BPF signing¶

This document describes how BPF programs are cryptographically signed, how the kernel verifies them at load time, and how Linux Security Modules (LSMs) - including the BPF LSM - use the resulting verdict to enforce policy. It is written for developers who want to produce signed BPF objects, understand what the signature actually guarantees, or build a policy on top of it.

Motivation¶

A signed BPF program lets the kernel establish that the bytecode being loaded originates from a trusted producer and was not modified in transit. On its own the kernel does not require signatures - an unsigned program loads exactly as before - but it records a verdict (see The verdict) that an LSM can gate on. This is the building block for policies such as “only run BPF that was signed by a key in the trusted keyring”, as could in the future be enforced by an LSM such as IPE.

Signing is orthogonal to the existing permission model: it does not replace the capability checks or the verifier. A signed load still requires the usual privileges (CAP_BPF and any program-type-specific capability, subject to kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled), and the loader’s instructions are still checked by the verifier like any other program. A valid signature establishes origin and integrity, not safety - it lets a policy trust where the bytecode came from, it does not let a load skip any check it would otherwise face.

The hard part is what gets signed. A naive scheme would sign a program’s instruction buffer at build time and verify that signature at BPF_PROG_LOAD. That does not survive contact with real BPF objects, because the bytes the kernel finally loads are not the bytes the developer built and signed. Between the two, libbpf and the kernel rewrite the program:

map file descriptors are patched into ld_imm64 instructions (BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD), and a map’s fd is assigned at load time, so it differs on every run;
CO-RE relocations rewrite field offsets, sizes and existence flags against the running kernel’s BTF, so the result differs from one kernel to the next;
kfunc and ksym references are resolved to ids/addresses in the running kernel;
global data (.rodata/.data/.bss) is created and seeded as maps at load.

So a signature over the original instructions cannot match the relocated instructions the verifier ends up checking, and the relocated form cannot be produced ahead of time because it depends on the target kernel. There is no fixed byte string that is both signable at build time and what the kernel actually loads - which is why a program cannot simply be signed and loaded directly.

The trusted loader¶

The solution is to move that setup work into a small BPF program - the loader - and sign the loader instead of the individual programs. libbpf’s gen_loader machinery (bpftool gen skeleton -L, the “light skeleton”) emits a BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL program whose body performs the bpf() syscalls that create maps, apply relocations, and load the real programs. The payload it installs - the serialized programs, map descriptions, relocation data and initial values - lives in a separate array map, the metadata map (__loader.map).

So the unit of trust is the loader, and the signing contract is:

Sig(I_loader || D_meta)

where I_loader is the loader’s instruction stream and D_meta is the content of the metadata map. Verifying the loader’s signature establishes that both the loader and the payload it is about to install are authentic. The loader is reproducible: gen_loader builds it from primitives so the same object yields the same bytes on any build host.

Why the loader is signable when the program is not¶

The loader sidesteps every rewrite listed above, because the bytes that are signed are relocation-invariant:

The loader’s own instructions are a fixed sequence of bpf() syscalls emitted by gen_loader; they carry no CO-RE relocations and resolve no ksyms, so they are identical on every kernel. The metadata map is referenced by index into fd_array (BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE), not by a baked-in file descriptor, so even that reference does not change between build and load. The loader instruction bytes the kernel verifies are exactly the bytes that were signed.
The metadata map is opaque, frozen data - the serialized target programs, their relocation records, map descriptions and initial values. Its bytes are identical at build time and at load time, so they are simply appended to the instructions and covered by the same signature (there is no separate metadata hash to compute or compare).

All the host-specific rewriting - creating maps, patching their fds into the target programs, applying CO-RE, resolving ksyms, seeding global data - still happens, but it happens inside the loader at runtime, on the verified metadata, after the kernel has verified the insns || metadata signature. The kernel never has to verify the relocated target programs: it verifies the loader and its inputs once, and trust transfers to whatever that now-trusted, deterministic loader installs. The relocation step is moved from “before the signature can be checked” to “after a trusted program runs” - which is exactly what makes it signable.

Because the metadata map is the loader’s only untrusted input, two existing map properties are reused to keep it trustworthy across the load:

Exclusive maps: A map created with excl_prog_hash (see BPF_MAP_CREATE) may only be accessed by a program whose digest matches that hash. The verifier enforces map->excl_prog_sha == prog->digest for every map a program uses, so the metadata map is bound to exactly the signed loader and cannot be shared with or mutated by another program.
Frozen maps: The metadata map is frozen (BPF_MAP_FREEZE) before the loader is loaded. Freezing blocks further userspace writes, so the bytes folded into the signature cannot change before the loader runs. (Freezing does not make the map read-only to the loader program itself, which still writes created file descriptors back into the blob’s scratch area.)

Load-time verification¶

Rather than have the loader check its own metadata from within BPF, the kernel verifies it directly at BPF_PROG_LOAD, with no new UAPI. The mechanism reuses the existing fd_array:

Userspace creates the metadata map with excl_prog_hash set to the loader’s digest, populates it, and freezes it.
The loader is loaded with signature/signature_size/keyring_id set, the metadata map referenced through fd_array, and fd_array_cnt set so the kernel knows the array’s length.
Signature verification runs inside the verifier (bpf_check()), once it has resolved the fd_array entries into the program’s used_maps. The maps folded into the signature are therefore the very objects the program binds - a single resolution of fd_array, not a separate read, so the verified bytes cannot be swapped for a different map after the check (no time-of-check/time-of-use window). Each folded map must be exclusive (carry excl_prog_sha) and a plain array map (BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY); only an array map exposes its value buffer through map_direct_value_addr() as a kernel address spanning value_size bytes. A map that is not exclusive, not frozen, or not a plain array is rejected, with a verifier log message naming the offending map. The kernel appends each map’s frozen contents to the instruction buffer and verifies the PKCS#7 signature over the concatenation insns || metadata_0 || metadata_1 || ... in used_maps order, before it rewrites the (signed) instructions.

A signed program therefore takes one of exactly two shapes, both fully supported:

No bound maps (fd_array_cnt == 0): there is nothing to append, so the kernel verifies the signature over the instructions alone. A valid signature yields BPF_SIG_VERIFIED and the program loads. This is the ordinary case for a directly-loaded signed program with no separate payload; it is not rejected for “missing” metadata, because it has none to cover.
Exclusive bound maps (fd_array_cnt > 0): every entry is exclusive and folded, so the signature covers insns || metadata.

There is no third shape: a non-exclusive map in a signed program’s fd_array is rejected rather than silently left out of the signature, so a signed loader never binds a map its signature does not cover.

The digest binding (excl_prog_sha == prog->digest) is enforced by the verifier as usual; because that check runs while fd_array is resolved - before the verifier would otherwise compute the tag - prog->digest is computed up front in the verifier, over the unmodified (signature-covered) instructions, for any signed load.

Coverage is then enforced as the verifier resolves instructions, at the point each object is bound rather than by a count taken afterwards. Once the signature has been verified, binding any further map is refused: a map reached by a directly-referenced fd, or a map swapped into an fd_array slot the loader reads, is not among those already folded, so it is rejected the moment the verifier tries to bind it. A BTF is refused outright for a signed program - a ksym or a BTF fd in fd_array, whether resolved up front or lazily for a module kfunc, is rejected when it would be bound. Together with the fold rule above this keeps the verdict binary: a signed program cannot use a map its signature does not cover, and a different but equally digest-bound map cannot be substituted at an fd_array slot. Non-exclusive maps are never folded, so a signed program cannot use one at all.

The verdict¶

A program is either unsigned or fully verified - there is no intermediate state. The outcome is recorded in prog->aux->sig.verdict:

enum bpf_sig_verdict {
        BPF_SIG_UNSIGNED = 0,
        BPF_SIG_VERIFIED,
};

BPF_SIG_VERIFIED means the signature is valid and covers the instructions and the frozen contents of every exclusive map the program uses:

For an ordinary, directly-loaded signed program the instructions are the whole artifact and it uses no exclusive maps, so a valid instruction signature is the complete verification.
For a signed loader the metadata map is exclusive, so its contents are folded in and the signature covers insns || metadata.

There is deliberately no “instructions verified but metadata not” verdict: a signed loader that fails to cover its metadata is rejected (see above), not recorded with a weaker verdict. BPF_SIG_VERIFIED therefore always means the program and everything the signature is responsible for are authentic, which is what a policy can rely on.

Alongside the verdict the kernel records which keyring validated the signature; see Keyrings.

Enforcement via LSMs¶

Signing only records a verdict; an LSM turns it into policy. The verdict and keyring fields live in struct bpf_prog_aux, so a BPF LSM program can read them directly (see LSM BPF Programs for writing and attaching BPF LSM programs); the same fields are equally available to in-tree LSMs. Two hooks are useful at different points of the load: the dedicated security_bpf_prog_load() gates admission before the main verification work, and the existing security_bpf_prog() observes a program that has fully loaded.

Admission: `security_bpf_prog_load()`¶

This hook gates admission for every load, from a single call site inside the verifier (bpf_check()), before the main verification work. It runs after the optional signature verification, so the verdict and keyring fields are final - the hook can see whether, and how strongly, the program was signed, which keyring validated it, the load attr, the BPF token and whether the load came from the kernel. For a signed load the verdict is BPF_SIG_VERIFIED here (the signature has just been checked); for an unsigned load it is BPF_SIG_UNSIGNED.

This is the place for coarse admission that must also see unsigned and not-yet-verified loads: require a signature at all, restrict the acceptable keyring, restrict which token/credentials may load BPF, apply per-program-type rules, or audit every load attempt that makes it past signature verification - attempts failing the signature or the metadata binding abort before this hook fires. It is the primary deny point.

One subtlety: this hook runs before the verifier finishes its work, so BPF_SIG_VERIFIED here means only “validly signed” - not “loaded”. Allowing a load at this point lets it proceed; it does not guarantee the program will load. A validly signed program can still be rejected afterwards on two independent grounds: the verifier may reject it like any other program (unsafe memory access, bad control flow, resource limits, ...), and the kernel separately refuses - as the verifier resolves instructions and binds each object - any map the signature does not cover or any BTF at all, regardless of what this hook returned. Only after the program has fully loaded, at the next hook (security_bpf_prog()), does BPF_SIG_VERIFIED carry its full meaning: validly signed and fully verified.

A more realistic admission policy than “is it signed at all”: base trust in the bpf keyring or an explicit allowlist of a caller-supplied staging key/ keyring, and emit a record of every decision including denied attempts. (Illustrative - error checking elided.)

/*
 * Serials of caller-supplied keyrings we are willing to stage. Empty
 * on a system that has committed to the bpf keyring, where the kernel
 * refuses them anyway.
 */
struct {
        __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
        __type(key, __s32);             /* keyring_serial */
        __type(value, __u8);
        __uint(max_entries, 64);
} staging_keys SEC(".maps");

/* Audit stream consumed by a userspace logger. */
struct {
        __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF);
        __uint(max_entries, 1 << 16);
} audit SEC(".maps");

struct decision { __u32 prog_type, verdict, ktype; __s32 serial, ret; };

SEC("lsm/bpf_prog_load")
int BPF_PROG(admit, struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
             struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel)
{
        __u32 verdict = prog->aux->sig.verdict;
        __u32 ktype   = prog->aux->sig.keyring_type;
        __s32 serial  = prog->aux->sig.keyring_serial;
        struct decision *d;
        int ret = 0;

        if (kernel)
                return 0;                       /* trust in-kernel loads */

        if (verdict != BPF_SIG_VERIFIED) {
                ret = -EPERM;                   /* must be validly signed */
        } else switch (ktype) {
        case BPF_SIG_KEYRING_BPF:
                break;
        case BPF_SIG_KEYRING_USER:
                if (!bpf_map_lookup_elem(&staging_keys, &serial))
                        ret = -EPERM;
                break;
        default:
                ret = -EPERM;                   /* keyring not in policy */
        }

        d = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(&audit, sizeof(*d), 0);
        if (d) {
                d->prog_type = attr->prog_type;
                d->verdict = verdict;
                d->ktype = ktype;
                d->serial = serial;
                d->ret = ret;
                bpf_ringbuf_submit(d, 0);       /* record allow *and* deny */
        }
        return ret;
}

Such a policy is what makes a caller-supplied keyring usable at all on a system that does not boot with bpf.keyring_unsealed=1: the allowlist bounds which staged keys count, and the LSM itself has to protect them from being tampered with.

Observing a verified load: `security_bpf_prog()`¶

There is deliberately no separate “metadata attested” hook. The coverage check above is enforced by the kernel unconditionally, so a signed loader that fails to cover its metadata never loads and an LSM never has to re-establish that fact. To act on a program that has successfully and fully loaded, use the existing security_bpf_prog() hook (lsm/bpf_prog), which fires from bpf_prog_new_fd() - after the verifier, after the coverage check, and after bpf_prog_alloc_id(). Relative to the admission hook this point is strictly later and stronger:

the program has an id (prog->aux->id), so it can be recorded or correlated with later events;
verdict == BPF_SIG_VERIFIED here means fully verified - a program that used a map the signature does not cover was already rejected, so it cannot reach this point;
it observes only programs that actually loaded; a failed load never mints an fd, so it never reaches this hook.

It takes only the prog and a non-zero return still aborts (the fd is not handed out), so it can veto as well as observe. One wrinkle: it also fires on other paths that mint a new program fd - notably bpf_prog_get_fd_by_id() - not just on a fresh load. Because the program already has its id here, an LSM can tell the two apart with a small hash map: the first time an id is seen is the load; a later sighting of the same id is just another fd to a program that already exists.

To bound the map and let a reused id read as a fresh load, this can be paired with security_bpf_prog_free() (lsm/bpf_prog_free), which deletes the entry on teardown - keyed by the same prog pointer, since bpf_prog_free_id() has already cleared prog->aux->id to 0 by the time that hook runs. (Illustrative - privileged LSM, error checking elided.)

struct rec { __u32 id, ktype; __s32 serial; };

struct {
        __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
        __type(key, __u64);             /* struct bpf_prog * -- stable id */
        __type(value, struct rec);
        __uint(max_entries, 4096);
} live SEC(".maps");

SEC("lsm/bpf_prog")            /* fires after load and on every later fd */
int BPF_PROG(observe, struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
        __u64 key = (__u64)(unsigned long)prog;
        struct rec r;

        if (prog->aux->sig.verdict != BPF_SIG_VERIFIED)
                return 0;
        if (bpf_map_lookup_elem(&live, &key))
                return 0;               /* seen before: a later fd, not a load */

        /* First sighting == this program just loaded; id is valid here. */
        r.id     = prog->aux->id;
        r.ktype  = prog->aux->sig.keyring_type;
        r.serial = prog->aux->sig.keyring_serial;
        bpf_map_update_elem(&live, &key, &r, BPF_NOEXIST);
        /* ... newly-loaded verified-program action, e.g. record r.id ... */
        return 0;
}

Putting them together: to require verified BPF, deny at the admission hook unless the verdict is BPF_SIG_VERIFIED (and, if desired, restrict the keyring). The kernel then guarantees that any program which actually loads with that verdict covered all of its exclusive maps, rejecting any that did not - so a deny-by-default admission policy needs no second enforcement point. Use security_bpf_prog() to record or finally gate the verified programs once they carry an id. The verdict, keyring_type and keyring_serial fields let a policy distinguish “verified against the operator’s bpf keyring” from “verified against a keyring the loader supplied itself”, which is the distinction that matters most. A policy LSM such as IPE could consume the same hooks to enforce system policy without writing any BPF, though none implements this today.

Keyrings¶

keyring_id selects the trusted keyring the PKCS#7 signature is verified against. Four values are well-known; anything else is resolved as a caller- supplied key or keyring, named either by its serial or by one of the other KEY_SPEC_* ids:

`keyring_id`	Keyring
`0`	builtin trusted keyring
`VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING` (`1`)	secondary trusted keyring
`VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING` (`2`)	platform keyring
`KEY_SPEC_BPF_KEYRING` (`-9`)	the bpf keyring
anything else	a caller-supplied user/session key or keyring

The keyring is resolved first, before the signature bytes are examined, so a signature naming a keyring that cannot be used is rejected up front, and a failed verification aborts the load - a program that loads successfully with a signature therefore always has consistent keyring fields recorded.

The bpf keyring¶

A system keyring needs a kernel rebuild or a vouched-for enrollment to rotate a key, and grants BPF-signing trust to keys trusted for everything else in the kernel too. A caller-supplied keyring, at the other extreme, is filled by the very process that loads the program and so carries no trust of its own.

The bpf keyring fills that gap and is the trust anchor which a signed BPF deployment should be built on top of: a keyring named .bpf, selected with KEY_SPEC_BPF_KEYRING, that an operator provisions at boot with a key scoped to BPF program loading and nothing else in the kernel’s trust hierarchy. It is owned by the operator rather than by the loader, and rotatable across a reboot without touching the kernel image. It is modelled after the dm-verity keyring (see dm_verity.keyring_unsealed=) and provisioned the same way: an initrd runs the keyctl steps below before handing off to the rootfs.

Provisioning¶

The keyring is created during late_initcall and is sealed empty by default: it carries a reject-all restriction, so no key can ever be added and KEY_SPEC_BPF_KEYRING fails with -ENOKEY for the whole boot.

bpf.keyring_unsealed=1 leaves it unrestricted at init so the initrd can provision it. The keyring is not linked into any process keyring, but the KEY_SPEC_BPF_KEYRING special key id addresses it directly, so its serial does not have to be looked up first. Steps would be as follows:

keyctl padd asymmetric "" -9 < signing_key.der
keyctl restrict_keyring -9

Both steps are required: the keyring is consulted only once it is non-empty and restricted. An unrestricted keyring is ignored even when it holds keys, so a half-provisioned keyring is inert rather than a weaker trust anchor, and a load naming it fails with -ENOKEY and a verifier log. Restricting cannot be undone.

More than one key is enrolled by repeating the keyctl padd step; the restriction is applied once, after the last of them:

for key in /etc/bpf/keys/*.der; do
    keyctl padd asymmetric "" -9 < $key
done

keyctl restrict_keyring -9
keyctl show -9

The restriction bounds what can be added, never what can be taken away. A key that is already enrolled can still be unlinked, and the keyring cleared or revoked, by anything running as root. That does not weaken the anchor, since a keyring left empty is no longer consulted and a load naming it fails with -ENOKEY, but it does take signed loading out until the next boot. Dropping the user permissions the keyring no longer needs would close that; as a third step in the initrd:

keyctl setperm -9 0x08030000

What remains is KEY_POS_SEARCH for the in-kernel search during verification, plus KEY_USR_VIEW and KEY_USR_READ so the keyring stays visible in /proc/keys. KEY_SPEC_BPF_KEYRING names the keyring but conveys no rights of its own - the keyring is not possessed by anyone, so the KEY_POS_* bits are only ever reached by the in-kernel search, and userspace is left with what the KEY_USR_* bits grant. Once they are dropped, addressing it by the serial /proc/keys reports gets no further than the special id does.

Provisioning has to complete before control passes to the rootfs. The keyring takes any number of keys for as long as it is unrestricted, so it is the restriction that bounds the enrolled set, not the first enrollment. Before the initrd hands off control, it must therefore restrict the keyring after the last enrollment.

Enforcement¶

bpf.keyring_unsealed=1 states that the bpf keyring is the trust anchor for this boot, so it does more than unseal. From the first program load onwards a caller-supplied user/session keyring is refused with -EPERM and a verifier log message, whether or not provisioning ever completed. The system keyrings stay selectable.

Enforcement is readable at /sys/module/bpf/parameters/keyring_unsealed, and read-only there: the flag is __ro_after_init behind a 0444 parameter. It is also derived from the boot flag rather than from the keyring’s runtime state, so there is no window early in boot during which a caller-supplied keyring is still accepted.

Caller-supplied keyrings are for staging¶

A keyring_id naming a user or session key or keyring is a staging mechanism, not a trust anchor: it is filled by the same userspace that loads the program, so verifying against it establishes only that the loader signed what it loaded. Its purpose is to let software installed onto a running system - whose signing key is not enrolled anywhere yet - run signed until that key reaches the bpf keyring on the next boot.

A system that has committed to the bpf keyring refuses this path outright (see Enforcement). A system that has not can still allow it, but a policy must never treat BPF_SIG_KEYRING_USER as equivalent to the bpf or system keyrings; it should allowlist the specific serials it is willing to stage and pair that with a BPF LSM policy protecting those keys from tampering, as in Enforcement via LSMs.

Recorded fields¶

Two fields are recorded in prog->aux->sig for an LSM to inspect:

keyring_type (enum bpf_sig_keyring): Classified purely from keyring_id whenever the program is signed: BPF_SIG_KEYRING_BUILTIN, _SECONDARY, _PLATFORM for the system keyrings, _BPF for the bpf keyring, or _USER for a caller-supplied user/session keyring. It is BPF_SIG_KEYRING_NONE for an unsigned program.
keyring_serial (s32): Set only on a successful verification, to the serial of the caller-supplied key or keyring that keyring_id resolved to - the object the signature was verified against, not the individual asymmetric key inside it that matched the signer. Passing KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, for example, records the session keyring’s serial. The system keyrings and the bpf keyring are trusted as a whole and expose no serial here, so the serial is 0 for them, and 0 for unsigned programs. A non-zero keyring_serial is therefore exactly “verified against the caller-supplied key/keyring with this serial”, which is exactly the case a policy has to scrutinise.

`keyring_id`	`keyring_type`	`keyring_serial`
(no signature)	`BPF_SIG_KEYRING_NONE`	`0`
`0`	`BPF_SIG_KEYRING_BUILTIN`	`0`
`VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING`	`BPF_SIG_KEYRING_SECONDARY`	`0`
`VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING`	`BPF_SIG_KEYRING_PLATFORM`	`0`
`KEY_SPEC_BPF_KEYRING`	`BPF_SIG_KEYRING_BPF`	`0`
other (a caller-supplied key serial)	`BPF_SIG_KEYRING_USER`	serial of the resolved key/keyring

Producing and loading a signed object¶

Generating a signing key¶

Signing is algorithm agnostic: the algorithm comes from the X.509 certificate and the PKCS#7 SignerInfo. Anything the X.509 and PKCS#7 parsers understand works with no BPF-side change. Both examples below read the certificate request config from x509.genkey, for which certs/x509.genkey serves as a template (see Kernel module signing facility). RSA:

openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha256 -days 36500 -batch -x509 \
        -config x509.genkey -outform PEM \
        -out signing_key.pem -keyout signing_key.pem
openssl x509 -in signing_key.pem -outform der -out signing_key.der

ML-DSA-87 (FIPS-204), which needs openssl 3.5 or later, and both CONFIG_CRYPTO_MLDSA and CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512 in the kernel - the latter for the signedAttrs digest described below, which CONFIG_CRYPTO_MLDSA does not select. Note the absence of a digest option: ML-DSA hashes the message itself, so openssl ignores an explicit digest for it:

openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -days 36500 -batch -x509 \
        -newkey ML-DSA-87 -config x509.genkey -outform PEM \
        -out signing_key.pem -keyout signing_key.pem
openssl x509 -in signing_key.pem -outform der -out signing_key.der

bpftool handles the following internally: openssl before 4.0 cannot combine ML-DSA with CMS_NOATTR, so it falls back to signedAttrs, where only SHA-512 is permitted. This mirrors what module signing does as well.

Signing¶

bpftool generates and signs a light skeleton in one step:

bpftool gen skeleton -L -S -k signing_key.pem -i signing_key.der \
        obj.bpf.o > obj.lskel.h

-L selects the light-skeleton (gen_loader) backend and -S enables signing; -k and -i supply the signing key and its X.509 certificate. bpftool signs insns || metadata - the exact bytes the kernel reconstructs - and also computes excl_prog_hash as the digest of the loader instructions so the metadata map can be bound to the loader. The signature and hash are embedded in the generated header; the certificate is used only for signing and is not included.

Loading¶

The generated skeleton exposes keyring_id, which selects the keyring the kernel verifies against. Set it between open and load; loading then performs the create/populate/freeze/load sequence described above:

struct obj *skel = obj__open();

skel->keyring_id = KEY_SPEC_BPF_KEYRING;
err = obj__load(skel);

For the staging case the same object is loaded against a keyring the caller populated itself, which only works on a system that has not set bpf.keyring_unsealed=1:

/*
 * Staging only: this keyring is under the loader's own control and
 * carries no trust of its own. See "Caller-supplied keyrings are for
 * staging".
 */
key_id = add_key("asymmetric", "", der, der_sz, KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
skel->keyring_id = KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING;
err = obj__load(skel);

Either way the trusted public key must already be in the chosen keyring for verification to succeed. For the bpf keyring that enrollment happens once at boot, see Provisioning.

UAPI reference¶

BPF_PROG_LOAD (union bpf_attr):

signature, signature_size: Pointer to and length of the PKCS#7 signature blob.
keyring_id: Trusted keyring selector (see Keyrings).
fd_array, fd_array_cnt: Array of map (and module BTF) file descriptors bound to the program. fd_array_cnt must be set for the kernel to scan the array. When a signature is present, a BTF entry is rejected outright, and every map must be exclusive; its frozen contents are folded into the verified buffer, and a non-exclusive entry is rejected.

BPF_MAP_CREATE (union bpf_attr):

excl_prog_hash, excl_prog_hash_size: SHA-256 digest of the program permitted to access this (exclusive) map. This binds the metadata map to the loader; it is not a hash of the map content. The map content is not hashed separately at all - it is covered, as bytes, by the program signature.

Kernel command line:

bpf.keyring_unsealed=: Set to 1 to leave the bpf keyring unsealed for provisioning, and to make it the only non-system keyring a loader may select for the rest of the boot (see The bpf keyring).

Notes and limitations¶

The instructions plus folded metadata are verified as one bpf_dynptr, which bounds the combined size (currently ~16 MiB); very large objects can exceed it.
The metadata container is a single-element array map, accessed through map_direct_value_addr.
The bpf keyring needs CONFIG_KEYS; without it there is no bpf keyring and KEY_SPEC_BPF_KEYRING never resolves.

The Linux Kernel

Contents

This Page

BPF signing¶

Motivation¶

The trusted loader¶

Why the loader is signable when the program is not¶

Load-time verification¶

The verdict¶

Enforcement via LSMs¶

Admission: `security_bpf_prog_load()`¶

Observing a verified load: `security_bpf_prog()`¶

Keyrings¶

The bpf keyring¶

Provisioning¶

Enforcement¶

Caller-supplied keyrings are for staging¶

Recorded fields¶

Producing and loading a signed object¶

Generating a signing key¶

Signing¶

Loading¶

UAPI reference¶

Notes and limitations¶

BPF signing¶

Motivation¶

The trusted loader¶

Why the loader is signable when the program is not¶

Load-time verification¶

The verdict¶

Enforcement via LSMs¶

Admission: security_bpf_prog_load()¶

Observing a verified load: security_bpf_prog()¶

Keyrings¶

The bpf keyring¶

Provisioning¶

Enforcement¶

Caller-supplied keyrings are for staging¶

Recorded fields¶

Producing and loading a signed object¶

Generating a signing key¶

Signing¶

Loading¶

UAPI reference¶

Notes and limitations¶

Admission: `security_bpf_prog_load()`¶

Observing a verified load: `security_bpf_prog()`¶