontext.regs->msr. The top word contains the transactional +state TS. + +However, basic signal handlers don't need to be aware of transactions +and simply returning from the handler will deal with things correctly: + +Transaction-aware signal handlers can read the transactional register state +from the second ucontext. This will be necessary for crash handlers to +determine, for example, the address of the instruction causing the SIGSEGV. + +Example signal handler:: + + void crash_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *si, void *uc) + { + ucontext_t *ucp = uc; + ucontext_t *transactional_ucp = ucp->uc_link; + + if (ucp_link) { + u64 msr = ucp->uc_mcontext.regs->msr; + /* May have transactional ucontext! */ + #ifndef __powerpc64__ + msr |= ((u64)transactional_ucp->uc_mcontext.regs->msr) << 32; + #endif + if (MSR_TM_ACTIVE(msr)) { + /* Yes, we crashed during a transaction. Oops. */ + fprintf(stderr, "Transaction to be restarted at 0x%llx, but " + "crashy instruction was at 0x%llx\n", + ucp->uc_mcontext.regs->nip, + transactional_ucp->uc_mcontext.regs->nip); + } + } + + fix_the_problem(ucp->dar); + } + +When in an active transaction that takes a signal, we need to be careful with +the stack. It's possible that the stack has moved back up after the tbegin. +The obvious case here is when the tbegin is called inside a function that +returns before a tend. In this case, the stack is part of the checkpointed +transactional memory state. If we write over this non transactionally or in +suspend, we are in trouble because if we get a tm abort, the program counter and +stack pointer will be back at the tbegin but our in memory stack won't be valid +anymore. + +To avoid this, when taking a signal in an active transaction, we need to use +the stack pointer from the checkpointed state, rather than the speculated +state. This ensures that the signal context (written tm suspended) will be +written below the stack required for the rollback. The transaction is aborted +because of the treclaim, so any memory written between the tbegin and the +signal will be rolled back anyway. + +For signals taken in non-TM or suspended mode, we use the +normal/non-checkpointed stack pointer. + +Any transaction initiated inside a sighandler and suspended on return +from the sighandler to the kernel will get reclaimed and discarded. + +Failure cause codes used by kernel +================================== + +These are defined in <asm/reg.h>, and distinguish different reasons why the +kernel aborted a transaction: + + ====================== ================================ + TM_CAUSE_RESCHED Thread was rescheduled. + TM_CAUSE_TLBI Software TLB invalid. + TM_CAUSE_FAC_UNAV FP/VEC/VSX unavailable trap. + TM_CAUSE_SYSCALL Syscall from active transaction. + TM_CAUSE_SIGNAL Signal delivered. + TM_CAUSE_MISC Currently unused. + TM_CAUSE_ALIGNMENT Alignment fault. + TM_CAUSE_EMULATE Emulation that touched memory. + ====================== ================================ + +These can be checked by the user program's abort handler as TEXASR[0:7]. If +bit 7 is set, it indicates that the error is considered persistent. For example +a TM_CAUSE_ALIGNMENT will be persistent while a TM_CAUSE_RESCHED will not. + +GDB +=== + +GDB and ptrace are not currently TM-aware. If one stops during a transaction, +it looks like the transaction has just started (the checkpointed state is +presented). The transaction cannot then be continued and will take the failure +handler route. Furthermore, the transactional 2nd register state will be +inaccessible. GDB can currently be used on programs using TM, but not sensibly +in parts within transactions. + +POWER9 +====== + +TM on POWER9 has issues with storing the complete register state. This +is described in this commit:: + + commit 4bb3c7a0208fc13ca70598efd109901a7cd45ae7 + Author: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> + Date: Wed Mar 21 21:32:01 2018 +1100 + KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Work around transactional memory bugs in POWER9 + +To account for this different POWER9 chips have TM enabled in +different ways. + +On POWER9N DD2.01 and below, TM is disabled. ie +HWCAP2[PPC_FEATURE2_HTM] is not set. + +On POWER9N DD2.1 TM is configured by firmware to always abort a +transaction when tm suspend occurs. So tsuspend will cause a +transaction to be aborted and rolled back. Kernel exceptions will also +cause the transaction to be aborted and rolled back and the exception +will not occur. If userspace constructs a sigcontext that enables TM +suspend, the sigcontext will be rejected by the kernel. This mode is +advertised to users with HWCAP2[PPC_FEATURE2_HTM_NO_SUSPEND] set. +HWCAP2[PPC_FEATURE2_HTM] is not set in this mode. + +On POWER9N DD2.2 and above, KVM and POWERVM emulate TM for guests (as +described in commit 4bb3c7a0208f), hence TM is enabled for guests +ie. HWCAP2[PPC_FEATURE2_HTM] is set for guest userspace. Guests that +makes heavy use of TM suspend (tsuspend or kernel suspend) will result +in traps into the hypervisor and hence will suffer a performance +degradation. Host userspace has TM disabled +ie. HWCAP2[PPC_FEATURE2_HTM] is not set. (although we make enable it +at some point in the future if we bring the emulation into host +userspace context switching). + +POWER9C DD1.2 and above are only available with POWERVM and hence +Linux only runs as a guest. On these systems TM is emulated like on +POWER9N DD2.2. + +Guest migration from POWER8 to POWER9 will work with POWER9N DD2.2 and +POWER9C DD1.2. Since earlier POWER9 processors don't support TM +emulation, migration from POWER8 to POWER9 is not supported there. + +Kernel implementation +===================== + +h/rfid mtmsrd quirk +------------------- + +As defined in the ISA, rfid has a quirk which is useful in early +exception handling. When in a userspace transaction and we enter the +kernel via some exception, MSR will end up as TM=0 and TS=01 (ie. TM +off but TM suspended). Regularly the kernel will want change bits in +the MSR and will perform an rfid to do this. In this case rfid can +have SRR0 TM = 0 and TS = 00 (ie. TM off and non transaction) and the +resulting MSR will retain TM = 0 and TS=01 from before (ie. stay in +suspend). This is a quirk in the architecture as this would normally +be a transition from TS=01 to TS=00 (ie. suspend -> non transactional) +which is an illegal transition. + +This quirk is described the architecture in the definition of rfid +with these lines: + + if (MSR 29:31 ¬ = 0b010 | SRR1 29:31 ¬ = 0b000) then + MSR 29:31 <- SRR1 29:31 + +hrfid and mtmsrd have the same quirk. + +The Linux kernel uses this quirk in its early exception handling. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/ultravisor.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/ultravisor.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..ba6b1bf1cc4458 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/ultravisor.rst @@ -0,0 +1,1117 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +.. _ultravisor: + +============================ +Protected Execution Facility +============================ + +.. contents:: + :depth: 3 + +Introduction +############ + + Protected Execution Facility (PEF) is an architectural change for + POWER 9 that enables Secure Virtual Machines (SVMs). DD2.3 chips + (PVR=0x004e1203) or greater will be PEF-capable. A new ISA release + will include the PEF RFC02487 changes. + + When enabled, PEF adds a new higher privileged mode, called Ultravisor + mode, to POWER architecture. Along with the new mode there is new + firmware called the Protected Execution Ultravisor (or Ultravisor + for short). Ultravisor mode is the highest privileged mode in POWER + architecture. + + +------------------+ + | Privilege States | + +==================+ + | Problem | + +------------------+ + | Supervisor | + +------------------+ + | Hypervisor | + +------------------+ + | Ultravisor | + +------------------+ + + PEF protects SVMs from the hypervisor, privileged users, and other + VMs in the system. SVMs are protected while at rest and can only be + executed by an authorized machine. All virtual machines utilize + hypervisor services. The Ultravisor filters calls between the SVMs + and the hypervisor to assure that information does not accidentally + leak. All hypercalls except H_RANDOM are reflected to the hypervisor. + H_RANDOM is not reflected to prevent the hypervisor from influencing + random values in the SVM. + + To support this there is a refactoring of the ownership of resources + in the CPU. Some of the resources which were previously hypervisor + privileged are now ultravisor privileged. + +Hardware +======== + + The hardware changes include the following: + + * There is a new bit in the MSR that determines whether the current + process is running in secure mode, MSR(S) bit 41. MSR(S)=1, process + is in secure mode, MSR(s)=0 process is in normal mode. + + * The MSR(S) bit can only be set by the Ultravisor. + + * HRFID cannot be used to set the MSR(S) bit. If the hypervisor needs + to return to a SVM it must use an ultracall. It can determine if + the VM it is returning to is secure. + + * There is a new Ultravisor privileged register, SMFCTRL, which has an + enable/disable bit SMFCTRL(E). + + * The privilege of a process is now determined by three MSR bits, + MSR(S, HV, PR). In each of the tables below the modes are listed + from least privilege to highest privilege. The higher privilege + modes can access all the resources of the lower privilege modes. + + **Secure Mode MSR Settings** + + +---+---+---+---------------+ + | S | HV| PR|Privilege | + +===+===+===+===============+ + | 1 | 0 | 1 | Problem | + +---+---+---+---------------+ + | 1 | 0 | 0 | Privileged(OS)| + +---+---+---+---------------+ + | 1 | 1 | 0 | Ultravisor | + +---+---+---+---------------+ + | 1 | 1 | 1 | Reserved | + +---+---+---+---------------+ + + **Normal Mode MSR Settings** + + +---+---+---+---------------+ + | S | HV| PR|Privilege | + +===+===+===+===============+ + | 0 | 0 | 1 | Problem | + +---+---+---+---------------+ + | 0 | 0 | 0 | Privileged(OS)| + +---+---+---+---------------+ + | 0 | 1 | 0 | Hypervisor | + +---+---+---+---------------+ + | 0 | 1 | 1 | Problem (Host)| + +---+---+---+---------------+ + + * Memory is partitioned into secure and normal memory. Only processes + that are running in secure mode can access secure memory. + + * The hardware does not allow anything that is not running secure to + access secure memory. This means that the Hypervisor cannot access + the memory of the SVM without using an ultracall (asking the + Ultravisor). The Ultravisor will only allow the hypervisor to see + the SVM memory encrypted. + + * I/O systems are not allowed to directly address secure memory. This + limits the SVMs to virtual I/O only. + + * The architecture allows the SVM to share pages of memory with the + hypervisor that are not protected with encryption. However, this + sharing must be initiated by the SVM. + + * When a process is running in secure mode all hypercalls + (syscall lev=1) go to the Ultravisor. + + * When a process is in secure mode all interrupts go to the + Ultravisor. + + * The following resources have become Ultravisor privileged and + require an Ultravisor interface to manipulate: + + * Processor configurations registers (SCOMs). + + * Stop state information. + + * The debug registers CIABR, DAWR, and DAWRX when SMFCTRL(D) is set. + If SMFCTRL(D) is not set they do not work in secure mode. When set, + reading and writing requires an Ultravisor call, otherwise that + will cause a Hypervisor Emulation Assistance interrupt. + + * PTCR and partition table entries (partition table is in secure + memory). An attempt to write to PTCR will cause a Hypervisor + Emulation Assitance interrupt. + + * LDBAR (LD Base Address Register) and IMC (In-Memory Collection) + non-architected registers. An attempt to write to them will cause a + Hypervisor Emulation Assistance interrupt. + + * Paging for an SVM, sharing of memory with Hypervisor for an SVM. + (Including Virtual Processor Area (VPA) and virtual I/O). + + +Software/Microcode +================== + + The software changes include: + + * SVMs are created from normal VM using (open source) tooling supplied + by IBM. + + * All SVMs start as normal VMs and utilize an ultracall, UV_ESM + (Enter Secure Mode), to make the transition. + + * When the UV_ESM ultracall is made the Ultravisor copies the VM into + secure memory, decrypts the verification information, and checks the + integrity of the SVM. If the integrity check passes the Ultravisor + passes control in secure mode. + + * The verification information includes the pass phrase for the + encrypted disk associated with the SVM. This pass phrase is given + to the SVM when requested. + + * The Ultravisor is not involved in protecting the encrypted disk of + the SVM while at rest. + + * For external interrupts the Ultravisor saves the state of the SVM, + and reflects the interrupt to the hypervisor for processing. + For hypercalls, the Ultravisor inserts neutral state into all + registers not needed for the hypercall then reflects the call to + the hypervisor for processing. The H_RANDOM hypercall is performed + by the Ultravisor and not reflected. + + * For virtual I/O to work bounce buffering must be done. + + * The Ultravisor uses AES (IAPM) for protection of SVM memory. IAPM + is a mode of AES that provides integrity and secrecy concurrently. + + * The movement of data between normal and secure pages is coordinated + with the Ultravisor by a new HMM plug-in in the Hypervisor. + + The Ultravisor offers new services to the hypervisor and SVMs. These + are accessed through ultracalls. + +Terminology +=========== + + * Hypercalls: special system calls used to request services from + Hypervisor. + + * Normal memory: Memory that is accessible to Hypervisor. + + * Normal page: Page backed by normal memory and available to + Hypervisor. + + * Shared page: A page backed by normal memory and available to both + the Hypervisor/QEMU and the SVM (i.e page has mappings in SVM and + Hypervisor/QEMU). + + * Secure memory: Memory that is accessible only to Ultravisor and + SVMs. + + * Secure page: Page backed by secure memory and only available to + Ultravisor and SVM. + + * SVM: Secure Virtual Machine. + + * Ultracalls: special system calls used to request services from + Ultravisor. + + +Ultravisor calls API +#################### + + This section describes Ultravisor calls (ultracalls) needed to + support Secure Virtual Machines (SVM)s and Paravirtualized KVM. The + ultracalls allow the SVMs and Hypervisor to request services from the + Ultravisor such as accessing a register or memory region that can only + be accessed when running in Ultravisor-privileged mode. + + The specific service needed from an ultracall is specified in register + R3 (the first parameter to the ultracall). Other parameters to the + ultracall, if any, are specified in registers R4 through R12. + + Return value of all ultracalls is in register R3. Other output values + from the ultracall, if any, are returned in registers R4 through R12. + The only exception to this register usage is the ``UV_RETURN`` + ultracall described below. + + Each ultracall returns specific error codes, applicable in the context + of the ultracall. However, like with the PowerPC Architecture Platform + Reference (PAPR), if no specific error code is defined for a + particular situation, then the ultracall will fallback to an erroneous + parameter-position based code. i.e U_PARAMETER, U_P2, U_P3 etc + depending on the ultracall parameter that may have caused the error. + + Some ultracalls involve transferring a page of data between Ultravisor + and Hypervisor. Secure pages that are transferred from secure memory + to normal memory may be encrypted using dynamically generated keys. + When the secure pages are transferred back to secure memory, they may + be decrypted using the same dynamically generated keys. Generation and + management of these keys will be covered in a separate document. + + For now this only covers ultracalls currently implemented and being + used by Hypervisor and SVMs but others can be added here when it + makes sense. + + The full specification for all hypercalls/ultracalls will eventually + be made available in the public/OpenPower version of the PAPR + specification. + + .. note:: + + If PEF is not enabled, the ultracalls will be redirected to the + Hypervisor which must handle/fail the calls. + +Ultracalls used by Hypervisor +============================= + + This section describes the virtual memory management ultracalls used + by the Hypervisor to manage SVMs. + +UV_PAGE_OUT +----------- + + Encrypt and move the contents of a page from secure memory to normal + memory. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t ultracall(const uint64_t UV_PAGE_OUT, + uint16_t lpid, /* LPAR ID */ + uint64_t dest_ra, /* real address of destination page */ + uint64_t src_gpa, /* source guest-physical-address */ + uint8_t flags, /* flags */ + uint64_t order) /* page size order */ + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * U_SUCCESS on success. + * U_PARAMETER if ``lpid`` is invalid. + * U_P2 if ``dest_ra`` is invalid. + * U_P3 if the ``src_gpa`` address is invalid. + * U_P4 if any bit in the ``flags`` is unrecognized + * U_P5 if the ``order`` parameter is unsupported. + * U_FUNCTION if functionality is not supported. + * U_BUSY if page cannot be currently paged-out. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Encrypt the contents of a secure-page and make it available to + Hypervisor in a normal page. + + By default, the source page is unmapped from the SVM's partition- + scoped page table. But the Hypervisor can provide a hint to the + Ultravisor to retain the page mapping by setting the ``UV_SNAPSHOT`` + flag in ``flags`` parameter. + + If the source page is already a shared page the call returns + U_SUCCESS, without doing anything. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. QEMU attempts to access an address belonging to the SVM but the + page frame for that address is not mapped into QEMU's address + space. In this case, the Hypervisor will allocate a page frame, + map it into QEMU's address space and issue the ``UV_PAGE_OUT`` + call to retrieve the encrypted contents of the page. + + #. When Ultravisor runs low on secure memory and it needs to page-out + an LRU page. In this case, Ultravisor will issue the + ``H_SVM_PAGE_OUT`` hypercall to the Hypervisor. The Hypervisor will + then allocate a normal page and issue the ``UV_PAGE_OUT`` ultracall + and the Ultravisor will encrypt and move the contents of the secure + page into the normal page. + + #. When Hypervisor accesses SVM data, the Hypervisor requests the + Ultravisor to transfer the corresponding page into a insecure page, + which the Hypervisor can access. The data in the normal page will + be encrypted though. + +UV_PAGE_IN +---------- + + Move the contents of a page from normal memory to secure memory. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t ultracall(const uint64_t UV_PAGE_IN, + uint16_t lpid, /* the LPAR ID */ + uint64_t src_ra, /* source real address of page */ + uint64_t dest_gpa, /* destination guest physical address */ + uint64_t flags, /* flags */ + uint64_t order) /* page size order */ + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * U_SUCCESS on success. + * U_BUSY if page cannot be currently paged-in. + * U_FUNCTION if functionality is not supported + * U_PARAMETER if ``lpid`` is invalid. + * U_P2 if ``src_ra`` is invalid. + * U_P3 if the ``dest_gpa`` address is invalid. + * U_P4 if any bit in the ``flags`` is unrecognized + * U_P5 if the ``order`` parameter is unsupported. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Move the contents of the page identified by ``src_ra`` from normal + memory to secure memory and map it to the guest physical address + ``dest_gpa``. + + If `dest_gpa` refers to a shared address, map the page into the + partition-scoped page-table of the SVM. If `dest_gpa` is not shared, + copy the contents of the page into the corresponding secure page. + Depending on the context, decrypt the page before being copied. + + The caller provides the attributes of the page through the ``flags`` + parameter. Valid values for ``flags`` are: + + * CACHE_INHIBITED + * CACHE_ENABLED + * WRITE_PROTECTION + + The Hypervisor must pin the page in memory before making + ``UV_PAGE_IN`` ultracall. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. When a normal VM switches to secure mode, all its pages residing + in normal memory, are moved into secure memory. + + #. When an SVM requests to share a page with Hypervisor the Hypervisor + allocates a page and informs the Ultravisor. + + #. When an SVM accesses a secure page that has been paged-out, + Ultravisor invokes the Hypervisor to locate the page. After + locating the page, the Hypervisor uses UV_PAGE_IN to make the + page available to Ultravisor. + +UV_PAGE_INVAL +------------- + + Invalidate the Ultravisor mapping of a page. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t ultracall(const uint64_t UV_PAGE_INVAL, + uint16_t lpid, /* the LPAR ID */ + uint64_t guest_pa, /* destination guest-physical-address */ + uint64_t order) /* page size order */ + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * U_SUCCESS on success. + * U_PARAMETER if ``lpid`` is invalid. + * U_P2 if ``guest_pa`` is invalid (or corresponds to a secure + page mapping). + * U_P3 if the ``order`` is invalid. + * U_FUNCTION if functionality is not supported. + * U_BUSY if page cannot be currently invalidated. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + This ultracall informs Ultravisor that the page mapping in Hypervisor + corresponding to the given guest physical address has been invalidated + and that the Ultravisor should not access the page. If the specified + ``guest_pa`` corresponds to a secure page, Ultravisor will ignore the + attempt to invalidate the page and return U_P2. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. When a shared page is unmapped from the QEMU's page table, possibly + because it is paged-out to disk, Ultravisor needs to know that the + page should not be accessed from its side too. + + +UV_WRITE_PATE +------------- + + Validate and write the partition table entry (PATE) for a given + partition. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t ultracall(const uint64_t UV_WRITE_PATE, + uint32_t lpid, /* the LPAR ID */ + uint64_t dw0 /* the first double word to write */ + uint64_t dw1) /* the second double word to write */ + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * U_SUCCESS on success. + * U_BUSY if PATE cannot be currently written to. + * U_FUNCTION if functionality is not supported. + * U_PARAMETER if ``lpid`` is invalid. + * U_P2 if ``dw0`` is invalid. + * U_P3 if the ``dw1`` address is invalid. + * U_PERMISSION if the Hypervisor is attempting to change the PATE + of a secure virtual machine or if called from a + context other than Hypervisor. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Validate and write a LPID and its partition-table-entry for the given + LPID. If the LPID is already allocated and initialized, this call + results in changing the partition table entry. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. The Partition table resides in Secure memory and its entries, + called PATE (Partition Table Entries), point to the partition- + scoped page tables for the Hypervisor as well as each of the + virtual machines (both secure and normal). The Hypervisor + operates in partition 0 and its partition-scoped page tables + reside in normal memory. + + #. This ultracall allows the Hypervisor to register the partition- + scoped and process-scoped page table entries for the Hypervisor + and other partitions (virtual machines) with the Ultravisor. + + #. If the value of the PATE for an existing partition (VM) changes, + the TLB cache for the partition is flushed. + + #. The Hypervisor is responsible for allocating LPID. The LPID and + its PATE entry are registered together. The Hypervisor manages + the PATE entries for a normal VM and can change the PATE entry + anytime. Ultravisor manages the PATE entries for an SVM and + Hypervisor is not allowed to modify them. + +UV_RETURN +--------- + + Return control from the Hypervisor back to the Ultravisor after + processing an hypercall or interrupt that was forwarded (aka + *reflected*) to the Hypervisor. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t ultracall(const uint64_t UV_RETURN) + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + This call never returns to Hypervisor on success. It returns + U_INVALID if ultracall is not made from a Hypervisor context. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + When an SVM makes an hypercall or incurs some other exception, the + Ultravisor usually forwards (aka *reflects*) the exceptions to the + Hypervisor. After processing the exception, Hypervisor uses the + ``UV_RETURN`` ultracall to return control back to the SVM. + + The expected register state on entry to this ultracall is: + + * Non-volatile registers are restored to their original values. + * If returning from an hypercall, register R0 contains the return + value (**unlike other ultracalls**) and, registers R4 through R12 + contain any output values of the hypercall. + * R3 contains the ultracall number, i.e UV_RETURN. + * If returning with a synthesized interrupt, R2 contains the + synthesized interrupt number. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. Ultravisor relies on the Hypervisor to provide several services to + the SVM such as processing hypercall and other exceptions. After + processing the exception, Hypervisor uses UV_RETURN to return + control back to the Ultravisor. + + #. Hypervisor has to use this ultracall to return control to the SVM. + + +UV_REGISTER_MEM_SLOT +-------------------- + + Register an SVM address-range with specified properties. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t ultracall(const uint64_t UV_REGISTER_MEM_SLOT, + uint64_t lpid, /* LPAR ID of the SVM */ + uint64_t start_gpa, /* start guest physical address */ + uint64_t size, /* size of address range in bytes */ + uint64_t flags /* reserved for future expansion */ + uint16_t slotid) /* slot identifier */ + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * U_SUCCESS on success. + * U_PARAMETER if ``lpid`` is invalid. + * U_P2 if ``start_gpa`` is invalid. + * U_P3 if ``size`` is invalid. + * U_P4 if any bit in the ``flags`` is unrecognized. + * U_P5 if the ``slotid`` parameter is unsupported. + * U_PERMISSION if called from context other than Hypervisor. + * U_FUNCTION if functionality is not supported. + + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Register a memory range for an SVM. The memory range starts at the + guest physical address ``start_gpa`` and is ``size`` bytes long. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + + #. When a virtual machine goes secure, all the memory slots managed by + the Hypervisor move into secure memory. The Hypervisor iterates + through each of memory slots, and registers the slot with + Ultravisor. Hypervisor may discard some slots such as those used + for firmware (SLOF). + + #. When new memory is hot-plugged, a new memory slot gets registered. + + +UV_UNREGISTER_MEM_SLOT +---------------------- + + Unregister an SVM address-range that was previously registered using + UV_REGISTER_MEM_SLOT. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t ultracall(const uint64_t UV_UNREGISTER_MEM_SLOT, + uint64_t lpid, /* LPAR ID of the SVM */ + uint64_t slotid) /* reservation slotid */ + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * U_SUCCESS on success. + * U_FUNCTION if functionality is not supported. + * U_PARAMETER if ``lpid`` is invalid. + * U_P2 if ``slotid`` is invalid. + * U_PERMISSION if called from context other than Hypervisor. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Release the memory slot identified by ``slotid`` and free any + resources allocated towards the reservation. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. Memory hot-remove. + + +UV_SVM_TERMINATE +---------------- + + Terminate an SVM and release its resources. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t ultracall(const uint64_t UV_SVM_TERMINATE, + uint64_t lpid, /* LPAR ID of the SVM */) + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * U_SUCCESS on success. + * U_FUNCTION if functionality is not supported. + * U_PARAMETER if ``lpid`` is invalid. + * U_INVALID if VM is not secure. + * U_PERMISSION if not called from a Hypervisor context. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Terminate an SVM and release all its resources. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. Called by Hypervisor when terminating an SVM. + + +Ultracalls used by SVM +====================== + +UV_SHARE_PAGE +------------- + + Share a set of guest physical pages with the Hypervisor. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t ultracall(const uint64_t UV_SHARE_PAGE, + uint64_t gfn, /* guest page frame number */ + uint64_t num) /* number of pages of size PAGE_SIZE */ + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * U_SUCCESS on success. + * U_FUNCTION if functionality is not supported. + * U_INVALID if the VM is not secure. + * U_PARAMETER if ``gfn`` is invalid. + * U_P2 if ``num`` is invalid. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Share the ``num`` pages starting at guest physical frame number ``gfn`` + with the Hypervisor. Assume page size is PAGE_SIZE bytes. Zero the + pages before returning. + + If the address is already backed by a secure page, unmap the page and + back it with an insecure page, with the help of the Hypervisor. If it + is not backed by any page yet, mark the PTE as insecure and back it + with an insecure page when the address is accessed. If it is already + backed by an insecure page, zero the page and return. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. The Hypervisor cannot access the SVM pages since they are backed by + secure pages. Hence an SVM must explicitly request Ultravisor for + pages it can share with Hypervisor. + + #. Shared pages are needed to support virtio and Virtual Processor Area + (VPA) in SVMs. + + +UV_UNSHARE_PAGE +--------------- + + Restore a shared SVM page to its initial state. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t ultracall(const uint64_t UV_UNSHARE_PAGE, + uint64_t gfn, /* guest page frame number */ + uint73 num) /* number of pages of size PAGE_SIZE*/ + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * U_SUCCESS on success. + * U_FUNCTION if functionality is not supported. + * U_INVALID if VM is not secure. + * U_PARAMETER if ``gfn`` is invalid. + * U_P2 if ``num`` is invalid. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Stop sharing ``num`` pages starting at ``gfn`` with the Hypervisor. + Assume that the page size is PAGE_SIZE. Zero the pages before + returning. + + If the address is already backed by an insecure page, unmap the page + and back it with a secure page. Inform the Hypervisor to release + reference to its shared page. If the address is not backed by a page + yet, mark the PTE as secure and back it with a secure page when that + address is accessed. If it is already backed by an secure page zero + the page and return. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. The SVM may decide to unshare a page from the Hypervisor. + + +UV_UNSHARE_ALL_PAGES +-------------------- + + Unshare all pages the SVM has shared with Hypervisor. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t ultracall(const uint64_t UV_UNSHARE_ALL_PAGES) + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * U_SUCCESS on success. + * U_FUNCTION if functionality is not supported. + * U_INVAL if VM is not secure. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Unshare all shared pages from the Hypervisor. All unshared pages are + zeroed on return. Only pages explicitly shared by the SVM with the + Hypervisor (using UV_SHARE_PAGE ultracall) are unshared. Ultravisor + may internally share some pages with the Hypervisor without explicit + request from the SVM. These pages will not be unshared by this + ultracall. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. This call is needed when ``kexec`` is used to boot a different + kernel. It may also be needed during SVM reset. + +UV_ESM +------ + + Secure the virtual machine (*enter secure mode*). + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t ultracall(const uint64_t UV_ESM, + uint64_t esm_blob_addr, /* location of the ESM blob */ + unint64_t fdt) /* Flattened device tree */ + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * U_SUCCESS on success (including if VM is already secure). + * U_FUNCTION if functionality is not supported. + * U_INVALID if VM is not secure. + * U_PARAMETER if ``esm_blob_addr`` is invalid. + * U_P2 if ``fdt`` is invalid. + * U_PERMISSION if any integrity checks fail. + * U_RETRY insufficient memory to create SVM. + * U_NO_KEY symmetric key unavailable. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Secure the virtual machine. On successful completion, return + control to the virtual machine at the address specified in the + ESM blob. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. A normal virtual machine can choose to switch to a secure mode. + +Hypervisor Calls API +#################### + + This document describes the Hypervisor calls (hypercalls) that are + needed to support the Ultravisor. Hypercalls are services provided by + the Hypervisor to virtual machines and Ultravisor. + + Register usage for these hypercalls is identical to that of the other + hypercalls defined in the Power Architecture Platform Reference (PAPR) + document. i.e on input, register R3 identifies the specific service + that is being requested and registers R4 through R11 contain + additional parameters to the hypercall, if any. On output, register + R3 contains the return value and registers R4 through R9 contain any + other output values from the hypercall. + + This document only covers hypercalls currently implemented/planned + for Ultravisor usage but others can be added here when it makes sense. + + The full specification for all hypercalls/ultracalls will eventually + be made available in the public/OpenPower version of the PAPR + specification. + +Hypervisor calls to support Ultravisor +====================================== + + Following are the set of hypercalls needed to support Ultravisor. + +H_SVM_INIT_START +---------------- + + Begin the process of converting a normal virtual machine into an SVM. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t hypercall(const uint64_t H_SVM_INIT_START) + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * H_SUCCESS on success. + * H_STATE if the VM is not in a position to switch to secure. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Initiate the process of securing a virtual machine. This involves + coordinating with the Ultravisor, using ultracalls, to allocate + resources in the Ultravisor for the new SVM, transferring the VM's + pages from normal to secure memory etc. When the process is + completed, Ultravisor issues the H_SVM_INIT_DONE hypercall. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. Ultravisor uses this hypercall to inform Hypervisor that a VM + has initiated the process of switching to secure mode. + + +H_SVM_INIT_DONE +--------------- + + Complete the process of securing an SVM. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t hypercall(const uint64_t H_SVM_INIT_DONE) + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * H_SUCCESS on success. + * H_UNSUPPORTED if called from the wrong context (e.g. + from an SVM or before an H_SVM_INIT_START + hypercall). + * H_STATE if the hypervisor could not successfully + transition the VM to Secure VM. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Complete the process of securing a virtual machine. This call must + be made after a prior call to ``H_SVM_INIT_START`` hypercall. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + On successfully securing a virtual machine, the Ultravisor informs + Hypervisor about it. Hypervisor can use this call to finish setting + up its internal state for this virtual machine. + + +H_SVM_INIT_ABORT +---------------- + + Abort the process of securing an SVM. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t hypercall(const uint64_t H_SVM_INIT_ABORT) + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * H_PARAMETER on successfully cleaning up the state, + Hypervisor will return this value to the + **guest**, to indicate that the underlying + UV_ESM ultracall failed. + + * H_STATE if called after a VM has gone secure (i.e + H_SVM_INIT_DONE hypercall was successful). + + * H_UNSUPPORTED if called from a wrong context (e.g. from a + normal VM). + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Abort the process of securing a virtual machine. This call must + be made after a prior call to ``H_SVM_INIT_START`` hypercall and + before a call to ``H_SVM_INIT_DONE``. + + On entry into this hypercall the non-volatile GPRs and FPRs are + expected to contain the values they had at the time the VM issued + the UV_ESM ultracall. Further ``SRR0`` is expected to contain the + address of the instruction after the ``UV_ESM`` ultracall and ``SRR1`` + the MSR value with which to return to the VM. + + This hypercall will cleanup any partial state that was established for + the VM since the prior ``H_SVM_INIT_START`` hypercall, including paging + out pages that were paged-into secure memory, and issue the + ``UV_SVM_TERMINATE`` ultracall to terminate the VM. + + After the partial state is cleaned up, control returns to the VM + (**not Ultravisor**), at the address specified in ``SRR0`` with the + MSR values set to the value in ``SRR1``. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + If after a successful call to ``H_SVM_INIT_START``, the Ultravisor + encounters an error while securing a virtual machine, either due + to lack of resources or because the VM's security information could + not be validated, Ultravisor informs the Hypervisor about it. + Hypervisor should use this call to clean up any internal state for + this virtual machine and return to the VM. + +H_SVM_PAGE_IN +------------- + + Move the contents of a page from normal memory to secure memory. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t hypercall(const uint64_t H_SVM_PAGE_IN, + uint64_t guest_pa, /* guest-physical-address */ + uint64_t flags, /* flags */ + uint64_t order) /* page size order */ + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * H_SUCCESS on success. + * H_PARAMETER if ``guest_pa`` is invalid. + * H_P2 if ``flags`` is invalid. + * H_P3 if ``order`` of page is invalid. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Retrieve the content of the page, belonging to the VM at the specified + guest physical address. + + Only valid value(s) in ``flags`` are: + + * H_PAGE_IN_SHARED which indicates that the page is to be shared + with the Ultravisor. + + * H_PAGE_IN_NONSHARED indicates that the UV is not anymore + interested in the page. Applicable if the page is a shared page. + + The ``order`` parameter must correspond to the configured page size. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. When a normal VM becomes a secure VM (using the UV_ESM ultracall), + the Ultravisor uses this hypercall to move contents of each page of + the VM from normal memory to secure memory. + + #. Ultravisor uses this hypercall to ask Hypervisor to provide a page + in normal memory that can be shared between the SVM and Hypervisor. + + #. Ultravisor uses this hypercall to page-in a paged-out page. This + can happen when the SVM touches a paged-out page. + + #. If SVM wants to disable sharing of pages with Hypervisor, it can + inform Ultravisor to do so. Ultravisor will then use this hypercall + and inform Hypervisor that it has released access to the normal + page. + +H_SVM_PAGE_OUT +--------------- + + Move the contents of the page to normal memory. + +Syntax +~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: c + + uint64_t hypercall(const uint64_t H_SVM_PAGE_OUT, + uint64_t guest_pa, /* guest-physical-address */ + uint64_t flags, /* flags (currently none) */ + uint64_t order) /* page size order */ + +Return values +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + One of the following values: + + * H_SUCCESS on success. + * H_PARAMETER if ``guest_pa`` is invalid. + * H_P2 if ``flags`` is invalid. + * H_P3 if ``order`` is invalid. + +Description +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + Move the contents of the page identified by ``guest_pa`` to normal + memory. + + Currently ``flags`` is unused and must be set to 0. The ``order`` + parameter must correspond to the configured page size. + +Use cases +~~~~~~~~~ + + #. If Ultravisor is running low on secure pages, it can move the + contents of some secure pages, into normal pages using this + hypercall. The content will be encrypted. + +References +########## + +- `Supporting Protected Computing on IBM Power Architecture <https://developer.ibm.com/articles/l-support-protected-computing/>`_ diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/vas-api.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/vas-api.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..a9625a2fa0c634 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/vas-api.rst @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +.. _VAS-API: + +=================================================== +Virtual Accelerator Switchboard (VAS) userspace API +=================================================== + +Introduction +============ + +Power9 processor introduced Virtual Accelerator Switchboard (VAS) which +allows both userspace and kernel communicate to co-processor +(hardware accelerator) referred to as the Nest Accelerator (NX). The NX +unit comprises of one or more hardware engines or co-processor types +such as 842 compression, GZIP compression and encryption. On power9, +userspace applications will have access to only GZIP Compression engine +which supports ZLIB and GZIP compression algorithms in the hardware. + +To communicate with NX, kernel has to establish a channel or window and +then requests can be submitted directly without kernel involvement. +Requests to the GZIP engine must be formatted as a co-processor Request +Block (CRB) and these CRBs must be submitted to the NX using COPY/PASTE +instructions to paste the CRB to hardware address that is associated with +the engine's request queue. + +The GZIP engine provides two priority levels of requests: Normal and +High. Only Normal requests are supported from userspace right now. + +This document explains userspace API that is used to interact with +kernel to setup channel / window which can be used to send compression +requests directly to NX accelerator. + + +Overview +======== + +Application access to the GZIP engine is provided through +/dev/crypto/nx-gzip device node implemented by the VAS/NX device driver. +An application must open the /dev/crypto/nx-gzip device to obtain a file +descriptor (fd). Then should issue VAS_TX_WIN_OPEN ioctl with this fd to +establish connection to the engine. It means send window is opened on GZIP +engine for this process. Once a connection is established, the application +should use the mmap() system call to map the hardware address of engine's +request queue into the application's virtual address space. + +The application can then submit one or more requests to the engine by +using copy/paste instructions and pasting the CRBs to the virtual address +(aka paste_address) returned by mmap(). User space can close the +established connection or send window by closing the file descriptor +(close(fd)) or upon the process exit. + +Note that applications can send several requests with the same window or +can establish multiple windows, but one window for each file descriptor. + +Following sections provide additional details and references about the +individual steps. + +NX-GZIP Device Node +=================== + +There is one /dev/crypto/nx-gzip node in the system and it provides +access to all GZIP engines in the system. The only valid operations on +/dev/crypto/nx-gzip are: + + * open() the device for read and write. + * issue VAS_TX_WIN_OPEN ioctl + * mmap() the engine's request queue into application's virtual + address space (i.e. get a paste_address for the co-processor + engine). + * close the device node. + +Other file operations on this device node are undefined. + +Note that the copy and paste operations go directly to the hardware and +do not go through this device. Refer COPY/PASTE document for more +details. + +Although a system may have several instances of the NX co-processor +engines (typically, one per P9 chip) there is just one +/dev/crypto/nx-gzip device node in the system. When the nx-gzip device +node is opened, Kernel opens send window on a suitable instance of NX +accelerator. It finds CPU on which the user process is executing and +determine the NX instance for the corresponding chip on which this CPU +belongs. + +Applications may chose a specific instance of the NX co-processor using +the vas_id field in the VAS_TX_WIN_OPEN ioctl as detailed below. + +A userspace library libnxz is available here but still in development: + + https://github.com/abalib/power-gzip + +Applications that use inflate / deflate calls can link with libnxz +instead of libz and use NX GZIP compression without any modification. + +Open /dev/crypto/nx-gzip +======================== + +The nx-gzip device should be opened for read and write. No special +privileges are needed to open the device. Each window corresponds to one +file descriptor. So if the userspace process needs multiple windows, +several open calls have to be issued. + +See open(2) system call man pages for other details such as return values, +error codes and restrictions. + +VAS_TX_WIN_OPEN ioctl +===================== + +Applications should use the VAS_TX_WIN_OPEN ioctl as follows to establish +a connection with NX co-processor engine: + + :: + + struct vas_tx_win_open_attr { + __u32 version; + __s16 vas_id; /* specific instance of vas or -1 + for default */ + __u16 reserved1; + __u64 flags; /* For future use */ + __u64 reserved2[6]; + }; + + version: + The version field must be currently set to 1. + vas_id: + If '-1' is passed, kernel will make a best-effort attempt + to assign an optimal instance of NX for the process. To + select the specific VAS instance, refer + "Discovery of available VAS engines" section below. + + flags, reserved1 and reserved2[6] fields are for future extension + and must be set to 0. + + The attributes attr for the VAS_TX_WIN_OPEN ioctl are defined as + follows:: + + #define VAS_MAGIC 'v' + #define VAS_TX_WIN_OPEN _IOW(VAS_MAGIC, 1, + struct vas_tx_win_open_attr) + + struct vas_tx_win_open_attr attr; + rc = ioctl(fd, VAS_TX_WIN_OPEN, &attr); + + The VAS_TX_WIN_OPEN ioctl returns 0 on success. On errors, it + returns -1 and sets the errno variable to indicate the error. + + Error conditions: + + ====== ================================================ + EINVAL fd does not refer to a valid VAS device. + EINVAL Invalid vas ID + EINVAL version is not set with proper value + EEXIST Window is already opened for the given fd + ENOMEM Memory is not available to allocate window + ENOSPC System has too many active windows (connections) + opened + EINVAL reserved fields are not set to 0. + ====== ================================================ + + See the ioctl(2) man page for more details, error codes and + restrictions. + +mmap() NX-GZIP device +===================== + +The mmap() system call for a NX-GZIP device fd returns a paste_address +that the application can use to copy/paste its CRB to the hardware engines. + + :: + + paste_addr = mmap(addr, size, prot, flags, fd, offset); + + Only restrictions on mmap for a NX-GZIP device fd are: + + * size should be PAGE_SIZE + * offset parameter should be 0ULL + + Refer to mmap(2) man page for additional details/restrictions. + In addition to the error conditions listed on the mmap(2) man + page, can also fail with one of the following error codes: + + ====== ============================================= + EINVAL fd is not associated with an open window + (i.e mmap() does not follow a successful call + to the VAS_TX_WIN_OPEN ioctl). + EINVAL offset field is not 0ULL. + ====== ============================================= + +Discovery of available VAS engines +================================== + +Each available VAS instance in the system will have a device tree node +like /proc/device-tree/vas@* or /proc/device-tree/xscom@*/vas@*. +Determine the chip or VAS instance and use the corresponding ibm,vas-id +property value in this node to select specific VAS instance. + +Copy/Paste operations +===================== + +Applications should use the copy and paste instructions to send CRB to NX. +Refer section 4.4 in PowerISA for Copy/Paste instructions: +https://openpowerfoundation.org/?resource_lib=power-isa-version-3-0 + +CRB Specification and use NX +============================ + +Applications should format requests to the co-processor using the +co-processor Request Block (CRBs). Refer NX-GZIP user's manual for the format +of CRB and use NX from userspace such as sending requests and checking +request status. + +NX Fault handling +================= + +Applications send requests to NX and wait for the status by polling on +co-processor Status Block (CSB) flags. NX updates status in CSB after each +request is processed. Refer NX-GZIP user's manual for the format of CSB and +status flags. + +In case if NX encounters translation error (called NX page fault) on CSB +address or any request buffer, raises an interrupt on the CPU to handle the +fault. Page fault can happen if an application passes invalid addresses or +request buffers are not in memory. The operating system handles the fault by +updating CSB with the following data:: + + csb.flags = CSB_V; + csb.cc = CSB_CC_FAULT_ADDRESS; + csb.ce = CSB_CE_TERMINATION; + csb.address = fault_address; + +When an application receives translation error, it can touch or access +the page that has a fault address so that this page will be in memory. Then +the application can resend this request to NX. + +If the OS can not update CSB due to invalid CSB address, sends SEGV signal +to the process who opened the send window on which the original request was +issued. This signal returns with the following siginfo struct:: + + siginfo.si_signo = SIGSEGV; + siginfo.si_errno = EFAULT; + siginfo.si_code = SEGV_MAPERR; + siginfo.si_addr = CSB address; + +In the case of multi-thread applications, NX send windows can be shared +across all threads. For example, a child thread can open a send window, +but other threads can send requests to NX using this window. These +requests will be successful even in the case of OS handling faults as long +as CSB address is valid. If the NX request contains an invalid CSB address, +the signal will be sent to the child thread that opened the window. But if +the thread is exited without closing the window and the request is issued +using this window. the signal will be issued to the thread group leader +(tgid). It is up to the application whether to ignore or handle these +signals. + +NX-GZIP User's Manual: +https://github.com/libnxz/power-gzip/blob/master/doc/power_nx_gzip_um.pdf + +Simple example +============== + + :: + + int use_nx_gzip() + { + int rc, fd; + void *addr; + struct vas_setup_attr txattr; + + fd = open("/dev/crypto/nx-gzip", O_RDWR); + if (fd < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "open nx-gzip failed\n"); + return -1; + } + memset(&txattr, 0, sizeof(txattr)); + txattr.version = 1; + txattr.vas_id = -1 + rc = ioctl(fd, VAS_TX_WIN_OPEN, + (unsigned long)&txattr); + if (rc < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "ioctl() n %d, error %d\n", + rc, errno); + return rc; + } + addr = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, + MAP_SHARED, fd, 0ULL); + if (addr == MAP_FAILED) { + fprintf(stderr, "mmap() failed, errno %d\n", + errno); + return -errno; + } + do { + //Format CRB request with compression or + //uncompression + // Refer tests for vas_copy/vas_paste + vas_copy((&crb, 0, 1); + vas_paste(addr, 0, 1); + // Poll on csb.flags with timeout + // csb address is listed in CRB + } while (true) + close(fd) or window can be closed upon process exit + } + + Refer https://github.com/libnxz/power-gzip for tests or more + use cases. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/vcpudispatch_stats.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/vcpudispatch_stats.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..5704657a5987ae --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/vcpudispatch_stats.rst @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +======================== +VCPU Dispatch Statistics +======================== + +For Shared Processor LPARs, the POWER Hypervisor maintains a relatively +static mapping of the LPAR processors (vcpus) to physical processor +chips (representing the "home" node) and tries to always dispatch vcpus +on their associated physical processor chip. However, under certain +scenarios, vcpus may be dispatched on a different processor chip (away +from its home node). + +/proc/powerpc/vcpudispatch_stats can be used to obtain statistics +related to the vcpu dispatch behavior. Writing '1' to this file enables +collecting the statistics, while writing '0' disables the statistics. +By default, the DTLB log for each vcpu is processed 50 times a second so +as not to miss any entries. This processing frequency can be changed +through /proc/powerpc/vcpudispatch_stats_freq. + +The statistics themselves are available by reading the procfs file +/proc/powerpc/vcpudispatch_stats. Each line in the output corresponds to +a vcpu as represented by the first field, followed by 8 numbers. + +The first number corresponds to: + +1. total vcpu dispatches since the beginning of statistics collection + +The next 4 numbers represent vcpu dispatch dispersions: + +2. number of times this vcpu was dispatched on the same processor as last + time +3. number of times this vcpu was dispatched on a different processor core + as last time, but within the same chip +4. number of times this vcpu was dispatched on a different chip +5. number of times this vcpu was dispatches on a different socket/drawer + (next numa boundary) + +The final 3 numbers represent statistics in relation to the home node of +the vcpu: + +6. number of times this vcpu was dispatched in its home node (chip) +7. number of times this vcpu was dispatched in a different node +8. number of times this vcpu was dispatched in a node further away (numa + distance) + +An example output:: + + $ sudo cat /proc/powerpc/vcpudispatch_stats + cpu0 6839 4126 2683 30 0 6821 18 0 + cpu1 2515 1274 1229 12 0 2509 6 0 + cpu2 2317 1198 1109 10 0 2312 5 0 + cpu3 2259 1165 1088 6 0 2256 3 0 + cpu4 2205 1143 1056 6 0 2202 3 0 + cpu5 2165 1121 1038 6 0 2162 3 0 + cpu6 2183 1127 1050 6 0 2180 3 0 + cpu7 2193 1133 1052 8 0 2187 6 0 + cpu8 2165 1115 1032 18 0 2156 9 0 + cpu9 2301 1252 1033 16 0 2293 8 0 + cpu10 2197 1138 1041 18 0 2187 10 0 + cpu11 2273 1185 1062 26 0 2260 13 0 + cpu12 2186 1125 1043 18 0 2177 9 0 + cpu13 2161 1115 1030 16 0 2153 8 0 + cpu14 2206 1153 1033 20 0 2196 10 0 + cpu15 2163 1115 1032 16 0 2155 8 0 + +In the output above, for vcpu0, there have been 6839 dispatches since +statistics were enabled. 4126 of those dispatches were on the same +physical cpu as the last time. 2683 were on a different core, but within +the same chip, while 30 dispatches were on a different chip compared to +its last dispatch. + +Also, out of the total of 6839 dispatches, we see that there have been +6821 dispatches on the vcpu's home node, while 18 dispatches were +outside its home node, on a neighbouring chip. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/vmemmap_dedup.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/vmemmap_dedup.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..dc4db59fdf87b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/vmemmap_dedup.rst @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +========== +Device DAX +========== + +The device-dax interface uses the tail deduplication technique explained in +Documentation/mm/vmemmap_dedup.rst + +On powerpc, vmemmap deduplication is only used with radix MMU translation. Also +with a 64K page size, only the devdax namespace with 1G alignment uses vmemmap +deduplication. + +With 2M PMD level mapping, we require 32 struct pages and a single 64K vmemmap +page can contain 1024 struct pages (64K/sizeof(struct page)). Hence there is no +vmemmap deduplication possible. + +With 1G PUD level mapping, we require 16384 struct pages and a single 64K +vmemmap page can contain 1024 struct pages (64K/sizeof(struct page)). Hence we +require 16 64K pages in vmemmap to map the struct page for 1G PUD level mapping. + +Here's how things look like on device-dax after the sections are populated:: + +-----------+ ---virt_to_page---> +-----------+ mapping to +-----------+ + | | | 0 | -------------> | 0 | + | | +-----------+ +-----------+ + | | | 1 | -------------> | 1 | + | | +-----------+ +-----------+ + | | | 2 | ----------------^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ + | | +-----------+ | | | | | + | | | 3 | ------------------+ | | | | + | | +-----------+ | | | | + | | | 4 | --------------------+ | | | + | PUD | +-----------+ | | | + | level | | . | ----------------------+ | | + | mapping | +-----------+ | | + | | | . | ------------------------+ | + | | +-----------+ | + | | | 15 | --------------------------+ + | | +-----------+ + | | + | | + | | + +-----------+ + + +With 4K page size, 2M PMD level mapping requires 512 struct pages and a single +4K vmemmap page contains 64 struct pages(4K/sizeof(struct page)). Hence we +require 8 4K pages in vmemmap to map the struct page for 2M pmd level mapping. + +Here's how things look like on device-dax after the sections are populated:: + + +-----------+ ---virt_to_page---> +-----------+ mapping to +-----------+ + | | | 0 | -------------> | 0 | + | | +-----------+ +-----------+ + | | | 1 | -------------> | 1 | + | | +-----------+ +-----------+ + | | | 2 | ----------------^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ + | | +-----------+ | | | | | + | | | 3 | ------------------+ | | | | + | | +-----------+ | | | | + | | | 4 | --------------------+ | | | + | PMD | +-----------+ | | | + | level | | 5 | ----------------------+ | | + | mapping | +-----------+ | | + | | | 6 | ------------------------+ | + | | +-----------+ | + | | | 7 | --------------------------+ + | | +-----------+ + | | + | | + | | + +-----------+ + +With 1G PUD level mapping, we require 262144 struct pages and a single 4K +vmemmap page can contain 64 struct pages (4K/sizeof(struct page)). Hence we +require 4096 4K pages in vmemmap to map the struct pages for 1G PUD level +mapping. + +Here's how things look like on device-dax after the sections are populated:: + + +-----------+ ---virt_to_page---> +-----------+ mapping to +-----------+ + | | | 0 | -------------> | 0 | + | | +-----------+ +-----------+ + | | | 1 | -------------> | 1 | + | | +-----------+ +-----------+ + | | | 2 | ----------------^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ + | | +-----------+ | | | | | + | | | 3 | ------------------+ | | | | + | | +-----------+ | | | | + | | | 4 | --------------------+ | | | + | PUD | +-----------+ | | | + | level | | . | ----------------------+ | | + | mapping | +-----------+ | | + | | | . | ------------------------+ | + | | +-----------+ | + | | | 4095 | --------------------------+ + | | +-----------+ + | | + | | + | | + +-----------+ diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/acpi.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/acpi.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..9870a282815b2f --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/acpi.rst @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +============== +ACPI on RISC-V +============== + +The ISA string parsing rules for ACPI are defined by `Version ASCIIDOC +Conversion, 12/2022 of the RISC-V specifications, as defined by tag +"riscv-isa-release-1239329-2023-05-23" (commit 1239329 +) <https://github.com/riscv/riscv-isa-manual/releases/tag/riscv-isa-release-1239329-2023-05-23>`_ diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/boot-image-header.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/boot-image-header.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..df2ffc173e803e --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/boot-image-header.rst @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +================================= +Boot image header in RISC-V Linux +================================= + +:Author: Atish Patra <atish.patra@wdc.com> +:Date: 20 May 2019 + +This document only describes the boot image header details for RISC-V Linux. + +The following 64-byte header is present in decompressed Linux kernel image:: + + u32 code0; /* Executable code */ + u32 code1; /* Executable code */ + u64 text_offset; /* Image load offset, little endian */ + u64 image_size; /* Effective Image size, little endian */ + u64 flags; /* kernel flags, little endian */ + u32 version; /* Version of this header */ + u32 res1 = 0; /* Reserved */ + u64 res2 = 0; /* Reserved */ + u64 magic = 0x5643534952; /* Magic number, little endian, "RISCV" */ + u32 magic2 = 0x05435352; /* Magic number 2, little endian, "RSC\x05" */ + u32 res3; /* Reserved for PE COFF offset */ + +This header format is compliant with PE/COFF header and largely inspired from +ARM64 header. Thus, both ARM64 & RISC-V header can be combined into one common +header in future. + +Notes +===== + +- This header is also reused to support EFI stub for RISC-V. EFI specification + needs PE/COFF image header in the beginning of the kernel image in order to + load it as an EFI application. In order to support EFI stub, code0 is replaced + with "MZ" magic string and res3(at offset 0x3c) points to the rest of the + PE/COFF header. + +- version field indicate header version number + + ========== ============= + Bits 0:15 Minor version + Bits 16:31 Major version + ========== ============= + + This preserves compatibility across newer and older version of the header. + The current version is defined as 0.2. + +- The "magic" field is deprecated as of version 0.2. In a future + release, it may be removed. This originally should have matched up + with the ARM64 header "magic" field, but unfortunately does not. + The "magic2" field replaces it, matching up with the ARM64 header. + +- In current header, the flags field has only one field. + + ===== ==================================== + Bit 0 Kernel endianness. 1 if BE, 0 if LE. + ===== ==================================== + +- Image size is mandatory for boot loader to load kernel image. Booting will + fail otherwise. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/boot.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/boot.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..6077b587a842eb --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/boot.rst @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +=============================================== +RISC-V Kernel Boot Requirements and Constraints +=============================================== + +:Author: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> +:Date: 23 May 2023 + +This document describes what the RISC-V kernel expects from bootloaders and +firmware, and also the constraints that any developer must have in mind when +touching the early boot process. For the purposes of this document, the +``early boot process`` refers to any code that runs before the final virtual +mapping is set up. + +Pre-kernel Requirements and Constraints +======================================= + +The RISC-V kernel expects the following of bootloaders and platform firmware: + +Register state +-------------- + +The RISC-V kernel expects: + + * ``$a0`` to contain the hartid of the current core. + * ``$a1`` to contain the address of the devicetree in memory. + +CSR state +--------- + +The RISC-V kernel expects: + + * ``$satp = 0``: the MMU, if present, must be disabled. + +Reserved memory for resident firmware +------------------------------------- + +The RISC-V kernel must not map any resident memory, or memory protected with +PMPs, in the direct mapping, so the firmware must correctly mark those regions +as per the devicetree specification and/or the UEFI specification. + +Kernel location +--------------- + +The RISC-V kernel expects to be placed at a PMD boundary (2MB aligned for rv64 +and 4MB aligned for rv32). Note that the EFI stub will physically relocate the +kernel if that's not the case. + +Hardware description +-------------------- + +The firmware can pass either a devicetree or ACPI tables to the RISC-V kernel. + +The devicetree is either passed directly to the kernel from the previous stage +using the ``$a1`` register, or when booting with UEFI, it can be passed using the +EFI configuration table. + +The ACPI tables are passed to the kernel using the EFI configuration table. In +this case, a tiny devicetree is still created by the EFI stub. Please refer to +"EFI stub and devicetree" section below for details about this devicetree. + +Kernel entry +------------ + +On SMP systems, there are 2 methods to enter the kernel: + +- ``RISCV_BOOT_SPINWAIT``: the firmware releases all harts in the kernel, one hart + wins a lottery and executes the early boot code while the other harts are + parked waiting for the initialization to finish. This method is mostly used to + support older firmwares without SBI HSM extension and M-mode RISC-V kernel. +- ``Ordered booting``: the firmware releases only one hart that will execute the + initialization phase and then will start all other harts using the SBI HSM + extension. The ordered booting method is the preferred booting method for + booting the RISC-V kernel because it can support CPU hotplug and kexec. + +UEFI +---- + +UEFI memory map +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +When booting with UEFI, the RISC-V kernel will use only the EFI memory map to +populate the system memory. + +The UEFI firmware must parse the subnodes of the ``/reserved-memory`` devicetree +node and abide by the devicetree specification to convert the attributes of +those subnodes (``no-map`` and ``reusable``) into their correct EFI equivalent +(refer to section "3.5.4 /reserved-memory and UEFI" of the devicetree +specification v0.4-rc1). + +RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +When booting with UEFI, the EFI stub requires the boot hartid in order to pass +it to the RISC-V kernel in ``$a1``. The EFI stub retrieves the boot hartid using +one of the following methods: + +- ``RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL`` (**preferred**). +- ``boot-hartid`` devicetree subnode (**deprecated**). + +Any new firmware must implement ``RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL`` as the devicetree +based approach is deprecated now. + +Early Boot Requirements and Constraints +======================================= + +The RISC-V kernel's early boot process operates under the following constraints: + +EFI stub and devicetree +----------------------- + +When booting with UEFI, the devicetree is supplemented (or created) by the EFI +stub with the same parameters as arm64 which are described at the paragraph +"UEFI kernel support on ARM" in Documentation/arch/arm/uefi.rst. + +Virtual mapping installation +---------------------------- + +The installation of the virtual mapping is done in 2 steps in the RISC-V kernel: + +1. ``setup_vm()`` installs a temporary kernel mapping in ``early_pg_dir`` which + allows discovery of the system memory. Only the kernel text/data are mapped + at this point. When establishing this mapping, no allocation can be done + (since the system memory is not known yet), so ``early_pg_dir`` page table is + statically allocated (using only one table for each level). + +2. ``setup_vm_final()`` creates the final kernel mapping in ``swapper_pg_dir`` + and takes advantage of the discovered system memory to create the linear + mapping. When establishing this mapping, the kernel can allocate memory but + cannot access it directly (since the direct mapping is not present yet), so + it uses temporary mappings in the fixmap region to be able to access the + newly allocated page table levels. + +For ``virt_to_phys()`` and ``phys_to_virt()`` to be able to correctly convert +direct mapping addresses to physical addresses, they need to know the start of +the DRAM. This happens after step 1, right before step 2 installs the direct +mapping (see ``setup_bootmem()`` function in arch/riscv/mm/init.c). Any usage of +those macros before the final virtual mapping is installed must be carefully +examined. + +Devicetree mapping via fixmap +----------------------------- + +As the ``reserved_mem`` array is initialized with virtual addresses established +by ``setup_vm()``, and used with the mapping established by +``setup_vm_final()``, the RISC-V kernel uses the fixmap region to map the +devicetree. This ensures that the devicetree remains accessible by both virtual +mappings. + +Pre-MMU execution +----------------- + +A few pieces of code need to run before even the first virtual mapping is +established. These are the installation of the first virtual mapping itself, +patching of early alternatives and the early parsing of the kernel command line. +That code must be very carefully compiled as: + +- ``-fno-pie``: This is needed for relocatable kernels which use ``-fPIE``, + since otherwise, any access to a global symbol would go through the GOT which + is only relocated virtually. +- ``-mcmodel=medany``: Any access to a global symbol must be PC-relative to + avoid any relocations to happen before the MMU is setup. +- *all* instrumentation must also be disabled (that includes KASAN, ftrace and + others). + +As using a symbol from a different compilation unit requires this unit to be +compiled with those flags, we advise, as much as possible, not to use external +symbols. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/features.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/features.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..c70ef6ac2368c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/features.rst @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +.. kernel-feat:: $srctree/Documentation/features riscv diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/hwprobe.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/hwprobe.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..a52996b22f75d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/hwprobe.rst @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +RISC-V Hardware Probing Interface +--------------------------------- + +The RISC-V hardware probing interface is based around a single syscall, which +is defined in <asm/hwprobe.h>:: + + struct riscv_hwprobe { + __s64 key; + __u64 value; + }; + + long sys_riscv_hwprobe(struct riscv_hwprobe *pairs, size_t pair_count, + size_t cpu_count, cpu_set_t *cpus, + unsigned int flags); + +The arguments are split into three groups: an array of key-value pairs, a CPU +set, and some flags. The key-value pairs are supplied with a count. Userspace +must prepopulate the key field for each element, and the kernel will fill in the +value if the key is recognized. If a key is unknown to the kernel, its key field +will be cleared to -1, and its value set to 0. The CPU set is defined by +CPU_SET(3). For value-like keys (eg. vendor/arch/impl), the returned value will +be only be valid if all CPUs in the given set have the same value. Otherwise -1 +will be returned. For boolean-like keys, the value returned will be a logical +AND of the values for the specified CPUs. Usermode can supply NULL for cpus and +0 for cpu_count as a shortcut for all online CPUs. There are currently no flags, +this value must be zero for future compatibility. + +On success 0 is returned, on failure a negative error code is returned. + +The following keys are defined: + +* :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_MVENDORID`: Contains the value of ``mvendorid``, + as defined by the RISC-V privileged architecture specification. + +* :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_MARCHID`: Contains the value of ``marchid``, as + defined by the RISC-V privileged architecture specification. + +* :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_MIMPLID`: Contains the value of ``mimplid``, as + defined by the RISC-V privileged architecture specification. + +* :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_BASE_BEHAVIOR`: A bitmask containing the base + user-visible behavior that this kernel supports. The following base user ABIs + are defined: + + * :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_BASE_BEHAVIOR_IMA`: Support for rv32ima or + rv64ima, as defined by version 2.2 of the user ISA and version 1.10 of the + privileged ISA, with the following known exceptions (more exceptions may be + added, but only if it can be demonstrated that the user ABI is not broken): + + * The ``fence.i`` instruction cannot be directly executed by userspace + programs (it may still be executed in userspace via a + kernel-controlled mechanism such as the vDSO). + +* :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_IMA_EXT_0`: A bitmask containing the extensions + that are compatible with the :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_BASE_BEHAVIOR_IMA`: + base system behavior. + + * :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_IMA_FD`: The F and D extensions are supported, as + defined by commit cd20cee ("FMIN/FMAX now implement + minimumNumber/maximumNumber, not minNum/maxNum") of the RISC-V ISA manual. + + * :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_IMA_C`: The C extension is supported, as defined + by version 2.2 of the RISC-V ISA manual. + + * :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_IMA_V`: The V extension is supported, as defined by + version 1.0 of the RISC-V Vector extension manual. + + * :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZBA`: The Zba address generation extension is + supported, as defined in version 1.0 of the Bit-Manipulation ISA + extensions. + + * :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZBB`: The Zbb extension is supported, as defined + in version 1.0 of the Bit-Manipulation ISA extensions. + + * :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZBS`: The Zbs extension is supported, as defined + in version 1.0 of the Bit-Manipulation ISA extensions. + +* :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_CPUPERF_0`: A bitmask that contains performance + information about the selected set of processors. + + * :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_UNKNOWN`: The performance of misaligned + accesses is unknown. + + * :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_EMULATED`: Misaligned accesses are + emulated via software, either in or below the kernel. These accesses are + always extremely slow. + + * :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_SLOW`: Misaligned accesses are slower + than equivalent byte accesses. Misaligned accesses may be supported + directly in hardware, or trapped and emulated by software. + + * :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_FAST`: Misaligned accesses are faster + than equivalent byte accesses. + + * :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_UNSUPPORTED`: Misaligned accesses are + not supported at all and will generate a misaligned address fault. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..4dab0cb4b900ff --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +=================== +RISC-V architecture +=================== + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + acpi + boot + boot-image-header + vm-layout + hwprobe + patch-acceptance + uabi + vector + + features + +.. only:: subproject and html + + Indices + ======= + + * :ref:`genindex` diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/patch-acceptance.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/patch-acceptance.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..634aa222b410c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/patch-acceptance.rst @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +arch/riscv maintenance guidelines for developers +================================================ + +Overview +-------- +The RISC-V instruction set architecture is developed in the open: +in-progress drafts are available for all to review and to experiment +with implementations. New module or extension drafts can change +during the development process - sometimes in ways that are +incompatible with previous drafts. This flexibility can present a +challenge for RISC-V Linux maintenance. Linux maintainers disapprove +of churn, and the Linux development process prefers well-reviewed and +tested code over experimental code. We wish to extend these same +principles to the RISC-V-related code that will be accepted for +inclusion in the kernel. + +Patchwork +--------- + +RISC-V has a patchwork instance, where the status of patches can be checked: + + https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-riscv/list/ + +If your patch does not appear in the default view, the RISC-V maintainers have +likely either requested changes, or expect it to be applied to another tree. + +Automation runs against this patchwork instance, building/testing patches as +they arrive. The automation applies patches against the current HEAD of the +RISC-V `for-next` and `fixes` branches, depending on whether the patch has been +detected as a fix. Failing those, it will use the RISC-V `master` branch. +The exact commit to which a series has been applied will be noted on patchwork. +Patches for which any of the checks fail are unlikely to be applied and in most +cases will need to be resubmitted. + +Submit Checklist Addendum +------------------------- +We'll only accept patches for new modules or extensions if the +specifications for those modules or extensions are listed as being +unlikely to be incompatibly changed in the future. For +specifications from the RISC-V foundation this means "Frozen" or +"Ratified", for the UEFI forum specifications this means a published +ECR. (Developers may, of course, maintain their own Linux kernel trees +that contain code for any draft extensions that they wish.) + +Additionally, the RISC-V specification allows implementers to create +their own custom extensions. These custom extensions aren't required +to go through any review or ratification process by the RISC-V +Foundation. To avoid the maintenance complexity and potential +performance impact of adding kernel code for implementor-specific +RISC-V extensions, we'll only consider patches for extensions that either: + +- Have been officially frozen or ratified by the RISC-V Foundation, or +- Have been implemented in hardware that is widely available, per standard + Linux practice. + +(Implementers, may, of course, maintain their own Linux kernel trees containing +code for any custom extensions that they wish.) diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/uabi.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/uabi.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..8960fac42c40f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/uabi.rst @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +RISC-V Linux User ABI +===================== + +ISA string ordering in /proc/cpuinfo +------------------------------------ + +The canonical order of ISA extension names in the ISA string is defined in +chapter 27 of the unprivileged specification. +The specification uses vague wording, such as should, when it comes to ordering, +so for our purposes the following rules apply: + +#. Single-letter extensions come first, in canonical order. + The canonical order is "IMAFDQLCBKJTPVH". + +#. All multi-letter extensions will be separated from other extensions by an + underscore. + +#. Additional standard extensions (starting with 'Z') will be sorted after + single-letter extensions and before any higher-privileged extensions. + +#. For additional standard extensions, the first letter following the 'Z' + conventionally indicates the most closely related alphabetical + extension category. If multiple 'Z' extensions are named, they will be + ordered first by category, in canonical order, as listed above, then + alphabetically within a category. + +#. Standard supervisor-level extensions (starting with 'S') will be listed + after standard unprivileged extensions. If multiple supervisor-level + extensions are listed, they will be ordered alphabetically. + +#. Standard machine-level extensions (starting with 'Zxm') will be listed + after any lower-privileged, standard extensions. If multiple machine-level + extensions are listed, they will be ordered alphabetically. + +#. Non-standard extensions (starting with 'X') will be listed after all standard + extensions. If multiple non-standard extensions are listed, they will be + ordered alphabetically. + +An example string following the order is:: + + rv64imadc_zifoo_zigoo_zafoo_sbar_scar_zxmbaz_xqux_xrux + +Misaligned accesses +------------------- + +Misaligned accesses are supported in userspace, but they may perform poorly. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/vector.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/vector.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..75dd88a62e1d84 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/vector.rst @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +========================================= +Vector Extension Support for RISC-V Linux +========================================= + +This document briefly outlines the interface provided to userspace by Linux in +order to support the use of the RISC-V Vector Extension. + +1. prctl() Interface +--------------------- + +Two new prctl() calls are added to allow programs to manage the enablement +status for the use of Vector in userspace. The intended usage guideline for +these interfaces is to give init systems a way to modify the availability of V +for processes running under its domain. Calling these interfaces is not +recommended in libraries routines because libraries should not override policies +configured from the parant process. Also, users must noted that these interfaces +are not portable to non-Linux, nor non-RISC-V environments, so it is discourage +to use in a portable code. To get the availability of V in an ELF program, +please read :c:macro:`COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_V` bit of :c:macro:`ELF_HWCAP` in the +auxiliary vector. + +* prctl(PR_RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL, unsigned long arg) + + Sets the Vector enablement status of the calling thread, where the control + argument consists of two 2-bit enablement statuses and a bit for inheritance + mode. Other threads of the calling process are unaffected. + + Enablement status is a tri-state value each occupying 2-bit of space in + the control argument: + + * :c:macro:`PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_DEFAULT`: Use the system-wide default + enablement status on execve(). The system-wide default setting can be + controlled via sysctl interface (see sysctl section below). + + * :c:macro:`PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_ON`: Allow Vector to be run for the + thread. + + * :c:macro:`PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_OFF`: Disallow Vector. Executing Vector + instructions under such condition will trap and casuse the termination of the thread. + + arg: The control argument is a 5-bit value consisting of 3 parts, and + accessed by 3 masks respectively. + + The 3 masks, PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_CUR_MASK, + PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_NEXT_MASK, and PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_INHERIT + represents bit[1:0], bit[3:2], and bit[4]. bit[1:0] accounts for the + enablement status of current thread, and the setting at bit[3:2] takes place + at next execve(). bit[4] defines the inheritance mode of the setting in + bit[3:2]. + + * :c:macro:`PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_CUR_MASK`: bit[1:0]: Account for the + Vector enablement status for the calling thread. The calling thread is + not able to turn off Vector once it has been enabled. The prctl() call + fails with EPERM if the value in this mask is PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_OFF + but the current enablement status is not off. Setting + PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_DEFAULT here takes no effect but to set back + the original enablement status. + + * :c:macro:`PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_NEXT_MASK`: bit[3:2]: Account for the + Vector enablement setting for the calling thread at the next execve() + system call. If PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_DEFAULT is used in this mask, + then the enablement status will be decided by the system-wide + enablement status when execve() happen. + + * :c:macro:`PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_INHERIT`: bit[4]: the inheritance + mode for the setting at PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_NEXT_MASK. If the bit + is set then the following execve() will not clear the setting in both + PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_NEXT_MASK and PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_INHERIT. + This setting persists across changes in the system-wide default value. + + Return value: + * 0 on success; + * EINVAL: Vector not supported, invalid enablement status for current or + next mask; + * EPERM: Turning off Vector in PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_CUR_MASK if Vector + was enabled for the calling thread. + + On success: + * A valid setting for PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_CUR_MASK takes place + immediately. The enablement status specified in + PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_NEXT_MASK happens at the next execve() call, or + all following execve() calls if PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_INHERIT bit is + set. + * Every successful call overwrites a previous setting for the calling + thread. + +* prctl(PR_RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL) + + Gets the same Vector enablement status for the calling thread. Setting for + next execve() call and the inheritance bit are all OR-ed together. + + Note that ELF programs are able to get the availability of V for itself by + reading :c:macro:`COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_V` bit of :c:macro:`ELF_HWCAP` in the + auxiliary vector. + + Return value: + * a nonnegative value on success; + * EINVAL: Vector not supported. + +2. System runtime configuration (sysctl) +----------------------------------------- + +To mitigate the ABI impact of expansion of the signal stack, a +policy mechanism is provided to the administrators, distro maintainers, and +developers to control the default Vector enablement status for userspace +processes in form of sysctl knob: + +* /proc/sys/abi/riscv_v_default_allow + + Writing the text representation of 0 or 1 to this file sets the default + system enablement status for new starting userspace programs. Valid values + are: + + * 0: Do not allow Vector code to be executed as the default for new processes. + * 1: Allow Vector code to be executed as the default for new processes. + + Reading this file returns the current system default enablement status. + + At every execve() call, a new enablement status of the new process is set to + the system default, unless: + + * PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_INHERIT is set for the calling process, and the + setting in PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_NEXT_MASK is not + PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_DEFAULT. Or, + + * The setting in PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_NEXT_MASK is not + PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_DEFAULT. + + Modifying the system default enablement status does not affect the enablement + status of any existing process of thread that do not make an execve() call. + +3. Vector Register State Across System Calls +--------------------------------------------- + +As indicated by version 1.0 of the V extension [1], vector registers are +clobbered by system calls. + +1: https://github.com/riscv/riscv-v-spec/blob/master/calling-convention.adoc diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/vm-layout.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/vm-layout.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..69ff6da1dbf8f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/vm-layout.rst @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +===================================== +Virtual Memory Layout on RISC-V Linux +===================================== + +:Author: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr> +:Date: 12 February 2021 + +This document describes the virtual memory layout used by the RISC-V Linux +Kernel. + +RISC-V Linux Kernel 32bit +========================= + +RISC-V Linux Kernel SV32 +------------------------ + +TODO + +RISC-V Linux Kernel 64bit +========================= + +The RISC-V privileged architecture document states that the 64bit addresses +"must have bits 63–48 all equal to bit 47, or else a page-fault exception will +occur.": that splits the virtual address space into 2 halves separated by a very +big hole, the lower half is where the userspace resides, the upper half is where +the RISC-V Linux Kernel resides. + +RISC-V Linux Kernel SV39 +------------------------ + +:: + + ======================================================================================================================== + Start addr | Offset | End addr | Size | VM area description + ======================================================================================================================== + | | | | + 0000000000000000 | 0 | 0000003fffffffff | 256 GB | user-space virtual memory, different per mm + __________________|____________|__________________|_________|___________________________________________________________ + | | | | + 0000004000000000 | +256 GB | ffffffbfffffffff | ~16M TB | ... huge, almost 64 bits wide hole of non-canonical + | | | | virtual memory addresses up to the -256 GB + | | | | starting offset of kernel mappings. + __________________|____________|__________________|_________|___________________________________________________________ + | + | Kernel-space virtual memory, shared between all processes: + ____________________________________________________________|___________________________________________________________ + | | | | + ffffffc6fea00000 | -228 GB | ffffffc6feffffff | 6 MB | fixmap + ffffffc6ff000000 | -228 GB | ffffffc6ffffffff | 16 MB | PCI io + ffffffc700000000 | -228 GB | ffffffc7ffffffff | 4 GB | vmemmap + ffffffc800000000 | -224 GB | ffffffd7ffffffff | 64 GB | vmalloc/ioremap space + ffffffd800000000 | -160 GB | fffffff6ffffffff | 124 GB | direct mapping of all physical memory + fffffff700000000 | -36 GB | fffffffeffffffff | 32 GB | kasan + __________________|____________|__________________|_________|____________________________________________________________ + | + | + ____________________________________________________________|____________________________________________________________ + | | | | + ffffffff00000000 | -4 GB | ffffffff7fffffff | 2 GB | modules, BPF + ffffffff80000000 | -2 GB | ffffffffffffffff | 2 GB | kernel + __________________|____________|__________________|_________|____________________________________________________________ + + +RISC-V Linux Kernel SV48 +------------------------ + +:: + + ======================================================================================================================== + Start addr | Offset | End addr | Size | VM area description + ======================================================================================================================== + | | | | + 0000000000000000 | 0 | 00007fffffffffff | 128 TB | user-space virtual memory, different per mm + __________________|____________|__________________|_________|___________________________________________________________ + | | | | + 0000800000000000 | +128 TB | ffff7fffffffffff | ~16M TB | ... huge, almost 64 bits wide hole of non-canonical + | | | | virtual memory addresses up to the -128 TB + | | | | starting offset of kernel mappings. + __________________|____________|__________________|_________|___________________________________________________________ + | + | Kernel-space virtual memory, shared between all processes: + ____________________________________________________________|___________________________________________________________ + | | | | + ffff8d7ffea00000 | -114.5 TB | ffff8d7ffeffffff | 6 MB | fixmap + ffff8d7fff000000 | -114.5 TB | ffff8d7fffffffff | 16 MB | PCI io + ffff8d8000000000 | -114.5 TB | ffff8f7fffffffff | 2 TB | vmemmap + ffff8f8000000000 | -112.5 TB | ffffaf7fffffffff | 32 TB | vmalloc/ioremap space + ffffaf8000000000 | -80.5 TB | ffffef7fffffffff | 64 TB | direct mapping of all physical memory + ffffef8000000000 | -16.5 TB | fffffffeffffffff | 16.5 TB | kasan + __________________|____________|__________________|_________|____________________________________________________________ + | + | Identical layout to the 39-bit one from here on: + ____________________________________________________________|____________________________________________________________ + | | | | + ffffffff00000000 | -4 GB | ffffffff7fffffff | 2 GB | modules, BPF + ffffffff80000000 | -2 GB | ffffffffffffffff | 2 GB | kernel + __________________|____________|__________________|_________|____________________________________________________________ + + +RISC-V Linux Kernel SV57 +------------------------ + +:: + + ======================================================================================================================== + Start addr | Offset | End addr | Size | VM area description + ======================================================================================================================== + | | | | + 0000000000000000 | 0 | 00ffffffffffffff | 64 PB | user-space virtual memory, different per mm + __________________|____________|__________________|_________|___________________________________________________________ + | | | | + 0100000000000000 | +64 PB | feffffffffffffff | ~16K PB | ... huge, almost 64 bits wide hole of non-canonical + | | | | virtual memory addresses up to the -64 PB + | | | | starting offset of kernel mappings. + __________________|____________|__________________|_________|___________________________________________________________ + | + | Kernel-space virtual memory, shared between all processes: + ____________________________________________________________|___________________________________________________________ + | | | | + ff1bfffffea00000 | -57 PB | ff1bfffffeffffff | 6 MB | fixmap + ff1bffffff000000 | -57 PB | ff1bffffffffffff | 16 MB | PCI io + ff1c000000000000 | -57 PB | ff1fffffffffffff | 1 PB | vmemmap + ff20000000000000 | -56 PB | ff5fffffffffffff | 16 PB | vmalloc/ioremap space + ff60000000000000 | -40 PB | ffdeffffffffffff | 32 PB | direct mapping of all physical memory + ffdf000000000000 | -8 PB | fffffffeffffffff | 8 PB | kasan + __________________|____________|__________________|_________|____________________________________________________________ + | + | Identical layout to the 39-bit one from here on: + ____________________________________________________________|____________________________________________________________ + | | | | + ffffffff00000000 | -4 GB | ffffffff7fffffff | 2 GB | modules, BPF + ffffffff80000000 | -2 GB | ffffffffffffffff | 2 GB | kernel + __________________|____________|__________________|_________|____________________________________________________________ + + +Userspace VAs +-------------------- +To maintain compatibility with software that relies on the VA space with a +maximum of 48 bits the kernel will, by default, return virtual addresses to +userspace from a 48-bit range (sv48). This default behavior is achieved by +passing 0 into the hint address parameter of mmap. On CPUs with an address space +smaller than sv48, the CPU maximum supported address space will be the default. + +Software can "opt-in" to receiving VAs from another VA space by providing +a hint address to mmap. A hint address passed to mmap will cause the largest +address space that fits entirely into the hint to be used, unless there is no +space left in the address space. If there is no space available in the requested +address space, an address in the next smallest available address space will be +returned. + +For example, in order to obtain 48-bit VA space, a hint address greater than +:code:`1 << 47` must be provided. Note that this is 47 due to sv48 userspace +ending at :code:`1 << 47` and the addresses beyond this are reserved for the +kernel. Similarly, to obtain 57-bit VA space addresses, a hint address greater +than or equal to :code:`1 << 56` must be provided. |