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authorKonstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@linuxfoundation.org>2021-04-01 14:56:36 -0400
committerKonstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@linuxfoundation.org>2021-04-01 14:56:36 -0400
commitb303c731387107a9f2755275dedcc685bfc8c030 (patch)
tree931170f7934e6b9a71ba6916b6ea7ae67e76be65
parentcb55769aa192731d819b306d3d3904ba443d22dd (diff)
downloadkorg-helpers-b303c731387107a9f2755275dedcc685bfc8c030.tar.gz
Copy admonition from the commit
Make sure the admonition about not relying too much on sig-prover is plainly visible. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@linuxfoundation.org>
-rwxr-xr-xsig-prover.py14
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sig-prover.py b/sig-prover.py
index 6d2d79b..74c3c44 100755
--- a/sig-prover.py
+++ b/sig-prover.py
@@ -6,6 +6,20 @@
# The script it supposed to be fire-and-forget, running in a screen session or as a
# systemd service, with reports sent to admin@kernel.org.
#
+# CAUTION:
+# This script is not a guaranteed mechanism to detect intrusion -- an
+# attacker can defeat it by analyzing access patterns/IPs and serving
+# different content when it suspects that someone is running an automated
+# signature verification check. The script can probably be improved by
+# adding random delays between retrieving the tarball and the detached
+# signature, setting a referrer value, etc. However, even with added
+# measures, it will always act fairly predictably, so there will always
+# remain a way to defeat it.
+#
+# If you download tarballs from kernel.org for any purpose, you should
+# always run your own verification on each downloaded file.
+# https://www.kernel.org/signature.html
+#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
#
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-