import of selections paralleling 2.6.32.45

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>

8 files changed, 1227 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/audit/from-v2.6.32/audit.txt b/audit/from-v2.6.32/audit.txt
index 9b1a3a0..2873ec2 100644
--- a/audit/from-v2.6.32/audit.txt
+++ b/audit/from-v2.6.32/audit.txt
@@ -3191,3 +3191,13 @@ c3c239c6 	17dd759c	v3.1		y	in queue already
 f89e20d6 	50e9efd6	v3.0		n
 46905de0 	227690df	v3.0		n
 32910025 	e999dc50	v3.0		n
+---- v2.6.32.45 ----
+Commit		Parent		Parent in	In 34.x		Notes
+========================================================================
+8d8f093d 	xxxxxxxx	-- ? -- 	n/a	Makefile ver. change
+2b3fde0c 	bed9a315	v3.1		n
+f562aba7 	966728dd	v3.1		n
+43e94c2e 	f4389489	v3.1		n
+b80a7826 	0584ffa5	v3.1		n
+263b8937 	6e5714ea	v3.1		n
+d792afea 	bc0b96b5	v3.1		n
diff --git a/queue/ALSA-snd-usb-caiaq-Fix-keymap-for-RigKontrol3.patch b/queue/ALSA-snd-usb-caiaq-Fix-keymap-for-RigKontrol3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa586fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue/ALSA-snd-usb-caiaq-Fix-keymap-for-RigKontrol3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 35b112ae147b428608fc792cca78e3c64453850a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 6 Aug 2011 09:13:08 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: snd-usb-caiaq: Fix keymap for RigKontrol3
+
+commit f4389489b5cbe60b3441869c68bb4afe760969c4 upstream.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Renato <naretobh@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
+---
+ sound/usb/caiaq/input.c |    2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c b/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c
+index a48d309..c93e1aa 100644
+--- a/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c
++++ b/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static unsigned short keycode_ak1[] =  { KEY_C, KEY_B, KEY_A };
+ static unsigned short keycode_rk2[] =  { KEY_1, KEY_2, KEY_3, KEY_4,
+ 					 KEY_5, KEY_6, KEY_7 };
+ static unsigned short keycode_rk3[] =  { KEY_1, KEY_2, KEY_3, KEY_4,
+-					 KEY_5, KEY_6, KEY_7, KEY_5, KEY_6 };
++					 KEY_5, KEY_6, KEY_7, KEY_8, KEY_9 };
+ 
+ static unsigned short keycode_kore[] = {
+ 	KEY_FN_F1,      /* "menu"               */
+-- 
+1.7.9.6
+
diff --git a/queue/ALSA-timer-Fix-Oops-at-closing-slave-timer.patch b/queue/ALSA-timer-Fix-Oops-at-closing-slave-timer.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..560c8c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue/ALSA-timer-Fix-Oops-at-closing-slave-timer.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From c88723310b7f60a592e5190c8a6080c8f721127a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
+Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2011 12:24:46 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: timer - Fix Oops at closing slave timer
+
+commit 0584ffa548b6e59aceb027112f23a55f0133400e upstream.
+
+A slave-timer instance has no timer reference, and this results in
+NULL-dereference at stopping the timer, typically called at closing
+the device.
+
+Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=40682
+
+Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
+---
+ sound/core/timer.c |    2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
+index 5040c7b..ecb2dd5 100644
+--- a/sound/core/timer.c
++++ b/sound/core/timer.c
+@@ -530,6 +530,8 @@ int snd_timer_stop(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri)
+ 	if (err < 0)
+ 		return err;
+ 	timer = timeri->timer;
++	if (!timer)
++		return -EINVAL;
+ 	spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
+ 	timeri->cticks = timeri->ticks;
+ 	timeri->pticks = 0;
+-- 
+1.7.9.6
+
diff --git a/queue/crypto-Move-md5_transform-to-lib-md5.c.patch b/queue/crypto-Move-md5_transform-to-lib-md5.c.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d12d839
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue/crypto-Move-md5_transform-to-lib-md5.c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+From 49cf50286b48f59535f1a031d858a94adeda7f16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
+Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2011 19:45:10 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto: Move md5_transform to lib/md5.c
+
+commit bc0b96b54a21246e377122d54569eef71cec535f upstream.
+
+We are going to use this for TCP/IP sequence number and fragment ID
+generation.
+
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
+---
+ crypto/md5.c               |   92 +-------------------------------------------
+ include/linux/cryptohash.h |    5 +++
+ lib/Makefile               |    2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/md5.c b/crypto/md5.c
+index 30efc7d..7febeaa 100644
+--- a/crypto/md5.c
++++ b/crypto/md5.c
+@@ -21,99 +21,9 @@
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/string.h>
+ #include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+ #include <asm/byteorder.h>
+ 
+-#define F1(x, y, z)	(z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
+-#define F2(x, y, z)	F1(z, x, y)
+-#define F3(x, y, z)	(x ^ y ^ z)
+-#define F4(x, y, z)	(y ^ (x | ~z))
+-
+-#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, in, s) \
+-	(w += f(x, y, z) + in, w = (w<<s | w>>(32-s)) + x)
+-
+-static void md5_transform(u32 *hash, u32 const *in)
+-{
+-	u32 a, b, c, d;
+-
+-	a = hash[0];
+-	b = hash[1];
+-	c = hash[2];
+-	d = hash[3];
+-
+-	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478, 7);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070db, 17);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8, 7);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
+-	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
+-
+-	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562, 5);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340, 9);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105d, 5);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
+-	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
+-
+-	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942, 4);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44, 4);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
+-	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
+-
+-	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244, 6);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97, 10);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314, 15);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82, 6);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
+-	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
+-
+-	hash[0] += a;
+-	hash[1] += b;
+-	hash[2] += c;
+-	hash[3] += d;
+-}
+-
+ /* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */
+ static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
+ {
+diff --git a/include/linux/cryptohash.h b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
+index ec78a4b..d2984fb 100644
+--- a/include/linux/cryptohash.h
++++ b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
+@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@
+ void sha_init(__u32 *buf);
+ void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *W);
+ 
++#define MD5_DIGEST_WORDS 4
++#define MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES 64
++
++void md5_transform(__u32 *hash, __u32 const *in);
++
+ __u32 half_md4_transform(__u32 buf[4], __u32 const in[8]);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
+index 0d40152..e0d495e 100644
+--- a/lib/Makefile
++++ b/lib/Makefile
+@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ endif
+ lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
+ 	 rbtree.o radix-tree.o dump_stack.o \
+ 	 idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o prio_tree.o \
+-	 sha1.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
++	 sha1.o md5.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
+ 	 proportions.o prio_heap.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \
+ 	 is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o flex_array.o
+ 
+-- 
+1.7.9.6
+
diff --git a/queue/net-Compute-protocol-sequence-numbers-and-fragment-I.patch b/queue/net-Compute-protocol-sequence-numbers-and-fragment-I.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24d559f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue/net-Compute-protocol-sequence-numbers-and-fragment-I.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,887 @@
+From a83b2dfa6b8a1b305cdf8ab7b0ee462494f3dbf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
+Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2011 20:50:44 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs
+ using MD5.
+
+commit 6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec upstream.
+
+Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
+partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
+
+MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
+other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
+
+Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
+unpredictable is a very serious limitation.  So the periodic
+regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed.  We compute and
+use a full 32-bit sequence number.
+
+For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
+number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
+
+Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
+Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+[PG: diffstat vs. 6e5714 differs, since no secure_ipv6_id to delete in 34]
+Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
+---
+ drivers/char/random.c                    |  334 +-----------------------------
+ include/linux/random.h                   |   11 -
+ include/net/secure_seq.h                 |   20 ++
+ lib/md5.c                                |   95 +++++++++
+ net/core/Makefile                        |    2 +-
+ net/core/secure_seq.c                    |  184 ++++++++++++++++
+ net/dccp/ipv4.c                          |    1 +
+ net/dccp/ipv6.c                          |    9 +-
+ net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c               |    1 +
+ net/ipv4/inetpeer.c                      |    1 +
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c |    1 +
+ net/ipv4/route.c                         |    1 +
+ net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c                      |    1 +
+ net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c              |    1 +
+ net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c                      |    1 +
+ 15 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 345 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 include/net/secure_seq.h
+ create mode 100644 lib/md5.c
+ create mode 100644 net/core/secure_seq.c
+
+diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
+index 2fd3d39..ccdadd9 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -1295,330 +1295,14 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
+ };
+ #endif 	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+ 
+-/********************************************************************
+- *
+- * Random functions for networking
+- *
+- ********************************************************************/
+-
+-/*
+- * TCP initial sequence number picking.  This uses the random number
+- * generator to pick an initial secret value.  This value is hashed
+- * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique
+- * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints.  This defeats
+- * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number.
+- * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin.
+- *
+- * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total
+- * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash,
+- * compensated for by changing the secret periodically.
+- */
+-
+-/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
+-#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
+-#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
+-#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
+-
+-/*
+- * The generic round function.  The application is so specific that
+- * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
+- * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
+- * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
+- */
+-#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s)	\
+-	(a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)))
+-#define K1 0
+-#define K2 013240474631UL
+-#define K3 015666365641UL
++static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;
+ 
+-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+-
+-static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform(__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
++static int __init random_int_secret_init(void)
+ {
+-	__u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
+-
+-	/* Round 1 */
+-	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1,  3);
+-	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1,  7);
+-	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11);
+-	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19);
+-	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1,  3);
+-	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1,  7);
+-	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11);
+-	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19);
+-	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1,  3);
+-	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1,  7);
+-	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11);
+-	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19);
+-
+-	/* Round 2 */
+-	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2,  3);
+-	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2,  5);
+-	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2,  9);
+-	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13);
+-	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2,  3);
+-	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2,  5);
+-	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2,  9);
+-	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13);
+-	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2,  3);
+-	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2,  5);
+-	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2,  9);
+-	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13);
+-
+-	/* Round 3 */
+-	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3,  3);
+-	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3,  9);
+-	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11);
+-	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15);
+-	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3,  3);
+-	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3,  9);
+-	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11);
+-	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15);
+-	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3,  3);
+-	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3,  9);
+-	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
+-	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);
+-
+-	return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
+-	/* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
+-}
+-#endif
+-
+-#undef ROUND
+-#undef F
+-#undef G
+-#undef H
+-#undef K1
+-#undef K2
+-#undef K3
+-
+-/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
+-#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
+-/*
+- * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
+- * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
+- * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
+- *
+- * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
+- * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
+- * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
+- * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
+- * 	to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
+- * 	clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
+- *
+- * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
+- * 4.55 hours.
+- *
+- * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
+- * 			Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
+- *
+- */
+-#define COUNT_BITS 8
+-#define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
+-#define HASH_BITS 24
+-#define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1)
+-
+-static struct keydata {
+-	__u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */
+-	__u32 secret[12];
+-} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
+-
+-static unsigned int ip_cnt;
+-
+-static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work);
+-
+-static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator);
+-
+-/*
+- * Lock avoidance:
+- * The ISN generation runs lockless - it's just a hash over random data.
+- * State changes happen every 5 minutes when the random key is replaced.
+- * Synchronization is performed by having two copies of the hash function
+- * state and rekey_seq_generator always updates the inactive copy.
+- * The copy is then activated by updating ip_cnt.
+- * The implementation breaks down if someone blocks the thread
+- * that processes SYN requests for more than 5 minutes. Should never
+- * happen, and even if that happens only a not perfectly compliant
+- * ISN is generated, nothing fatal.
+- */
+-static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work)
+-{
+-	struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
+-
+-	get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
+-	keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
+-	smp_wmb();
+-	ip_cnt++;
+-	schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work,
+-			      round_jiffies_relative(REKEY_INTERVAL));
+-}
+-
+-static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
+-{
+-	struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
+-
+-	smp_rmb();
+-
+-	return keyptr;
+-}
+-
+-static __init int seqgen_init(void)
+-{
+-	rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
++	get_random_bytes(random_int_secret, sizeof(random_int_secret));
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+-late_initcall(seqgen_init);
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+-__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+-				   __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+-{
+-	__u32 seq;
+-	__u32 hash[12];
+-	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-
+-	/* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
+-	 * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
+-	 */
+-
+-	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+-	hash[4] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+-	memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
+-
+-	seq = twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
+-	seq += keyptr->count;
+-
+-	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
+-
+-	return seq;
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
+-#endif
+-
+-/*  The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
+- *  All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@msu.ru>.
+- */
+-__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
+-{
+-	struct keydata *keyptr;
+-	__u32 hash[4];
+-
+-	keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-
+-	/*
+-	 *  Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
+-	 *  The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
+-	 *  which is then hashed with random data.
+-	 */
+-	hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr;
+-	hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
+-	hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
+-	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+-
+-	return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+-}
+-
+-#ifdef CONFIG_INET
+-
+-__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+-				 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+-{
+-	__u32 seq;
+-	__u32 hash[4];
+-	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-
+-	/*
+-	 *  Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
+-	 *  (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
+-	 *  Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
+-	 *  then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
+-	 */
+-	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+-	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+-	hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+-	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+-
+-	seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
+-	seq += keyptr->count;
+-	/*
+-	 *	As close as possible to RFC 793, which
+-	 *	suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
+-	 *	Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
+-	 *	For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
+-	 *	For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
+-	 *	we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
+-	 *	overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
+-	 *	Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
+-	 */
+-	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6;
+-
+-	return seq;
+-}
+-
+-/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral IPV4 transport port search */
+-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
+-{
+-	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-	u32 hash[4];
+-
+-	/*
+-	 *  Pick a unique starting offset for each ephemeral port search
+-	 *  (saddr, daddr, dport) and 48bits of random data.
+-	 */
+-	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+-	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+-	hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ keyptr->secret[10];
+-	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+-
+-	return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral);
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+-			       __be16 dport)
+-{
+-	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-	u32 hash[12];
+-
+-	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+-	hash[4] = (__force u32)dport;
+-	memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
+-
+-	return twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash);
+-}
+-#endif
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
+-/* Similar to secure_tcp_sequence_number but generate a 48 bit value
+- * bit's 32-47 increase every key exchange
+- *       0-31  hash(source, dest)
+- */
+-u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+-				__be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+-{
+-	u64 seq;
+-	__u32 hash[4];
+-	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-
+-	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+-	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+-	hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+-	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+-
+-	seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+-	seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS);
+-
+-	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
+-	seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
+-
+-	return seq;
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
+-#endif
+-
+-#endif /* CONFIG_INET */
+-
++late_initcall(random_int_secret_init);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
+@@ -1626,17 +1310,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
+  * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
+  * depleting entropy is too high
+  */
+-DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [4], get_random_int_hash);
++DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash);
+ unsigned int get_random_int(void)
+ {
+-	struct keydata *keyptr;
+ 	__u32 *hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
+-	int ret;
++	unsigned int ret;
+ 
+-	keyptr = get_keyptr();
+ 	hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + get_cycles();
+-
+-	ret = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
++	md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret);
++	ret = hash[0];
+ 	put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
+ 
+ 	return ret;
+diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
+index 25d02fe..2948046 100644
+--- a/include/linux/random.h
++++ b/include/linux/random.h
+@@ -53,17 +53,6 @@ extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+ extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+ void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
+ 
+-extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
+-extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
+-extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+-				      __be16 dport);
+-extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+-					__be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+-extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+-					  __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+-extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+-				       __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+-
+ #ifndef MODULE
+ extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
+ #endif
+diff --git a/include/net/secure_seq.h b/include/net/secure_seq.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d97f689
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++#ifndef _NET_SECURE_SEQ
++#define _NET_SECURE_SEQ
++
++#include <linux/types.h>
++
++extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
++extern __u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4]);
++extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
++extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
++				      __be16 dport);
++extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
++					__be16 sport, __be16 dport);
++extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
++					  __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
++extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
++				       __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
++extern u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
++					 __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
++
++#endif /* _NET_SECURE_SEQ */
+diff --git a/lib/md5.c b/lib/md5.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..c777180
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/lib/md5.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
++
++#define F1(x, y, z)	(z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
++#define F2(x, y, z)	F1(z, x, y)
++#define F3(x, y, z)	(x ^ y ^ z)
++#define F4(x, y, z)	(y ^ (x | ~z))
++
++#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, in, s) \
++	(w += f(x, y, z) + in, w = (w<<s | w>>(32-s)) + x)
++
++void md5_transform(__u32 *hash, __u32 const *in)
++{
++	u32 a, b, c, d;
++
++	a = hash[0];
++	b = hash[1];
++	c = hash[2];
++	d = hash[3];
++
++	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478, 7);
++	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
++	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070db, 17);
++	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
++	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7);
++	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
++	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
++	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
++	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8, 7);
++	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
++	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
++	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
++	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7);
++	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
++	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
++	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
++
++	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562, 5);
++	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340, 9);
++	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
++	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
++	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105d, 5);
++	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9);
++	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
++	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
++	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5);
++	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9);
++	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
++	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
++	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5);
++	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9);
++	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
++	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
++
++	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942, 4);
++	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
++	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
++	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
++	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44, 4);
++	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
++	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
++	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
++	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4);
++	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
++	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
++	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
++	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4);
++	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
++	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
++	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
++
++	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244, 6);
++	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97, 10);
++	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
++	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
++	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6);
++	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
++	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
++	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
++	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6);
++	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
++	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314, 15);
++	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
++	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82, 6);
++	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
++	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
++	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
++
++	hash[0] += a;
++	hash[1] += b;
++	hash[2] += c;
++	hash[3] += d;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(md5_transform);
+diff --git a/net/core/Makefile b/net/core/Makefile
+index 08791ac..1e8ca3c 100644
+--- a/net/core/Makefile
++++ b/net/core/Makefile
+@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
+ #
+ 
+ obj-y := sock.o request_sock.o skbuff.o iovec.o datagram.o stream.o scm.o \
+-	 gen_stats.o gen_estimator.o net_namespace.o
++	 gen_stats.o gen_estimator.o net_namespace.o secure_seq.o
+ 
+ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl_net_core.o
+ 
+diff --git a/net/core/secure_seq.c b/net/core/secure_seq.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..45329d7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/init.h>
++#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/cache.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
++#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
++#include <linux/ktime.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
++
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
++
++static u32 net_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;
++
++static int __init net_secret_init(void)
++{
++	get_random_bytes(net_secret, sizeof(net_secret));
++	return 0;
++}
++late_initcall(net_secret_init);
++
++static u32 seq_scale(u32 seq)
++{
++	/*
++	 *	As close as possible to RFC 793, which
++	 *	suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
++	 *	Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
++	 *	For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
++	 *	For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
++	 *	we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
++	 *	overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
++	 *	Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
++	 */
++	return seq + (ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6);
++}
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
++__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
++				   __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
++{
++	u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
++	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++	u32 i;
++
++	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
++	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
++		secret[i] = net_secret[i] + daddr[i];
++	secret[4] = net_secret[4] +
++		(((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport);
++	for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
++		secret[i] = net_secret[i];
++
++	md5_transform(hash, secret);
++
++	return seq_scale(hash[0]);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
++
++u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
++			       __be16 dport)
++{
++	u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
++	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++	u32 i;
++
++	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
++	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
++		secret[i] = net_secret[i] + (__force u32) daddr[i];
++	secret[4] = net_secret[4] + (__force u32)dport;
++	for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
++		secret[i] = net_secret[i];
++
++	md5_transform(hash, secret);
++
++	return hash[0];
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_INET
++__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
++{
++	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++
++	hash[0] = (__force __u32) daddr;
++	hash[1] = net_secret[13];
++	hash[2] = net_secret[14];
++	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
++
++	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
++
++	return hash[0];
++}
++
++__u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4])
++{
++	__u32 hash[4];
++
++	memcpy(hash, daddr, 16);
++	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
++
++	return hash[0];
++}
++
++__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
++				 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
++{
++	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++
++	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
++	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
++	hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
++	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
++
++	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
++
++	return seq_scale(hash[0]);
++}
++
++u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
++{
++	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++
++	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
++	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
++	hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ net_secret[14];
++	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
++
++	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
++
++	return hash[0];
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral);
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
++u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
++				__be16 sport, __be16 dport)
++{
++	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++	u64 seq;
++
++	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
++	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
++	hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
++	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
++
++	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
++
++	seq = hash[0] | (((u64)hash[1]) << 32);
++	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
++	seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
++
++	return seq;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
++u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
++				  __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
++{
++	u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
++	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
++	u64 seq;
++	u32 i;
++
++	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
++	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
++		secret[i] = net_secret[i] + daddr[i];
++	secret[4] = net_secret[4] +
++		(((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport);
++	for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
++		secret[i] = net_secret[i];
++
++	md5_transform(hash, secret);
++
++	seq = hash[0] | (((u64)hash[1]) << 32);
++	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
++	seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
++
++	return seq;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccpv6_sequence_number);
++#endif
++#endif
+diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv4.c b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
+index 52ffa1c..e072e01 100644
+--- a/net/dccp/ipv4.c
++++ b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
+ #include <net/tcp_states.h>
+ #include <net/xfrm.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+ 
+ #include "ackvec.h"
+ #include "ccid.h"
+diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+index 3b11e41..fec7de6 100644
+--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
++++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
+ #include <net/transp_v6.h>
+ #include <net/ip6_checksum.h>
+ #include <net/xfrm.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+ 
+ #include "dccp.h"
+ #include "ipv6.h"
+@@ -70,13 +71,7 @@ static inline void dccp_v6_send_check(struct sock *sk, int unused_value,
+ 	dh->dccph_checksum = dccp_v6_csum_finish(skb, &np->saddr, &np->daddr);
+ }
+ 
+-static inline __u32 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+-						  __be16 sport, __be16 dport   )
+-{
+-	return secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(saddr, daddr, sport, dport);
+-}
+-
+-static inline __u32 dccp_v6_init_sequence(struct sk_buff *skb)
++static inline __u64 dccp_v6_init_sequence(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ 	return secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
+ 					     ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32,
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+index 2b79377..7da0827 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
+ #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+ #include <net/ip.h>
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
+index 6bcfe52..5639e05 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
+ #include <linux/net.h>
+ #include <net/ip.h>
+ #include <net/inetpeer.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  *  Theory of operations.
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c
+index 6c4f11f..2d5073a 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c
+@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ip.h>
+ 
+ #include <linux/netfilter.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+ #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat.h>
+ #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.h>
+ #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_rule.h>
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
+index 325b43c..c57dead 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
+@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+ #include <linux/sysctl.h>
+ #endif
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+ 
+ #define RT_FL_TOS(oldflp) \
+     ((u32)(oldflp->fl4_tos & (IPTOS_RT_MASK | RTO_ONLINK)))
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+index ea51c2f..ab71655 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
+ #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
+ #include <net/xfrm.h>
+ #include <net/netdma.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+ 
+ #include <linux/inet.h>
+ #include <linux/ipv6.h>
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+index 633a6c2..b7c125f 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
+ #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
+ #include <net/inet6_hashtables.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+ #include <net/ip.h>
+ 
+ int __inet6_hash(struct sock *sk, struct inet_timewait_sock *tw)
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+index 075f540..d854453 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
+ #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
+ #include <net/netdma.h>
+ #include <net/inet_common.h>
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
+-- 
+1.7.9.6
+
diff --git a/queue/powerpc-Fix-device-tree-claim-code.patch b/queue/powerpc-Fix-device-tree-claim-code.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f1e316
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue/powerpc-Fix-device-tree-claim-code.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 2f6404468ae3d02ef512fb0477eaa8a034817489 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
+Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2011 20:47:07 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] powerpc: Fix device tree claim code
+
+commit 966728dd88b4026ec58fee169ccceaeaf56ef120 upstream.
+
+I have a box that fails in OF during boot with:
+
+DEFAULT CATCH!, exception-handler=fff00400
+at   %SRR0: 49424d2c4c6f6768   %SRR1: 800000004000b002
+
+ie "IBM,Logh". OF got corrupted with a device tree string.
+
+Looking at make_room and alloc_up, we claim the first chunk (1 MB)
+but we never claim any more. mem_end is always set to alloc_top
+which is the top of our available address space, guaranteeing we will
+never call alloc_up and claim more memory.
+
+Also alloc_up wasn't setting alloc_bottom to the bottom of the
+available address space.
+
+This doesn't help the box to boot, but we at least fail with
+an obvious error. We could relocate the device tree in a future
+patch.
+
+Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
+Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
+---
+ arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c |    6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c
+index 97d4bd9..2731a27 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c
+@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ static unsigned long __init alloc_up(unsigned long size, unsigned long align)
+ 	}
+ 	if (addr == 0)
+ 		return 0;
+-	RELOC(alloc_bottom) = addr;
++	RELOC(alloc_bottom) = addr + size;
+ 
+ 	prom_debug(" -> %x\n", addr);
+ 	prom_debug("  alloc_bottom : %x\n", RELOC(alloc_bottom));
+@@ -1782,7 +1782,7 @@ static void __init *make_room(unsigned long *mem_start, unsigned long *mem_end,
+ 		chunk = alloc_up(room, 0);
+ 		if (chunk == 0)
+ 			prom_panic("No memory for flatten_device_tree (claim failed)");
+-		*mem_end = RELOC(alloc_top);
++		*mem_end = chunk + room;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ret = (void *)*mem_start;
+@@ -2001,7 +2001,7 @@ static void __init flatten_device_tree(void)
+ 	mem_start = (unsigned long)alloc_up(room, PAGE_SIZE);
+ 	if (mem_start == 0)
+ 		prom_panic("Can't allocate initial device-tree chunk\n");
+-	mem_end = RELOC(alloc_top);
++	mem_end = mem_start + room;
+ 
+ 	/* Get root of tree */
+ 	root = call_prom("peer", 1, 1, (phandle)0);
+-- 
+1.7.9.6
+
diff --git a/queue/powerpc-pseries-Fix-kexec-on-machines-with-more-than.patch b/queue/powerpc-pseries-Fix-kexec-on-machines-with-more-than.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8421d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue/powerpc-pseries-Fix-kexec-on-machines-with-more-than.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 7437762b345110d2ffbae7ce20dd54678cb237f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2011 18:15:03 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] powerpc: pseries: Fix kexec on machines with more than 4TB
+ of RAM
+
+commit bed9a31527af8ff3dfbad62a1a42815cef4baab7 upstream.
+
+On a box with 8TB of RAM the MMU hashtable is 64GB in size. That
+means we have 4G PTEs. pSeries_lpar_hptab_clear was using a signed
+int to store the index which will overflow at 2G.
+
+Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
+Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
+Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
+---
+ arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c |    2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c
+index cf79b46..7e0eba4 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c
++++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c
+@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ static void pSeries_lpar_hptab_clear(void)
+ 		unsigned long ptel;
+ 	} ptes[4];
+ 	long lpar_rc;
+-	int i, j;
++	unsigned long i, j;
+ 
+ 	/* Read in batches of 4,
+ 	 * invalidate only valid entries not in the VRMA
+-- 
+1.7.9.6
+
diff --git a/queue/series b/queue/series
index e3ae4dc..8efb09c 100644
--- a/queue/series
+++ b/queue/series
@@ -148,3 +148,9 @@ dm-mpath-fix-potential-NULL-pointer-in-feature-arg-p.patch
 dm-fix-idr-leak-on-module-removal.patch
 x86-Hpet-Avoid-the-comparator-readback-penalty.patch
 x86-HPET-Chose-a-paranoid-safe-value-for-the-ETIME-c.patch
+crypto-Move-md5_transform-to-lib-md5.c.patch
+net-Compute-protocol-sequence-numbers-and-fragment-I.patch
+ALSA-timer-Fix-Oops-at-closing-slave-timer.patch
+ALSA-snd-usb-caiaq-Fix-keymap-for-RigKontrol3.patch
+powerpc-Fix-device-tree-claim-code.patch
+powerpc-pseries-Fix-kexec-on-machines-with-more-than.patch